CALVIN FLOURNOY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-11-24
No. 2D09-4177
CASANUEVA, C.J., and LaROSE, J„ Concur.
47 So. 3d 403 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Calvin Flournoy appeals his conviction and sentences, arguing the trial court violated his right to self-representation by denying his unequivocal request without conducting a Faretta inquiry. The court holds that even where a Faretta inquiry might appear futile due to the defendant's conduct, the trial court must still conduct the inquiry to make an appropriate determination before denying self-representation.


Holding

The trial court's failure to conduct a Faretta hearing upon an unequivocal request for self-representation constitutes per se reversible error. Although a court may preclude self-representation after making an appropriate determination through a Faretta inquiry, the seeming futility of such an inquiry does not eliminate the requirement that a hearing be held.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must conduct a Faretta inquiry when a defendant makes an unequivocal request to represent himself.

[2] The potential futility of a Faretta inquiry does not eliminate the requirement that a hearing be held to determine if a defendant can represent himself.

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Key Quotes

“the seeming futility of a trial court's Faretta inquiry 'does not eliminate the requirement that a hearing be held to enable the trial court to make the appropriate determination of whether a defendant can represent himself.'”

Establishes the core holding that a Faretta hearing is mandatory despite potential futility

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Facts & Procedural History

Flournoy made an unequivocal request to represent himself during trial. The trial court denied this request without holding a Faretta hearing or inqui…

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Opinion of the Court
CRENSHAW, Judge.

CRENSHAW, Judge.

Calvin Flournoy appeals his judgment and sentences and argues that the trial court erred by denying his unequivocal request to represent himself without conducting an inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The State contends that any Faretta inquiry would be futile because Flournoy failed to demonstrate during the pendency of his trial that he had the ability to exercise the necessary restraint to represent himself. See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008) (recognizing Faretta and later cases “have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute”); see also Tennis v. State, 997 So.2d 375, 378 (Fla.2008) (acknowledging that in “certain instances a defendant may be precluded from exercising his or her right to proceed pro se after the trial court conducts a Faretta inquiry”). However, the seeming futility of a trial court’s Faretta inquiry “does not eliminate the requirement that a hearing be held to enable the trial court to make the appropriate determination of whether a defendant can represent himself.” Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378-79. Flournoy’s request for self-representation was unequivocal; consequently, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing resulted in per se reversible error, and our review is not amenable to a harmless error analysis. See Tennis, 997 So.2d at 379; State v. Young, 626 So.2d 655, 656-57 (Fla.1993); Goldsmith v. State, 937 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Accordingly, because the trial court failed to conduct any Faret-ta inquiry and because we are constrained by the language in Tennis, Young, and Goldsmith, we reverse Flournoy’s judgment and sentences and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and LaROSE, J„ Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Trenton M. Herron v. State, 113 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
    …epresent himself. Because the trial court committed per se reversible error in failing to hold a hearing on the motion, “our review is not amenable to a harmless error analysis,” and we must reverse and remand for a new trial. See Flournoy v. State, 47 So. 3d 403, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Cruz v. State, 59 So. 3d 322, 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). In conjunction with his claim that the court failed to conduct a Faretta inquiry, Herron also argues that the court committed per se reversible error in failing to condu…
  • Betts v. State, 157 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
    …reversible error.2 See State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993) (“We conclude that the United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta and our rule 3.111(d) require a reversal when there is not a proper Far-etta inquiry.”); Flournoy v. State, 47 So. 3d 403, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Flournoy’s request for self-representation was unequivocal; consequently, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing resulted in per se reversible error, and our review is not amenable to a harmless error analysis.…
  • Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …Id. (quoting McCray, 71 So. 3d at 864); accord Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). “ ‘[O]ur review is not amenable to a harmless error analysis,’ and we must reverse and remand for a new trial.” Id. (quoting Flournoy v. State, 47 So. 3d 403, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). We note that contrary to the implied assertion of the trial court, a written motion to proceed pro se is not required. Oral invocations of the right to self-representation are sufficient to warrant a Faret-ta inquiry provi…

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