LOUIS BRYANT, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-11-17
No. 2D09-2156
CASANUEVA, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur.
47 So. 3d 952 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Louis Bryant appeals his convictions for delivery and possession of cocaine, challenging the admissibility of evidence related to a twenty-dollar bill and various fines and costs imposed at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the convictions but remanded for correction of a scrivener's error in the judgment and struck certain improperly imposed fines while upholding mandatory costs.


Holding

The court found no merit in Bryant's evidentiary challenge. The court affirmed the crime prevention cost and prosecution cost as properly imposed, struck the $500 fine and $25 surcharge as not properly pronounced orally at sentencing, and remanded the case for correction of a scrivener's error in the judgment describing count I.


Headnotes

[1] A scrivener's error in a written judgment may be corrected on appeal.

[2] A discretionary fine imposed under section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes, must be pronounced orally at sentencing to be valid.

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Key Quotes

“Fines under this section are discretionary and must be pronounced orally at sentencing.”

Establishes the requirement that discretionary fines must be orally pronounced, supporting the court's decision to strike the $500 fine.

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Facts & Procedural History

Louis Bryant was convicted of delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $500 fine pursuant to section 77…

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Opinion of the Court
LaROSE, Judge.

LaROSE, Judge.

Louis Bryant, Jr., appeals his convictions and sentences for delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. We find no merit in Mr. Bryant’s argument that the trial court should have excluded evidence relating to the twenty-dollar bill used to buy cocaine. We write, however, to address a scrivener’s error in the judgment and the trial court’s imposition of certain costs and fines.

Mr. Bryant argues, and the State concedes, that the written judgment erroneously describes count I as delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a church. We agree and remand for correction of this scrivener’s error. See Dennis v. State, 917 So.2d 288, 288-89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Mr. Bryant challenges two fines and two costs imposed by the trial court. He filed a motion to correct sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) to *953preserve these issues. The trial court did not rule on the motion within sixty days; thus, it is deemed denied. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Watts v. State, 973 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We strike the fines but affirm the costs.

The written judgment includes a $500 fine pursuant to section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes (2007). Fines under this section are discretionary and must be pronounced orally at sentencing. Dadds v. State, 946 So.2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). We strike the $500 fine because the trial court failed to pronounce it orally. See Perdue v. State, 17 So.3d 1283, 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Masengale v. State, 969 So.2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

The written judgment also includes an additional five percent surcharge on the $500 fine in the amount of $25, pursuant to section 938.04, Florida Statutes (2007). Because the $500 fine was not properly imposed, the $25 surcharge must also be stricken. See Perdue, 17 So.3d at 1283; Masengale, 969 So.2d at 1219; Dadds, 946 So.2d at 1130.

Mr. Bryant challenges a $50 crime prevention cost imposed pursuant to section 775.083(2).1 He argues that this cost is discretionary and must be pronounced orally. However, the statute provides that the court “shall” assess this cost. Id. Therefore, it is a mandatory cost that the trial court need not pronounce orally. See Anderson v. State, 739 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating that trial court need not orally pronounce mandatory costs). We affirm the crime prevention court cost.

Finally, Mr. Bryant contests the imposition of a $150 prosecution cost pursuant to section 938.27. He claims that the State neither requested nor documented the cost item.2 Mr. Bryant did not object at the sentencing hearing when the trial court orally pronounced the prosecution cost. Thus, he has not preserved this issue for our review. See Rivera v. State, 34 So.3d 207, 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding rule 3.800(b)(2) motion will not preserve imposition of prosecution costs for review where the trial court orally pronounces them); Norman v. State, 676 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We affirm the imposition of the prosecution cost.

We affirm Mr. Bryant’s convictions and sentences but remand for entry of a corrected judgment and sentence as addressed in this opinion.

Affirmed and remanded.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Clussman v. State, 89 So. 3d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …3(1), Florida Statutes (2010), and an accompanying $50 surcharge pursuant to section 938.04, Florida Statutes (2010), in each case. Fines under section 775.083(1) are discretionary, and “must be pronounced orally at sentencing.” See Bryant v. State, 47 So. 3d 952, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Dadds v. State, 946 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). The trial court’s “lump sum” pronouncement of all costs and fines was not sufficient. See Nix v. State, 84 So. 3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Accordingly,…
  • Caldwell v. State, 125 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2010), without also imposing a fine. The crime prevention cost is mandatory and must be imposed regardless of whether or not the defendant was required to pay fines under a separate statutory basis. See Bryant v. State, 47 So. 3d 952, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). We also find no error in the trial court’s failure to refer to the specific statutory authority for imposing costs in the written order. See Johnson v. State, 944 So. 2d 474, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that the trial…
  • Kent v. State, 134 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …tion of the written sentence. Appellant next argues that the lump-sum imposition of discretionary fines and costs was erroneous. While mandatory costs may be imposed in a lump-sum amount, discretionary fines must be orally imposed. Bryant v. State, 47 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). We therefore reverse the imposition of the $1,000 fine and attendant five percent surcharge and $20 court cost. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. WOLF, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., concur. . Appellant moved for correct…

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