CATHERINE CLUSSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that sentences containing illegal terms, unpronounced probation conditions, and unpronounced fines and surcharges must be corrected.
[1] A sixty-month prison sentence is the maximum legal term for a third-degree felony.
[2] Special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing and cannot be imposed at resentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCatherine Clussman appealed judgments and sentences in three consolidated criminal cases. The sentences included sixty-month prison terms for third-de…
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Catherine Clussman appeals judgments and sentences in three consolidated cases. We approve the judgments, but agree that the sentences contain several errors, and reverse and remand with instructions to enter corrected written sentences and orders of probation. Ms. Clussman preserved the necessary points by filing motions pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
First, the sentences imposed in count II of each case — sixty months in prison followed by two years of probation — are illegal, because Ms. Clussman was convicted of third-degree felonies in each of these counts. A sixty-month term of imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the trial court could have legally imposed for a third-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). The state concedes error on this point.
Next, the trial court did not orally pronounce special conditions of probation 3 and 20 at sentencing. They must therefore be stricken from the written order of probation. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla.1996) (holding “special conditions of probation must be imposed at sentencing and may not be imposed at resentencing”).
Finally, the trial court erred by imposing a $1000 fine pursuant to section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes (2010), and an accompanying $50 surcharge pursuant to section 938.04, Florida Statutes (2010), in each case. Fines under section 775.083(1) are discretionary, and “must be pronounced orally at sentencing.” See Bryant v. State, 47 So.3d 952, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Dadds v. State, 946 So.2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). The trial court’s “lump sum” pronouncement of all costs and fines was not sufficient. See Nix v. State, 84 So.3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to strike, in each case, the probationary terms on each count II, the special conditions of probation 3 and 20, and the $1000 fine and accompanying $50 surcharge.
BENTON, C.J., THOMAS, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Snow v. State, 157 So. 3d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…ounced at sentenc [*562] ing. Those conditions not orally pronounced' at sentencing must be stricken because double jeopardy principles prevent them from being imposed at resen-tencing. Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996); Clussman v. State, 89 So. 3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court strike those special conditions of sex offender probation not orally pronounced at sentencing. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with…
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Levandoski v. State, 245 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 2018)…unced at sentencing. Those conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken because double jeopardy principles prevent them from being imposed at resentencing. [*651] Justice v. State , 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996) ; Clussman v. State , 89 So. 3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Snow I , 157 So. 3d at 561-62. Beyond Snow I , this Court has made clear that "special conditions, which are those not specifically authorized by statute, must be orally pronounced at sentencing before they can be placed…
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Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…isonment with a ten-year mandatory minimum followed by life probation. In his motion to correct illegal sentence, he argued that by the addition of life probation, his sentences exceeded the statutory maximum and were illegal. See Clussman v. State, 89 So. 3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing for the striking of the probationary terms of Clussman’s sentences because when they were added to her terms of imprisonment, her sentences exceeded the statutory maximum). Parks correctly noted that a sentence m…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)
- NIX v. State, 84 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
- Dadds v. State, 946 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Bryant v. State, 47 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)