DONNA LAVERE-ALVARO, APPELLANT,
v.
SYPRETT, MESHAD, RESNICK, LIEB, DUMBAUGH, JONES, KROTEC & WESTHEIMER, P.A., APPELLEE
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LaVere-Alvaro appeals a trial court judgment imposing charging and retaining liens in favor of her former attorneys for fees and costs in a divorce action. The appellate court reversed the charging lien because the trial court failed to determine whether the attorneys' services produced a positive judgment or settlement, and reversed the retaining lien as premature because the client's ownership interest in the property had not been established.
The trial court erred in imposing the charging lien because it failed to determine whether the attorneys' services produced a positive judgment or settlement for LaVere-Alvaro, as required by law. The trial court also erred in imposing the retaining lien because LaVere-Alvaro's ownership interest in the property that the firm sought to retain had not yet been established, making the lien premature.
[1] A charging lien in favor of an attorney requires a determination that the attorney's services produced a positive judgment or settlement for the client.
[2] A retaining lien is premature when the client's ownership interest in the property subject to the lien has not yet been established.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.”
Establishes the definition and nature of a charging lien in attorney-client relationships.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonna LaVere-Alvaro retained Syprett law firm to represent her in a dissolution of marriage action. The parties entered into a retainer agreement. The…
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Donna LaVere-Alvaro appeals a judgment imposing a charging lien in favor of her former counsel, Syprett, Meshad, Res-nick, Lieb, Dumbaugh, Jones, Krotec & Westheimer, P.A. (Syprett), for attorney’s fees and costs incurred during its representation of LaVere-Alvaro in a dissolution of marriage action. The judgment also awarded Syprett a retaining lien on all of LaVere-Alvaro’s property in its possession. We find the trial court erred by entering the charging lien because it failed to determine whether Syprett provided services that produced a positive judgment or settlement for LaVere-Alvaro. Likewise, the entry of the retaining lien was premature because LaVere-Alvaro’s ownership interest in the property that Sy-prett sought to retain had not yet been established. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the remainder of LaV-ere-Alvaro’s issues without discussion.
“The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that *1058particular suit.” Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1384 (Fla.1983). In this instance, the trial court summarily determined that LaVere-Alvaro was obligated to pay for all services rendered by Syprett pursuant to a retainer agreement previously entered into by the parties. Yet, “ ‘[i]t is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services.’ ” Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Correa v. Christensen, 780 So.2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). Because the trial court failed to find that Syprett’s services benefitted LaVere-Alvaro, we find the trial court erred by imposing the charging lien.
The trial court also erred by entering a retaining lien in favor of Syprett.1 Because LaVere-Alvaro’s ownership interest in the property that Syprett sought to retain had yet to be determined, a retaining lien attaching the property was premature. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
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Cited By
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Pickle v. Hale (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…under the contingent fee agreement, Pickle needed to identify tangible benefits from his attorney’s services, such as a positive judgment or settlement. See LaVere-Alvaro v. Syprett, Meshad, Resnick, Lieb, Dumbaugh, Jones, Krotec & Westheimer, P.A., 54 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). But Pickle received no tangible benefit from the voluntary dismissal. Instead, dismissal of the lawsuit left the parties as though no action had been brought. See Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 32 (Fla. 2013) (quoting…
Authorities Cited
- Sinclair v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983)
- Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Franz Edward Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Foreman v. Behr, 866 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Brickell Place Condo Ass'n, Inc. v. Joseph H. Ganguzza & Assocs., P.A., 31 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- Boroff v. The BIC Corp., 718 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)