HILARY KATES, SUSAN ZEITLIN AND NANCY WOLIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
BAYLA LIFTER, AARON LIFTER, AND HOWARD LUCAS, TRUSTEE OF THE BENNETT M. LIFTER AMENDED AND RESTATED REVOCABLE TRUST, APPELLEES
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The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's decision prohibiting a trustee from making improper "sweetheart" loans from a trust and corporation to beneficiary-shareholders. The court rejected appellants' argument that the probate court lacked jurisdiction, holding that circuit court judges possess full jurisdiction over both probate and non-probate matters regardless of which division they sit in.
The circuit court had complete jurisdiction over both the trust and corporate aspects of the litigation regardless of which division it was sitting in, and appellants' argument that a separate non-probate proceeding was required was rejected as judicial wheel-spinning.
[1] A circuit court judge possesses the full jurisdiction of the circuit court, regardless of the division in which the judge is sitting.
[2] The abolition of the County Judges' Court and the transfer of its jurisdiction to the circuit court renders prior case law based on the existence of a separate probate co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“every judge of the circuit court possesses the full jurisdiction of that court in his of her circuit and that the various divisions of that court operate in multi-judge circuits for the convenience of the litigants and for the efficiency of the administration of the circuits' judicial business.”
Establishes that circuit court divisions do not limit judicial jurisdiction, only provide administrative convenience
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHoward Lucas served as trustee of the Bennett M. Lifter Amended and Restated Revocable Trust and as president and sole director of Bennett M. Lifter, …
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Affirmed.
(specially concurring).
The trial court ruled that Howard Lucas, the trustee of the Bennett M. Lifter Amended and Restated Revocable Trust and the president and sole director of Bennett M. Lifter, Inc., may not proceed on behalf of either entity in either capacity from making “sweetheart” three percent loans of up to a million dollars each to the uncreditworthy appellants who are both beneficiaries of the trust and shareholders in the corporation. The merits of this conclusion, which are virtually self-evident, were not seriously challenged before us. Relying on Gettinger v. Gettinger, 165 So.2d 757 (Fla.1964), and like cases, the appellants argue, however, that the “probate court” had no authority over the corporation, and that a new and different proceeding in a “non-probate court” must be initiated and prosecuted to achieve the same result. Since I agree that adopting this position would represent judicial wheel-spinning at its finest, I concur in its rejection.
The basis for my vote is that the judge of the circuit court who made the decision on review had complete jurisdiction over both aspects of the existing litigation and that it does not matter in which division of the court he happened to find himself. As this Court has stated:
[Ejvery judge of the circuit court possesses the full jurisdiction of that court in his of her circuit and that the various divisions of that court operate in multi-judge circuits for the convenience of the litigants and for the efficiency of the administration of the circuits’ judicial business.
Maugeri v. Plourde, 396 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see Baudanza v. Baudanza, 78 So.3d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). In other words, there is no such thing as “a” or “the” Florida Probate Court with the limited jurisdiction the appellants argue is fatal to the order on review. The decisions which represent this position are based on Gettinger. But that case was decided in 1964, when there was a “probate court” in Florida, the County Judges’ Court. While it is understandable in view of the well-known judicial tendency to cling resolutely to the past, Parker v. Shullman, 906 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review denied, 915 So.2d 1196 (Fla.2005), for example, overlooked that, as recently as 1973, the County Judges’ Court was abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the circuit court. See Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla. Const. (Rev. 1972). I believe that this fact renders Gettinger obsolete and more modern authority which follows it incorrect.
SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge
(specially concurring).
The trial court ruled that Howard Lucas, the trustee of the Bennett M. Lifter Amended and Restated Revocable Trust and the president and sole director of Bennett M. Lifter, Inc., may not proceed on behalf of either entity in either capacity from making “sweetheart” three percent loans of up to a million dollars each to the uncreditworthy appellants who are both beneficiaries of the trust and shareholders in the corporation. The merits of this conclusion, which are virtually self-evident, were not seriously challenged before us. Relying on Gettinger v. Gettinger, 165 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1964), and like cases, the appellants argue, however, that the “probate court” had no authority over the corporation, and that a new and different proceeding in a “non-probate court” must be initiated and prosecuted to achieve the same result. Since I agree that adopting this position would represent judicial wheel-spinning at its finest, I concur in its rejection.
The basis for my vote is that the judge of the circuit court who made the decision on review had complete jurisdiction over both aspects of the existing litigation and that it does not matter in which division of the court he happened to find himself. As this Court has stated:
[Ejvery judge of the circuit court possesses the full jurisdiction of that court in his of her circuit and that the various divisions of that court operate in multi-judge circuits for the convenience of the litigants and for the efficiency of the administration of the circuits’ judicial business.
Maugeri v. Plourde, 396 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see Baudanza v. Baudanza, 78 So. 3d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). In other words, there is no such thing as “a” or “the” Florida Probate Court with the limited jurisdiction the appellants argue is fatal to the order on review. The decisions which represent this position are based on Gettinger. But that case was decided in 1964, when there was a “probate court” in Florida, the County Judges’ Court. While it is understandable in view of the well-known judicial tendency to cling resolutely to the past, Parker v. Shullman, 906 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review denied, 915 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.2005), for example, overlooked that, as recently as 1973, the County Judges’ Court was abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the circuit court. See Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla. Const. (Rev. 1972). I believe that this fact renders Gettinger obsolete and more modern authority which follows it incorrect.
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Sonnett Humes v. Haresh Solanki, M.D., 305 So. 3d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…st practice to a mechanical, rigid rule in civil cases. First, in many cases like this case, the majority’s new bright-line rule elevates form over substance and accomplishes little more than “judicial wheel-spinning at its finest.” Kates v. Lifter, 84 So. 3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (Schwartz, J. concurring). More fundamentally, the federal and Florida Constitutions and laws afford trial judges much greater levels of discretion than appellate courts for good reason. A trial judge’s discretion is neces…
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Asous v. In re The Guardianship OF J.L. & M.L., 128 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…accounting for the funds held by Ms. Asous for the time between her discharge as guardian through the time the probate court re-opened the case and Ms. Asous then transferred funds to the trust account of Ms. Asous’s attorney. .See Kates v. Lifter, 84 So. 3d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (Schwartz, Senior Judge, concurring).…
Authorities Cited
- Maugeri v. Plourde, 396 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Gurley v. State, 915 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 2005)
- Gettinger v. Gettinger, 165 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1964)
- Lemuel Anderson v. City OF Miami, 165 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1964)
- Lauri F. Parker v. Shullman, 906 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Baudanza v. Baudanza, 78 So. 3d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)