ATLANTIC CIVIL, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
EDWIN O. SWIFT, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Defendants' unjustified denial of access to plaintiff's stored fill material constituted conversion, requiring judgment in plaintiff's favor for the established value of the material.
Unjustified and deliberate denial of access to a chattel stored on another's land by mutual agreement constitutes conversion requiring judgment for its established value.
[1] Intentional denial of access to a chattel lawfully stored on another's land by mutual agreement constitutes conversion when the possessor seeks to retrieve it.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“one who is under a duty to admit to his land a possessor of a chattel who is seeking to obtain it has effectively dispossessed the other of his chattel if he refuses him access to it”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 221 cmt. e, cited for the principle that denial of access to stored property constitutes dispossession
Atlantic Civil stored a large quantity of fill material used in road construction on Swift's land by mutual agreement, but Swift unjustifiably and del…
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As a matter of law, the defendants’ unjustified and deliberate denial of access to what all agreed was the plaintiff appellant’s property, a large quantity of “fill” used in road construction, which had been stored on the appellee’s land by mutual agreement, constituted a conversion of that material which required the entry of a judgment in the appellant’s favor for its established value. See Thomas v. Hertz Corp., 890 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Warshall v. Price, 629 So.2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Seymour v. Adams, 638 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 223 (1965); § 221 (“A dispossession may be committed by intentionally ... barring the possessor’s access to a chattel.”); § 221 cmt. e (“[Ojne who is under a duty to admit to his land a possessor of a chattel who is seeking to obtain it has effectively dispossessed the other of his chattel if he refuses him access to it.”); § 222 cmt. a. (“Normally any dispossession is so clearly a serious interference with the right of control that it amounts to a conversion; and it is frequently said that any dispossession is a conversion.”)
Accordingly, the judgment in the defendants’ favor rendered after a non-jury trial below is to that extent reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment for the plaintiff upon computing the amount of material converted at $25.75 per ton.
There is no other error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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Atl. Civil, Inc. v. Swift, 271 So. 3d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…ted, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Swift and Key Haven not liable on all counts and entered final judgment in their favor. Atlantic Civil appealed the final judgment to this Court in Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift, 118 So. 3d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). This Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Atlantic Civil established its claim for conversion as a matter of law, and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of Atlantic Civil. Id. at 271. On remand, the tr…
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Atlantic Civil v. Swift III (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- Seymour v. Adams, 638 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Warshall v. Price, 629 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Thomas v. HERTZ Corp., 890 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)