GEORGE COPELAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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George Copeland appealed the denial of his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, arguing that sentencing him to thirty years as a habitual felony offender violated Florida law which he claimed mandated a life sentence. The court affirmed the denial, clarifying that sentencing under HFO and HVFO statutes is permissive rather than mandatory, and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
Sentencing under both the HFO and HVFO statutes is permissive, not mandatory. The sentencing court has discretion to impose a sentence less than life when sentencing a defendant as an HFO for a first-degree felony, and therefore the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Copeland to thirty years.
[1] Sentencing under Florida's habitual felony offender (HFO) and habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) statutes is permissive, not mandatory.
[2] A sentencing court has discretion when imposing a sentence under Florida's habitual felony offender (HFO) statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“sentencing under both the HVFO and HFO statutes is permissive, not mandatory”
The court's primary holding clarifying the nature of HFO sentencing authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCopeland was convicted of a first-degree felony and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (HFO) to thirty years in prison. He subsequently filed a m…
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George Copeland appeals the order summarily denying his motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a). Although we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Copeland’s motion as successive and without merit, we write to address Copeland’s misplaced reliance on Shingler v. State, 74 So.3d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
In his motion, Copeland asserts that because he was sentenced for committing a first-degree felony as a habitual felony offender (HFO), the circuit court was obligated to impose a life sentence under section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). According to Copeland, it follows that because the circuit court sentenced him to thirty years in prison, it failed to impose a legal sentence. He contends that he cannot be sentenced as an HFO upon re-sentencing and that his sentence must therefore be vacated, thus entitling him to immediate release. To support his claim, Copeland primarily relies on the following quote from Shingler: “On its face, this sentence is unlawful. In the case of a felony of the first degree, section 775.084(4)(b)l., mandates a life sentence; it does not authorize the imposition of a term-of-years sentence.” Id. at 172.
Shingler does not apply to Copeland’s case because Shingler specifically addresses the application of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), to a defendant convicted of a first-degree felony committed when he was sixteen years old and sentenced to life in prison as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) under section 775.084(4)(b)(l). However, we write to clarify that sentencing under both the HVFO and HFO statutes is permissive, not mandatory. King v. State, 681 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1996), receded from on other grounds by Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001); Allen v. State, 599 So.2d 996, 997 (Fla.1992) (holding that maximum sentences in HFO statutes are permissive); Stephens v. State, 974 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that the sentencing court has discretion when imposing an HFO sentence); Pankhurst v. State, 796 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore it was within the sentencing court’s discretion under section 775.084 to sentence Copeland to a thirty-year sentence as an HFO rather than to a life sentence.
Affirmed.
KELLY and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
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Cited By
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Span v. State, 145 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
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McCLOUD v. State, 202 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
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Harris v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
Authorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Graham v. Florida (1st Cir. 2010)
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- O'Riley v. State, 974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Allen v. State, 599 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1992)
- Collazo v. Moore, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Kirby Sylvester Shingler v. State, 74 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)