HARVEY C. BROOKS III, APPELLANT,
v.
DAWN E. WALKER-BROOKS, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2013-08-23
No. 1D12-3780
BENTON, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.
119 So. 3d 552 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2013) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Harvey Brooks appealed a family court order denying his venue change request and awarding $600 in attorney's fees to his wife's counsel. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the trial court held an unnoticed hearing violating due process and that the fee award lacked required findings regarding hourly rate, hours expended, and other statutory factors.


Holding

The trial court violated procedural due process by conducting an unnoticed hearing, and the denial of the venue change motion must be reversed and remanded. Additionally, the $600 attorney's fee award must be reversed because the order failed to include specific findings regarding hourly rate, hours expended, and other statutory factors required by Florida law.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court order must be reversed where a party is deprived of procedural due process by not receiving notice of a hearing.

[2] Procedural due process requires both fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard before judgment is entered.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“procedural due process requires both fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard before judgment is entered”

Establishes the foundational due process requirement violated by the unnoticed hearing

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The trial court held a hearing attended only by Appellee's counsel, Michael Weinstock. Appellant Harvey Brooks received no notice of this hearing, as …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Harvey C. Brooks, makes two arguments on appeal. First, that the trial court erred in denying his request to change venue. Second, that the trial court erred in awarding $600 in attorneys’ fees to Michael Weinstock, Appellee’s counsel. Because (i) the trial court held an unnoticed hearing at which only Mr. Weinstock appeared, and (ii) the resulting order did not set forth any specific findings regarding the fee award, we reverse.

As to Appellant’s first issue, “[procedural due process requires both fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard before judgment is entered.” Owens v. Owens, 14 So.3d 1093, 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Where a party receives no notice, it has been deprived of due process and the underlying order must be reversed. Owens v. Owens, 14 So.3d 1093, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); see also Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 693 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“Failure to give notice of a hearing to the opposing party absent a true emergency deprives the opposing party of its right to procedural due process.”).

In this case, the trial court clearly held a hearing, attended by only Appellee’s counsel; this is evidenced throughout the final order. Yet, as Appellant argues, nothing in the record or court docket report evinces Appellant was notified of this hearing. In fact, nothing in the record or court docket report, other than the trial court’s disclosure in its order, evinces a hearing was held. Appellee, after warning from this Court, has failed to file an answer brief to refute or explain these facts or contest that a due process violation occurred. Thus, on the record before us, we reverse the trial court’s denial and remand for further proceedings.1

As to the attorneys’ fees issue, an award of attorneys’ fees must “set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors.” Ingram v. Ingram, 59 So.3d 147, 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985)); see also Giltex Corp. v. Diehl, 583 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Here, the order does not state a reasonable hourly rate or the number of hours Appellee’s counsel expended. The order also does not contain any findings that Appellant has the means to pay the award or that Appellee cannot do so herself. Moreover, there is no transcript or other support in the record with which to sustain the trial court’s award of $600. Simply, neither the trial court’s order nor the record contains a scintilla of evidence *554to support the conclusory sum granted to Appellee’s counsel. The award of attorneys’ fees must therefore be reversed.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the order on appeal and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings.

BENTON, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw