THOMAS A. SUFFIELD, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Thomas Suffield appealed a summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming he was improperly sentenced as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) for burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery. The court agreed, holding that while burglary with assault qualifies for PRR sentencing under the catch-all provision, burglary with battery does not, and remanded for resentencing.
Suffield is entitled to resentencing because he does not qualify as a PRR. While burglary of a conveyance with assault qualifies under the PRR statute's catch-all provision covering felonies involving the use or threat of physical force, burglary with battery does not, because battery does not necessarily involve the threat or use of force or violence.
[1] A conviction for burglary of a conveyance with a battery does not qualify a defendant for Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the catch-all provision for fe…
[2] A conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault qualifies a defendant for Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the catch-all provision for felonies…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“while burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying PRR offense under Hackley, burglary with a battery is not”
Establishes the critical distinction in PRR sentencing eligibility between assault and battery convictions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSuffield was convicted of two counts, including Count 1: Burglary of an Occupied Conveyance with Assault or Battery. The trial court sentenced him to …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Assault Definition cases and more on FLexlaw
Thomas A. Suffield, Jr. appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800 motion. He alleges that his sentence is illegal because the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) on Count 1 (Burglary of an Occupied Conveyance with Assault or Battery) in a two-count conviction where he does not qualify as a PRR. See § 775.028(9)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (2001). The State properly concedes that Suffield is entitled to resentencing.
Suffield argues that a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery does not qualify for PRR sentencing pursuant to Gorham v. State, 988 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding resentencing was required where defendant was sentenced as a PRR for burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery where offense did not qualify for PRR sentencing), and Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (remanding for full resentencing hearing where defendant did not qualify for PRR designation in sentencing of burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery). The trial court, in its order of denial, surmised that State v. Hackley, 95 So.3d 92 (Fla.2012), overruled Gorham and Tum-blin where it held that burglary with an assault qualifies a defendant as a PRR under the catch-all provision of section 725.082(9)(a)(l)(o)(“Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual”). However, as the State points out in response to this Court’s order to show cause, while burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying PRR offense under Hackley, burglary with a battery is not. See Hackley, 95 So.3d at 95 (“The First District correctly concluded that ... burglary of a conveyance with a battery is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute”). Hackley explains that:
An assault — by definition — always includes the threat to do violence. § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). Battery, on the other hand, does not necessarily involve the threat or use of force or violence. § 784.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Hearns, 961 So.2d at 218. The Legislature could rationally have intended — as the plain language of the PRR statute suggests — to subject a defendant to PRR sentencing for committing a felony that necessarily involves violence or the threat of violence, but not for a felony that can be committed without violence or the threat of violence.
Id. at 96. Where Suffield was convicted of burglary with an assault or battery and improperly sentenced as a PRR on Count 1, we conclude that he is entitled to resen-tencing and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded for resentenc-ing.
DAMOORGIAN, C.J., LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Plain v. State, 141 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…make that finding was not harmless under the circumstances of this case. Appellant has demonstrated that his mandatory life sentence as a prison release reoffender for burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery is illegal. Suffield v. State, 132 So. 3d 333, 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Tumblin v. State, 965 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). We remand for resentencing. Reversed and Remanded for Resentenc-ing. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.…
-
Crosley v. State, 247 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
-
Theiss v. State, 152 So. 3d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…3.800(a) motion challenging the legality of his life sentence for burglary with assault or battery under the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute. § 775.082(9)(a)l.o., Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The motion was legally sufficient under Suffield v. State, 132 So. 3d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and the case law cited therein. The trial court improperly denied the legally sufficient motion with no explanation and without ordering a state response. See Charles v. State, 100 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Shea v. State,…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012)
- Tavorris Tumblin v. State, 965 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Gorham v. State, 988 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)