VICTOR LEE LOPEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Victor Lee Lopez challenged his Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for felony battery with a weapon, arguing that under Alleyne v. United States, the jury—not the judge—must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he met the statutory requirements for PRR sentencing. The Florida appellate court affirmed the sentence, holding that the Apprendi exception for recidivist statutes applies, making the judicial determination of the release date a ministerial act.
The court held that the Apprendi recidivist exception applies to PRR sentencing, allowing a judge to determine the date of a defendant's prior release from prison without submitting the matter to a jury. The release date is considered directly derivative of a prior conviction and constitutes a ministerial act properly performed by the trial judge incident to sentencing.
[1] Recidivist sentencing statutes based on a defendant’s prior criminal record fall outside the scope of Apprendi and Blakely.
[2] The date of a defendant’s release from prison under the prison releasee reoffender statute is analogous to the fact of a prior conviction for the purpose of applying Appr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Establishes the Apprendi rule with its exception for prior convictions, which the court applied to uphold the PRR sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVictor Lee Lopez was sentenced under Florida's PRR statute for felony battery with a weapon. The trial judge, rather than a jury, determined that Lope…
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Victor Lee Lopez appeals from his Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for felony battery with a weapon. See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). He argues that under Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.-, 138 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), a judge may no longer determine whether a defendant’s release date from a state correctional facility subjects him or her to PRR sentencing based on a preponderance of evidence; rather, a jury must make such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury. 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (holding that due process requires a jury to determine that the defendant is guilty of every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt)). Lopez contends that because the jury did not determine that he met the statutory requirements for PRR sentencing, his PRR designation must be reversed.
The State responds that the jury is not required to make the PRR factual determination because Apprendi carved out a specific exception for recidivist statutes. We agree. The Supreme Court in Apprendi stated that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). In this case, it is not the fact that Lopez has a prior conviction that increases his sentence under the PRR statute. Rather, it is the date that Lopez was released from prison for the prior offense that is the fact that may increase his sentence. However, as this court stated in Calloway v. State, 914 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), “[wjhile we recognize that the fact of [the defendant’s] date of release from his prior prison sentence is not the same as a bare fact of a prior conviction, we conclude that it is directly derivative of a prior conviction.” Therefore, because Lopez’s date of release from prison is a part of his prior record, that fact determination did not need to be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The determination of the date Lopez was released from prison for the prior offense was a ministerial act the trial judge properly made incident to sentencing. See id. at 15; Gurley v. State, 906 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that even though the judge, rather than the jury, determined that Gurley’s conviction fell within three years of his release from prison, the date of release from prison was analogous to the fact of a prior conviction and could be found by a judge without violating Apprendi). Accordingly, we affirm Lopez’s PRR sentence.
Affirmed.
WALLACE and LaROSE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (67 total)
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Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…ee years of release from prison — is not an ingredient of the charged offense. Rather, it relates to the fact of a prior conviction. Accordingly, we hold that Alleyne does not require a jury to make the PRR factual determination. See Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). AFFIRMED. ROWE and RAY, JJ., concur.…1 / 2
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Chapa v. State, 159 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…(2013), the Act unconstitutionally allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find appellant qualified as a prison releas-ee reoffender. We affirm, adopting the reasoning of Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), and Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), which hold that the facts found by the judge under the Act are not elements of the offense and are within the “prior conviction” exception to Apprendi. Affirmed. WARNER, MAY and GERBER, JJ., concur.…1 / 3
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Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…wise, the cases rejecting Apprendi/Alleyne challenges to recidivism statutes remain good law. See St. Louis, 985 So. 2d at 18; Culp v. State, 141 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Appellant’s habitual offender sentence did not violate Apprendi or Alleyne. Under current precedent, the existence of appellant’s prior convictions is not a fact that must be submitted to a jury. We affirm as to this issue. Con…1 / 3
Previewing 3 of 67 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (U.S. 2013)
- Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- O'Donnell v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp., 906 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)