JOSEPH A. WILLIAMS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2014-06-25
No. 1D13-2316
ROWE and RAY, JJ., concur.
143 So. 3d 423 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2014) Negative Treatment
Cited by 86 cases

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Synopsis

Joseph A. Williams, Jr. was convicted by jury of burglary and grand theft and received a 15-year Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence based on facts found by the trial court. Williams challenged the sentence as unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States, arguing that facts increasing mandatory minimum sentences must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed, holding that Alleyne does not apply because the PRR sentencing factor is not an element of the charged offense but rather relates to a prior conviction exception.


Holding

Alleyne does not require a jury to make the PRR factual determination because whether a defendant committed the charged offense within three years of release from prison is not an element or ingredient of the charged offense but rather relates to the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi v. New Jersey.


Headnotes

[1] Facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender statute's factual determination of whether a defendant committed the charged offense within three years of release from prison does not con…

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Key Quotes

“Appellant correctly encapsulates the holding in Alleyne, but it does not apply to this case.”

Establishes that while the appellant accurately stated Alleyne's general principle, the court found it inapplicable to PRR sentencing.

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Facts & Procedural History

Joseph A. Williams, Jr. was convicted by jury of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. The trial court imposed a 15-year PRR sentence for burglary p…

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Opinion of the Court
MARSTILLER, J.

MARSTILLER, J.

Joseph A. Williams, Jr. (“Appellant”), was convicted by a jury of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. The trial court imposed a 15-year Prison Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”) sentence for the burglary pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, and a concurrent five-year sentence for the grand theft. Appellant argues the PRR sentence is unconstitutional because the trial court, and not the jury, found the facts necessary to establish him as a prison releasee reoffender. He asserts that under Alleyne v. United States, — U.S.—, 138 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), any facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant correctly encapsulates the holding in Alleyne, but it does not apply to this case. Alleyne dealt with a sentence imposed under a federal statute providing for a five-year mandatory minimum if the defendant used or carried a firearm while committing a “crime of violence,” and a seven-year mandatory minimum if the defendant “brandished” the firearm while committing such crime. Alleyne, — U.S. at-, 133 S.Ct at 2155-56. Appellant’s case involves no mandatory minimum sentence and no enhancement based on firearm usage or any similar enhancement factor.

Furthermore, Alleyne leaves intact the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which held that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Florida Supreme Court has held that Apprendi does not require a jury to determine whether a defendant committed the charged offense(s) within three years of being released from prison. Robinson v. State, 793 So.2d 891, 893 (Fla.2001); see § 775.082(9)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2011).

“The touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.” Alleyne, — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 2158 (emphasis added). The key fact pertinent to PRR sentencing — whether the defendant committed the charged offense within three years of release from prison — is not an ingredient of the charged offense. Rather, it relates to the fact of a prior conviction. Accordingly, we hold that Alleyne does not require a jury to make the PRR factual determination. See Lopez v. State, 135 So.3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

AFFIRMED.

ROWE and RAY, JJ., concur.


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Cited By (60 total)

  • Chapa v. State, 159 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …United States, -U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the Act unconstitutionally allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find appellant qualified as a prison releas-ee reoffender. We affirm, adopting the reasoning of Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), and Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), which hold that the facts found by the judge under the Act are not elements of the offense and are within the “prior conviction” exception to Apprendi. Affirmed. WAR…
  • Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …low Almendarez-Torres as binding precedent.”). Likewise, the cases rejecting Apprendi/Alleyne challenges to recidivism statutes remain good law. See St. Louis, 985 So. 2d at 18; Culp v. State, 141 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Appellant’s habitual offender sentence did not violate Apprendi or Alleyne. Under current precedent, the existence of appellant’s prior convictions is not a fact that must be s…
  • Tush-ee Lewis Hunter v. State, 174 So. 3d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …yne does not apply to PRR sentencing because the key pertinent fact- — whether the defendant committed the charged offense within three years of being released from prison — is not an element or ingredient of the charged offense.1 Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423, 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), rev. denied, 157 So. 3d 1052, 2014 WL 6977641 (Fla. Dec. 9, 2014). The same reasoning applies to HVFO sentencing, where the key pertinent fact is [*1017] whether the defendant has a prior conviction for one of the felonies…

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