SEAN DUPREE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sean Dupree appeals his jury convictions for false imprisonment, battery, and aggravated assault, challenging the special interrogatory verdict form regarding firearm possession and the trial court's restitution order entered after notice of appeal. The Fourth District affirms the convictions but reverses the restitution order and remands for further proceedings.
The court affirms the convictions, finding that Standard Jury Instruction 3.7, when considered as a whole with other jury instructions, properly informed the jury that all material allegations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reverses the restitution order because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution after notice of appeal was filed, but remands for the trial court to conduct a new hearing and potentially re-enter the restitution order.
[1] A special interrogatory firearm enhancement verdict form does not improperly allow a jury to find the existence of the enhancement element on a burden of proof less than…
[2] Standard jury instructions suffice to inform a jury that a material allegation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Standard Jury Instruction 3.7 sufficed to inform the jury that a material allegation made in an information must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Establishes that the standard jury instruction adequately conveys the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden for all elements, including the firearm enhancement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDupree was tried by jury and found guilty of false imprisonment (a lesser included offense of kidnapping), battery (a lesser included offense of aggra…
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The defendant was found guilty by jury of false imprisonment (a lesser included offense of kidnapping), battery (a lesser included offense of aggravated battery), aggravated assault (as charged), and battery (as charged). As to the jury verdict on false imprisonment, the jury found by way of a special interrogatory that the defendant actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense. We affirm the defendant’s convictions, but reverse the order of restitution and remand for further proceedings.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the special interrogatory verdict form was fundamentally erroneous because it did not inform the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required for the jury to make the finding that he possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense. However, our court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the firearm interrogatory improperly allows the jury to find the existence of the weapon enhancement element on a burden of proof less than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. See Tukes v. State, 115 So.3d 1014, 1015 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); State v. Jacobs, 8 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Huger v. State, 941 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
As we explained in Tukes, “Standard Jury Instruction 3.7 sufficed to inform the jury that a material allegation made in an information must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 115 So.3d at 1015 n. 1. “This instruction tells the jury to apply the same burden of proof to all aspects of the case which the state is required to prove. Considering the instructions as a whole, they are not error, let alone fundamental error.” Ruger, 941 So.3d at 1185. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
The defendant also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order restitution after he filed his notice of appeal. We agree and the state concedes this point. See, e.g., Marro v. State, 803 So.2d 906, 906-907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Brayley v. State, 93 So.3d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). However, because the trial court reserved jurisdiction to impose restitution, on remand the trial court may conduct another hearing and again enter an order imposing restitution. Marro, 803 So.2d at 907.
Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.
MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Farris v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2025)
Authorities Cited
- Ruger v. State, 941 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- State v. Jacobs, 8 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
- Brayley v. State, 93 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
- Tukes v. State, 115 So. 3d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)