CHRISTIAN FLEMING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Christian Fleming appeals his resentencing on aggravated battery and related charges, arguing that the trial court improperly scored 40 points for severe victim injury without a jury finding and imposed an upward departure based on judicial rather than jury findings in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington. The State concedes error regarding the upward departure, and the court reverses and remands for resentencing.
The court held that the 40-point assessment for severe victim injury was not error because the jury implicitly found severe victim injury when it convicted Fleming of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. However, because the State conceded error regarding all four grounds for the upward departure, the sentence was reversed and remanded for resentencing.
[1] A jury must make a finding of severe victim injury for the trial court to score points on that basis.
[2] A conviction for aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement can support a jury finding of severe victim injury.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the jury must make a finding of severe victim injury pursuant to Apprendi, in this case severe victim injury was found by the jury when it convicted appellant of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”
Establishes that the jury's conviction on the aggravated battery charge implicitly includes the necessary finding of severe victim injury to satisfy Apprendi requirements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFleming was convicted on May 14, 1997 of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, shooting w…
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Appellant appeals his sentence entered after resentencing pursuant to the 1994 sentencing guidelines, alleging that the trial court scored 40 points for severe victim injury without a jury finding, and made an upward departure based in part on three grounds found by the trial court and not the jury in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Additionally, appellant argues that the fourth reason for departure is facially invalid. Because the State concedes error regarding the upward departure, we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
Appellant was convicted on May 14,1997 of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement (count one), shooting within a dwelling (count two), and false imprisonment (count three). Appellant was resentenced after a hearing held on April 3, 2003.1 The scoresheet included 40 points for severe victim injury, resulting in a range of 55.5 months to 92.5 months. The trial court made an upward departure and provided the following written reasons:
Offense was one of violence and was committed in a manner that was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Victim suffered ... permanent physical injury.
Offense committed in order to prevent or avoid arrest, to impede or prevent *903prosecution for the conduct underlying the arrest, or to effect an escape from custody.
Primary offense is scored at level 7 or higher and the defendant has been convicted of one or more offense that scored, or would have scored, at an offense level 8 or higher.
The trial court imposed a prison term of 20 years, consisting of consecutive terms of ten years for the first count, and five years each for counts two and three.
Because Apprendi was decided prior to appellant’s resentencing, appellant brings this appeal pursuant to Isaac v. State, 911 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (providing that Apprendi applies where an appellant is resentenced subsequent to that decision), review pending, No. SC05-2047 (Fla. filed Oct. 31, 2005). But see, e.g., Galindez v. State, 910 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (certifying conflict with Isaac), review pending, No. SC05-1341 (Fla. filed July 29, 2005).
Appellant first argues that the jury did not find “severe victim injury,” and therefore, the trial court erred in scoring 40 points on this basis. Although the jury must make a finding of severe victim injury pursuant to Apprendi2, in this case severe victim injury was found by the jury when it convicted appellant of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Cf. Arrowood v. State, 843 So.2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating, “[t]he jury’s findings of DUI manslaughter and DUI serious bodily injuries support the imposition of the death and severe victim injury points”). Accordingly, the trial court’s assessment of 40 points for severe victim injury was not error in this case.
Appellant also argues that the first three grounds for upward departure entered by the trial court were found by the trial judge and not the jury in violation of Apprendi and also that the fourth ground is invalid on its face, as appellant does not have any present or prior convictions at level 8 or higher. The State concedes error on all four grounds relating to the upward departure. Because of this concession, we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
BENTON, POLSTON, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Booker v. State, 244 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…ing today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); Fleming v. State, 139 So. 3d 902, 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 5 We agree with the dissent in Brown, which was disinclined to rewrite the statute and, instead, would have applied it consistent with the Sixth Amendment principles expressed in Apprendi/Blakely and their progeny. See Brown, 233…
Authorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Lemuel E. Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Galindez v. State, 910 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- Behl v. State, 898 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Arrowood v. State, 843 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Hope v. State, 797 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2001)
- Fleming v. State, 808 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Gallagher v. Walgreen's Distrib. Ctr., 808 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)