AMANDA PRYOR, WIFE, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID PRYOR, HUSBAND, APPELLEE
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Amanda Pryor appeals an order extending a temporary injunction for domestic violence protection that had already expired by the time of appeal. The court vacates the extension order and the temporary injunction itself, dismissing the appeal as moot while acknowledging the collateral legal consequences exception to mootness doctrine.
The court vacated both the order extending the temporary injunction and the temporary injunction itself, dismissing the appeal. Although injunctions for domestic violence protection are generally excepted from mootness doctrine due to collateral legal consequences, vacatur is appropriate when the injunction has expired to clear the path for future relitigation and eliminate judgments whose review was prevented by happenstance.
[1] A temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence may be extended only upon a continuance of the evidentiary hearing granted for good cause shown.
[2] A continuance of an evidentiary hearing for good cause may include a continuance to obtain service of process.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 741.30 'does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions in lieu of a permanent injunction.'”
Establishes the statutory limit on temporary injunction extensions and prohibits using multiple temporary injunctions as a substitute for permanent relief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAmanda Pryor sought to appeal an order dated November 14, 2013, which extended a temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence. By the…
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Amanda Pryor appeals an order extending a temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence which, even as extended, has now expired. We vacate the November 14, 2013 order under review, which extended the temporary injunction, as well as the temporary injunction itself, and dismiss the appeal. Section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2013), “authorizes extending a temporary injunction during a continuance of the evidentiary hearing, but authorizes a continuance only for good cause: ‘The court may grant a continuance of the hearing before or during a hearing for good cause shown by any party, which shall include a continuance to obtain service of process. Any injunction shall be extended if necessary to remain in full force and effect during any period of continuance.’ § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (201 [3]).” Dietz v. Dietz, 127 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Section 741.30 ‘does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions in lieu of a permanent injunction.’ ” (citation omitted)).
While “injunctions for protection against domestic violence are an exception to the usual rules of mootness because of the collateral legal consequences that flow from such an injunction,” Rodman v. Rodman, 48 So.3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), we have vacated both the order under review in the present case and the temporary injunction it purported to extend. See Kunkel v. Stanford ex rel. C.S., 137 So.3d 608, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“Although the injunction has expired, we reverse and remand ‘with instructions to vacate the injunction due to the collateral consequences such an injunction might cause.’ ” (citation omitted)). See also Garces v. Legarda, 86 So.3d 602, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that vacatur of an order which has become moot pending a decision on appeal “ ‘clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance’ ” (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950))).
Temporary injunction, as extended, vacated; appeal dismissed.
BENTON, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (U.S. 1950)
- Rodman v. Niah Rodman, 48 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Dietz v. Dietz, 127 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
- Kunkel v. Stanford, 137 So. 3d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
- Garces v. Dino Miguel Zavala Legarda, 86 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)