JAMES MITCHEL REED, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 5th DCA | 2014-12-31
No. 5D14-4274
TORPY, C. J., SAWAYA and LAMBERT, J.J., concur.
154 So. 3d 455 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2014) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

James Mitchel Reed, a pro se defendant, petitioned for a writ of prohibition after the trial court erroneously struck his Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time and subsequently denied his motion for discharge when speedy trial time expired. The court granted the petition, finding that Reed's right to a speedy trial under Florida law was violated and ordering his discharge from all three felony cases.


Holding

The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition, finding that Reed's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordering the trial court to discharge Reed from all three felony cases. The court held that prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on violation of the speedy trial rule.


Headnotes

[1] Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on a violatio…

[2] A defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 175 days of arrest.

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Key Quotes

“Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on a violation of the speedy trial rule.”

Establishes that prohibition is the proper remedy when a trial court erroneously denies a speedy trial discharge motion

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Facts & Procedural History

Reed was charged with three felonies and granted the right to represent himself. He was held in continuous custody in the Volusia County Jail for more…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

James Mitchel Reed, the' defendant in three felony cases pending below in Volu-sia County, petitions for a writ of prohibition, alleging that the State violated his right to a speedy trial in each case. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) provides that a person charged with a felony “shall be brought to trial within ... 175 days of arrest.” Reed was granted the right to represent himself in these cases and, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(2), he filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time, after having been in continuous custody in the Volusia County Jail for more than 175 days following his arrest. The trial court, thinking Reed was represented by counsel,1 erroneously entered an order striking the notice. The court, therefore, did not hold a hearing on the notice of expiration of speedy trial within five days from the date Reed filed the notice, and Reed was not brought to trial within ten days of that date, as required by rule 3.191(p)(3). At this point, Reed, who through no fault of his own had not been brought to trial, was entitled to be “forever discharged” from the crimes “on motion of the defendant or the court.” Id. Instead, Reed then separately filed a Demand for Speedy Trial pursuant to rule 3.191(b), unwittingly providing the State an additional 60 days to bring him to trial. No calendar call was held on Reed’s demand as required under rule 3.191(b)(1), and the time to bring Reed to trial again expired. At that time, Reed appropriately filed a motion for discharge in his cases, which the trial court subsequently denied.

“‘Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on a violation of the speedy trial *457rule.’ ” Hill v. State, 132 So.3d 925, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Cespedes v. State, 17 So.3d 302, 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). Based on the allegations in the petition for writ of prohibition, we ordered the State to file a response. The State, in its response, did not expressly argue that the petition should be denied, but asserted only that this court should “rule as necessitated by the interests of justice.” Because the record in this case established that Reed’s right to a speedy trial was violated, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and order the trial court to discharge James Mitchel Reed in Volusia County Case Nos.2013-CF-306690, 2013-CF-306776, and 2013-CF-306786.

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY, C. J., SAWAYA and LAMBERT, J.J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Deriso v. State, 221 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
    …are moot.” This, too, was error, “Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after the erroneous denial of a motion for discharge based on a violation of the speedy trial rule.” Reed v. State, 154 So. 3d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting Hill v. State, 132 So. 3d 925, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). Based on the allegations in the petition for writ of prohibition, we. ordered the State to file a response, which it did. The State conceded that the groun…

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