OLIVER W. FOLMAR, APPELLANT,
v.
OLIVIA ANDERSON DAVIS, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH A. ANDERSON, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees, holding that the trial judge did not abuse their discretion in determining the fee amount, even though it was lower than what most expert witnesses suggested.
No, the trial court did not err in its determination of the attorney's fees. The court's award was within its discretion, and expert testimony, while helpful, is not binding.
“The determination of the amount of the recovery was largely in the discretion of the trier of facts taking into consideration the service performed, the responsibility incurred, the nature of the service, the skill and time required, the circumstances under which it was rendered, the customary charges for like service, the amount involved, and the importance and results of the litigation.”
This quote establishes the factors a court should consider when determining attorney's fees, emphasizing the discretionary nature of the decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, an attorney, represented a deceased client in litigation and sought compensation for his services. The trial court awarded him attorney…
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The issue tried in this cause was the amount of compensation to which the appellant was entitled. He had been replaced, as an attorney, in certain litigation in which he represented one Joseph Anderson, now deceased. The error assigned was that the court erred in finding the amount it awarded as reasonable attorney’s fees. A review of the evidence before the trial judge reveals that several expert witnesses testified that the appellant was entitled to a fee much larger in amount than that awarded and only one testified to a smaller amount. No witness testified to the exact amount found by the court.
The determination of the amount of the recovery was largely in the discretion of the trier of facts taking into consideration the service performed, the responsibility incurred, the nature of the service, the skill and time required, the circumstances under which it was rendered, the customary charges for like service, the amount involved, and the importance and results of the litigation. Also in estimating the value of an attorney’s services his skill, experience, professional reputation, and even his amount of business may be taken into consideration. The testimony of expert witnesses is to aid and assist in the determination, but such testimony is neither conclusive nor binding on the court or the jury. See Munroe v. Birdsey, 102 Fla. 544, 136 So. 886; Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831; Powell v. Cocowitch, Fla.1957, 94 So.2d 589.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and BARNS, PAUL D., Associate Judge, concur.
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Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…ates: “The law is well established that where the condemning authority files a voluntary dismissal, the defendants are entitled to recover costs, including attorneys fees.” . Provos v. Provos, Fla.1950, 44 So. 2d 656; Folmar v. Davis, Fla.App.1959, 108 So. 2d 772; City of Miami Beach v. Cummings, Fla. App.1969, 228 So. 2d 109; Canal Authority v. Ocala Mfg. Ice & P. Co., Fla.App.1971, 253 So. 2d 495; Manatee County v. Harbor Ventures, Inc., Fla.App.1975, 305 So. 2d 299. . “A court is without power to measure…
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Ronlee, Inc. v. P. M. Walker Co., Inc., 129 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…y’s fees. It is settled that testimony as to the value of an attorney’s services is strongly persuasive and may aid in the determination, but is not binding on the jury. See Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831; Folmar v. Davis, Fla.App.1959, 108 So. 2d 772; Romy v. Dade County, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So. 2d 8. For that reason alone the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for submission of the issue of the amount of such attorney’s fee to a jury for determination. The need for new trial on th…
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Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…record, as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We hold that the trial judge did abuse his discretion and that the order must be reversed under the principles stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(B). See also Folmar v. Davis, 108 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). The trial judge recognized the appropriateness of an allowance of an attorney’s fee for the defendant in this cause where a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act was affirmatively pled as a defense to…
Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sailing W. Baruch v. Giblen, 122 Fla. 59 (Fla. 1935)
- Monroe v. Birdsey, 102 Fla. 544 (Fla. 1931)
- Powell v. Cocowitch, 94 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1957)