DAVID ANTONIO WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2015-05-01
No. 1D13-2893
ROBERTS, J., concurs; SWANSON, J., dissents with opinion.
163 So. 3d 740 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

David Antonio Williams was convicted of battery and resisting a law enforcement officer but appeals, arguing the trial court improperly denied his request for self-representation. The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that once a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-representation, a trial court must conduct a legally sufficient Faretta hearing focused on whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent and whether the defendant is mentally competent, not on the defendant's legal skills or experience.


Holding

The trial court reversibly erred by denying Williams' self-representation request. A trial court must honor an unequivocal request for self-representation if it determines the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and does not suffer from severe mental illness preventing competent trial conduct. The court impermissibly denied the request based solely on lack of legal training and experience, failing to conduct a legally sufficient Faretta hearing, requiring reversal and remand for new trial.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant has the right to self-representation at trial, which must be honored if the defendant makes an unequivocal request and knowingly and intelligently waives the…

[2] A trial court errs by denying a defendant's unequivocal request for self-representation based solely on a perceived lack of legal training or experience.

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Key Quotes

“Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta, an accused has the right to self-representation at trial. A defendant's choice to invoke this right 'must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'”

Establishes the fundamental constitutional right to self-representation and the respect due to that choice.

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Facts & Procedural History

Williams filed a written waiver of counsel stating he voluntarily, knowingly, and competently waived his right to be represented by an attorney. At a …

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Opinion of the Court
MARSTILLER, J.

MARSTILLER, J.

David Antonio Williams appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and two counts of resisting an officer with violence. Williams argues that the trial court reversibly erred by denying his request to represent himself at trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his appointed attorney. Finding that the court incorrectly denied Williams’ request to represent himself, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Prior to trial, Williams, filed a written waiver of representation by counsel stating that he “voluntarily, knowingly and competently” waived his right to be represented by an attorney. The day of jury selection, the trial court conducted a Far-etta 1 hearing and questioned Williams on his educational level, language competency and motivation for wanting to proceed unrepresented. Williams stated that he had completed high school and one year of college, his main language was English, and he felt he was better able than appointed counsel to address the issues in his case. After substantial discussion between the court and Williams about whether Williams understood the legal grounds for the State’s request for enhanced sentencing and whether it would be appropriate to grant Williams a continuance to conduct research prior to picking a jury, the court concluded:

Well, because of your hesitation and not feeling comfortable with knowing how to proceed in selecting a jury, based upon your announcement that you would want to do further research before you proceed, it’s an indication to me that you don’t have the necessary legal experience and training to go forward today. And therefore, Pm going to deny your request for you to represent yourself before a court.

“Under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Faretta, an accused has the right to self-representation at trial. A defendant’s choice to invoke this right ‘must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” Tennis v. State, 997 So.2d 375, 377-78 (Fla.2008) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525). Once a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-representation, pursuant to Faret-ta and Florida Supreme Court precedent, the trial court is obligated to hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel. See McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 864 (citing Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378). “[I]t is error to deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself, regardless of his legal skills or the complexity of the case, if the trial court determines that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and ‘does not suffer *742from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.’ ” Neal v. State, 132 So.3d 949, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3)).

The trial court in this instance did not consider whether Williams’ waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent and whether he was mentally competent to represent himself, and impermissibly denied Williams’ self-representation request based on a perceived lack of legal training and experience. The court thus failed to conduct a legally sufficient Faretta hearing, and in so doing, committed an error that requires reversal of Williams’ convictions and remand for new trial. See Neal, 132 So.3d at 951 (stating that such error is not subject to harmless error review) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006)).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, J., concurs; SWANSON, J., dissents with opinion.

SWANSON, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Appellant’s request to represent himself was not unequivocal, was not made in good faith and was designed solely for purpose of delay. Haram v. State, 625 So.2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Moreover, Appellant’s subsequent conduct indicated he had abandoned the request.

Dissent
SWANSON, J.,

SWANSON, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Appellant’s request to represent himself was not unequivocal, was not made in good faith and was designed solely for purpose of delay. Haram v. State, 625 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Moreover, Appellant’s subsequent conduct indicated he had abandoned the request.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Holmes v. State, 229 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
    …ether Williams’ waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent and whether he r was mentally competent to represent himself, and impermissibly • denied Williams’ self-representation request based on a perceived lack of legal training and experience.” 163 So. 3d 740, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); see also Wilson v. State, 201 So. 3d 203, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“[T]he judge focused on the defendant’s legal knowledge and denied the request to proceed pro se expressly because the defendant was not qualified to represe…
  • Tucker v. State, 256 So. 3d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
    …voking his probation. Appellant argues that the trial court failed to hold a proper Faretta inquiry after appellant made an unequivocal request to represent himself. The State concedes that reversible error occurred. We agree. Williams v. State, 163 So. 3d 740, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); see also Cuyler v. State, 131 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se must be offered the assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding, including…

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