ELIZABETH BRONSTEIN, PETITIONER,
v.
TAL BRONSTEIN, RESPONDENT
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A Florida appellate court granted a petition for writ of certiorari and quashed a trial court's order that temporarily modified a parenting plan based on unverified allegations of fraud, holding that the trial court departed from essential requirements of law by modifying custody without an evidentiary hearing, factual findings, or sworn evidence.
The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and caused irreparable harm. The court's order was quashed because: (1) the unverified motion did not seek modification of timesharing or emergency relief; (2) no testimony, sworn evidence, or factual findings were presented; (3) the former wife was not on notice that timesharing modification was at issue; and (4) the four-month temporary modification was not supported by evidence of a true emergency or substantial change of circumstances.
[1] A trial court's order modifying a timesharing plan without sworn evidence or testimony constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.
[2] A party seeking a temporary modification of a timesharing plan must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification is in the child's best int…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court departed from the essential requirements of the law, causing irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on post-judgment appeal”
Statement of the legal standard for certiorari relief and application to the trial court's actions in this case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElizabeth and Tal Bronstein divorced in 2012 with a parenting plan approved by the trial court. After Tal relocated to Colorado and filed a modificati…
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Elizabeth Bronstein (“Former Wife”) filed this petition for writ of certiorari1 to review the trial court’s Order on Petitioner/Former Husband’s Motion to Vacate Final Judgment Denying Former Husband’s Supplemental Petition for Modification of Timesharing Plan Based Upon Former Wife’s Fraud Perpetrated on the Court and Request to Stay all Pending Motions by the Former Wife (the “Order”), dated April 9, 2015. The Order effectively modifies the parties’ parenting plan by ordering that the six-year old minor child (“Child”) reside with his father, Tal Bronstein (“Former Husband”), in Colorado until the court holds an evidentiary hearing on the matter on August 7, 2015 — a period of nearly four months. The Order effectively deprives Former Wife of all contact and meaningful timesharing with Child during this time period. The Former Wife contends that the Order, entered on an unverified motion *463that did not seek emergency relief or modification of timesharing, rendered without any factual findings, and without the taking of any evidence or testimony, constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law. For the reasons that follow, we grant the writ of certiorari and quash the Order below.
After several years of marriage, the parties separated and the trial court entered a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage on September 25, 2012, which approved and ratified the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement dated March 24, 2012. By the time the Final Judgment was entered, Former Husband had already relocated from Miami to Aurora, Colorado. In March of 2014, Former Husband filed a Petition for Modification of Timesharing/Parenting Plan alleging that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred since the entry of the Final Judgment. After hearing evidence for four days, the trial court denied that petition in its Final Judgment Denying Modification due to the lack of any substantial change in circumstances. Former Husband neither appealed that order, nor filed a motion for rehearing. Instead, on April 2, 2015, Former Husband filed an unverified Motion to Vacate Final Judgment Denying Former Husband’s Supplemental Petition for Modification of Timesharing Plan Based Upon Former Wife’s Fraud Perpetrated on the Court and Request to Stay all Pending Motions by the Former Wife (the “Motion”).
In his Motion, Former Husband contends that after the hearing on his prior petition for modification he hired a private investigator (“Investigator”) to follow Former Wife. Former Husband alleges that the Investigator found Former Wife spending time with an old boyfriend who she had previously testified she was no longer seeing. Former Husband attached a report from the Investigator to the Motion. The report contained photographs allegedly depicting the Former Wife’s ex-boyfriend sitting on Former Wife’s balcony, lighting a pipe, and smoking from it. There is no way to ascertain what is contained in the pipe. Neither Child nor Former Wife are in any of the pictures, there are no allegations that Child was home at the time the photographs were taken, and there are no allegations in the Motion that Former Wife was using drugs. The Motion was not verified and it contained no affidavit from the Investigator. Nonetheless, Former Husband relied on this report as the primary basis for his claim that there was newly discovered evidence and a fraud on the court warranting both a vaca-tur of the Final Judgment Denying Modification and a stay of Former Wife’s pending, unrelated motions until the lower court could rule on the Motion. Significantly, Former Husband did not seek emergency relief in his Motion.
On April 7, 2015, only five days after Former Husband filed the Motion, the trial court, sua sponte, deemed this matter an emergency and scheduled a hearing on the motion for April 9, 2015. Former Husband appeared at the hearing by telephone, and Former Wife and her counsel were present. During the hearing, the court took no testimony from witnesses, received no evidence, and deferred ruling on the merits of the Motion. Nevertheless the court ordered, over Former Wife’s counsel’s objection, that Child would remain in Colorado (where he was visiting Former Husband) until such time that the court could hold an evidentiary hearing. The court reduced its oral pronouncement to writing on April 9, 2015, and its order contained no factual findings.
The evidentiary hearing was scheduled for July 29, 2015 and later reset to August 7, 2015. Thus, four months were to pass *464between the time Child was ordered to temporarily remain in Colorado with Former Husband and the date of the eviden-tiary hearing. .The Order therefore was tantamount to a temporary modification of the timesharing arrangement as established by the parties’ parenting plan.
To obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist: (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law; (2) resulting in material injury; (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So.2d 812, 822 (Fla.2004). Although Former Wife was given notice of (and attended) the hearing in this matter, the Former Husband’s motion did not seek a modification of the timesharing arrangement, and Former Wife was thus not on notice that such relief was within the scope of the motion or the hearing.
Further, it is undisputed that: the motion was unverified; the motion did not seek emergency relief; and the trial court did not take any testimony or rely upon any sworn evidence. There was nothing provided by Former Husband to establish a true emergency or to suggest that Child was being threatened with physical harm or about to be improperly removed from the State of Florida.2 There was nothing presented even to establish the existence of a substantial change of circumstances such that Child’s temporary relocation to Colorado pending the evidentiary hearing was warranted and in Child’s best interest.3 The court’s Order, which contained no factual findings, was based solely on argument from counsel and the unverified allegations in Former Husband’s Motion.4 In rendering its emergency Order upon this basis, and scheduling the evidentiary hearing some four months later,5 the court departed from the essential requirements of the law, causing irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on post-judgment appeal.
We therefore grant the petition, issue the writ and quash the Order below, with instructions that minor Child be returned to Former Wife’s care pursuant to the terms of the marital settlement agreement and parenting plan, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Wolfson v. Wolfson, 173 So. 3d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…e is an actual, demonstrated emergency situation, “such as where a child is threatened with physical harm or is about to be improperly removed from the state.” Smith v. Crider, 932 So. 2d 393, 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Bronstein v. Bronstein, 167 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Gielchinsky v. Gielchinsky, 662 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Even in such instances, “every reasonable effort should be made to ensure both parties have an opportunity to be heard.” Ashby v. Murray, 113 So. 3d 951, 954 (Fla. 5…
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YU YAN Chan v. Addison, 386 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024)…ed for hearing. Furthermore, Addison’s amended supplemental petition did not request that the trial court strike the Parenting Plan. Thus, Chan was not on notice that the trial court would sua sponte grant such relief. See Bronstein v. Bronstein, 167 So. 3d 462, 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Addison points out that a parenting plan must “[d]escribe in adequate detail the methods and technologies that the parents will use to communicate with the child.” § 61.13(2)(b)4., Fla. Stat. (2020). He also observes that…
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Karin Shaleesh v. Shaleesh, 233 So. 3d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ce that (1) there has been a substantial or material change in circumstances and (2) the modification is in the best interest of the child or children involved.” Bon v. Rivera, 10 So. 3d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); see also Bronstein v. Bronstein, 167 So. 3d 462, 464 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Upon reviewing the transcripts of the hearing conducted below, at which: (1) the former wife was both present and participated; and (2) the trial court conducted a transcribed, in camera interview of LS, we find that the…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes OF Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2004)
- Wilson v. Blaine Alan Roseberry, 669 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Gordon v. Gordon, 932 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Shaw v. Shaw, 696 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)