MARCUS WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2015-07-08
No. 1D14-3757
LEWIS and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
170 So. 3d 144 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Marcus White appealed the revocation of his probation based on an alleged curfew violation. The court reversed the revocation, holding that the trial court's finding was supported solely by hearsay evidence, which is insufficient to support probation revocation under Florida law.


Holding

Probation revocation cannot be based entirely on hearsay evidence. Although hearsay is admissible at probation revocation hearings, the decision to revoke must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. The trial court's revocation here was based solely on hearsay statements from the uncle and unnamed woman, with no direct observation of the curfew violation by the probation officer.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's decision to revoke probation must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.

[2] Hearsay evidence is admissible at probation revocation hearings, but a revocation cannot be based solely on hearsay.

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Key Quotes

“Hearsay evidence is admissible at evidentiary hearings for probation revocation, but a decision to revoke probation cannot be based entirely on hearsay.”

Establishes the key legal principle that while hearsay is procedurally admissible, it cannot be the sole basis for revocation

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Facts & Procedural History

A probation officer visited White's home to check curfew compliance but remained in her car. She spoke with White's uncle and an unnamed woman on the …

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Opinion of the Court
RAY, J.

RAY, J.

Appellant, Marcus White, appeals the revocation of his probation. We agree with Appellant’s contention that the revocation was based solely on hearsay. Accordingly, we reverse.

During the violation of probation hearing, Appellant’s probation officer testified that on the evening at issue, she went to Appellant’s home to check his compliance with the curfew condition of his probation. She did not get out of her car but communicated with Appellant’s uncle and an unnamed woman, who were in a group that was drinking and talking on Appellant’s porch. Appellant’s uncle stated that Appellant had gone to a store, and the unnamed woman stated that Appellant was in the shower inside the house. Neither would retrieve Appellant from the home, and when the.unnamed woman began to raise her voice, the probation officer chose to leave for her own safety. Before leaving, the probation officer asked the woman to tell Appellant she had come by and to contact her. Appellant did not call the probation officer until the next morning, when he stated that he had been in the shower when she arrived and that his uncle had been drunk and had lied about Appellant’s whereabouts.

The trial court found Appellant in violation of his probation for failing to adhere to his curfew, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to thirty-six months in pris*145on. That sentence was later reduced to thirty-three months for an unrelated reason.

While a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a person has willfully and substantially violated his probation, findings supporting that determination must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. Prickett v. State, 895 So.2d 538, 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Hearsay evidence is admissible at evidentiary hearings for probation revocation, but a decision to revoke probation cannot be based entirely on hearsay. Smith-Curles v. State, 24 So.3d 702, 702-03 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); C.B.H. v. State, 117 So.3d 450, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (concluding that a probation officer’s testimony was insufficient to support probation revocation where the probation officer did not search the probationer’s home and instead relied on a statement by the probationer’s mother that he was not home); Rowan v. State, 696 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (concluding that a probation officer’s reliance on statements from the probationer’s landlord that he had moved in violation of his probation was insufficient in itself to support probation revocation).

In arguing that the revocation was based on more than hearsay, the State relies on the probation officer’s personal observations on the evening at issue, her. discussion with Appellant the next morning, testimony concerning a post-curfew visit to Appellant’s home on a prior occasion, and Appellant’s knowledge of the protocol in case an emergency precludes compliance with his curfew. None of this testimony provides evidence that Appellant violated his curfew on the night in question. Rather, the only evidence substantiating the charge that Appellant violated his probation was hearsay. Therefore, we reverse the revocation of probation and the resulting prison sentence.

REVERSED.

LEWIS and KELSEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Rodgers v. State, 171 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …(Fla.2008). “While a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a person has willfully and substantially violated his probation, findings supporting that determination must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.” White v. State, 170 So. 3d 144, (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Hearsay evidence, though admissible in violation-of-probation hearings, is not sufficient alone to establish a violation. See id. at 145 (and cases cited therein). The hearsay must be corroborated by non-hearsay evidence. See R…
  • Palancar v. State, 204 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
    …s 5 and 9. “While a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a person has willfully and substantially violated his probation, findings supporting that determination must be supported by competent, substantial evidence,” White v. State, 170 So. 3d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). The state alleged Palancar violated his probation by, among-other things, committing the new offense of disorderly intoxication and failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions by committing the new offense. Sec…
  • Tionne Rashad Williams v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
    …court’s decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 301 So. 3d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Competent, substantial evidence must support any factual findings on which that revocation decision is based. White v. State, 170 So. 3d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Competent, substantial evidence is “such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred.” Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619, 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting De G…

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