OFF LEASE ONLY, INC., APPELLANT,

v.

LEJEUNE AUTO WHOLESALE, INC., ETC., APPELLEE

*869EMAS, J.

Appellant, Off Lease Only, Inc. (“Off Lease”), appeals from an order denying its motion for leave to file an amended complaint and a final summary judgment entered in favor of Appellee, LeJeune Auto Wholesale, Inc. d/b/a Car Factory Outlet (“Car Factory”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the order granting summary judgment, reverse the order- denying Off Lease’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In June 2014, Off Lease filed suit against Car Factory ■ alleging, inter alia, violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 et seq., Florida Statutes (2014) (“FDUTPA”), and seeking damages and injunctive relief. Car Factory filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, in relevant part, that: 1) Off Lease was not entitled to seek injunctive relief or damages under FDUTPA because Off Lease was not a consumer; 2) Off Lease was not entitled to seek injunctive relief because the alleged conduct by Car Factory had already ceased; and 3) even if Off Lease could seek damages under FDUTPA, it was seeking only special or consequential damages, which are .not recoverable under FDUTPA. ■ Off Lease filed a response to Car Factory’s motion for summary judgment, and also filed a motion for leave to aménd its complaint.

At the hearing , on Car Factory’s summary judgment motion, Car Factory contended, and the trial court agreed, that our decision in Bio-Med Plus, Inc. v. Health Coalition, Inc., 793 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) was dispositive of the issue and required entry of summary judgment because Off Lease was not a “consumer” and therefore could not maintain an action for either injunctive relief or damages under FDUTPA.1

The court entered final judgment in Car Factory’s favor and denied Off Lease’s motion for leave to amend its complaint. This appeal followed. The issues for our consideration have since been substantially narrowed. On appeal, Off Lease conceded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on its claim for damages under FDUTPA, as Off Lease’s claim in that regard sought only consequential damages, which are not recoverable under FDUTPA.2 See § 501.211(2), Fla. Stat. *870(2014) (providing for recovery of “actual damages” suffered as a result of a FDUT-PA violation); Rodriguez v. Recovery Performance & Marine, LLC, 38 So.3d 178, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)(affirming judgment in favor of defendant and holding that “under FDUTPA, the term ‘actual damages’ does not include special or consequential damages”).3

Therefore, the issue remaining for .our consideration is whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in fayor of Car Factory on Off Lease’s .claim for injunctive relief under FDUTPA.

Addressing this issue, the subsection providing' for a remedy of injunc-tive relief (§ 501.211(1)), has, since 1993, provided a right to declaratory and injunc-tive relief to “anyone aggrieved by a violation of this part....” Further, that subsection provides that an aggrieved party may seek such relief “to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this part.” By its express terms the statute contemplates, under the appropriate circumstances and proof, that one may seek injunctive relief for future violations. Under Florida law “an injunction will not be granted where it appears that the acts complained of have already been committed and .there is no showing by the pleadings and proof that there is a reasonably well grounded probability that such course of conduct will continue in the future.” City of Jacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So.2d 108, 111 (1946)(emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Bryson, 548 So.2d 679, 681. (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The mere voluntary cessation of conduct alleged to be in violation of FDUTPA does not necessarily .foreclose Off Lease from pursuing an action for-injunctive relief. ■ See Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). • The trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the cessation of allegedly violative conduct precluded' Off Lease from seeking relief under FDUTPA for future violations. - As a result, the trial court did not reach the question of whether any genuine issue of material fact, is in dispute. We therefore reverse that portion of the final summary judgment and express no opinion on the merits of the claim or whether there exists any genuine issue of disputed fact.

Because we are reversing in part the final summary judgment.and remand*871ing for proceedings consistent with, this opinion, we also reverse the trial court’s order denying Off Lease’s motion for leave to amend its complaint. .Consistent, with this opinion, the trial court on remand should consider anew whether to grant Off Lease’s motion insofar as it sought to amend its cause of action for injunctive relief under FDUTPA.4

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.