THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DARYL MILLER, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court order reducing charges against Daryl Miller from driving with a suspended license under section 322.34(5) to the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver's license. The Third District affirmed, holding that section 322.34(5) requires that a defendant have previously held a Florida driver's license, and since Miller never had one, he could not be convicted of driving with a suspended license.
A defendant cannot be convicted under section 322.34(5) for driving with a suspended license when that defendant never had a Florida driver's license issued to them. Because Miller never held a driver's license, he could only be convicted of the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver's license.
[1] A person cannot be convicted of driving with a suspended or revoked license under Florida Statute section 322.34(5) if they have never been issued a driver's license.
[2] Penal statutes in Florida must be strictly construed according to their letter.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One of the most fundamental principles of Florida law is that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter.”
Establishes the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that guides the court's analysis of section 322.34(5)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaryl Miller was charged with violating section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes for driving while his license was suspended, revoked, canceled, or d…
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Daryl Miller' was charged with violating section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes titled “[d]riving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified.” See § 322.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2014).1 The trial court treated Miller’s sworn motion to dismiss as a motion for reduction of charges to the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver’s' license. See § 322.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized in this chapter, a person may not drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in' this state unless such person has a valid driver license”); § 322.39(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing “[i]t is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, unless such violation is declared to be otherwise by this chapter or other law of this state”); see also Crain v. State, 79 So.3d 118, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing a conviction under section 322.34(5) and remanding with instructions to “adjudicate [the defendant] guilty of the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver’s license”). Concluding as a matter of law that having, at some time, a Florida driver’s license is an element of a section 322.34(5) offense — the offense charged here — and considering that it , was undisputed that Miller never had a Florida’s driver’s license, the court below granted Miller’s motion and adjudicated him guilty of the lesser offense. For the following reasons, we affirm that ruling.
In doing so, we align ourselves with the First District Court of Appeal in Crain where that court concluded that in accordance with our obligation to strictly construe penal statutes, a defendant may not be convicted as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) for driving with -a suspended license when no license had ever been issued to that'defendant:
“One of the most- fundamental principles of. Florida law is that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter.” ' Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1991). “Revocation” is “the termination of a licensee’s privilege to drive.” . § .322.01(36), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis supplied)., The Second District in Carroll v. State, 761 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), adopted the state’s argument that “even though appellant did not have a driver’s license, he did have a ‘driving privilege’ that had been revoked due, to his status as a habitual. traffic offender, and the revocation of this driving privilege was the equivalent of revocation of a driver’s license for purposes of section 322.264, Florida Statutes (1997).” But this reads language into the statute that the Legislature did not enact.
It “‘is a firmly established rule that “Courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies *1003and inequalities in its operation.” ’ ” Guilder v. State, 899 So.2d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Aiuppa, 298 So.2d 391, 404 (Fla.1974)).
Crain, 79 So.3d at 121-22.2
As our sister court pointed out, we need look no further than section 322.34(6) to confirm that the legislature clearly knew how to extend a punishment to those without licenses:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle:
(a) Without having a driver’s license as required under s. 322.03; or
(b) While his or her driver’s license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s. 316.655, s. 322.26(8), s. 322.27(2), or s. 322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury .to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree_
Crain, 79 So.3d at 121 (quoting § 322.34(6), Fla. Stat. (2009)).
In sum, because Miller never has had a driver’s license, he could not be convicted as a "person whose driver license has been revoked” under section 322.34(5). The trial court therefore properly reduced the charges against him to the lesser included offense of driving without a valid driver’s license.
Finally, we note that in reaching this conclusion, wé necessarily disagree with the Second, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on this issue and therefore certify conflict with the decisions of those courts on this issue. See Carroll v. State, 761 So.2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that a person may be convicted of violating section 322.34(5) without ever having been issued a driver’s license); see also Newton v. State, 898 So.2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (affirming a section 322.34(5) conviction, citing Carroll); State v. Bletcher, 763 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Carroll to support reversal of an order dismissing a sectio322.34(5) charge).
Affirmed; conflict certified.
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State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2017)…[*563] QUINCE, J. This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Miller, 193 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), which certified conflict with decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Newton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); and State v. Bletche…
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Alphonso Finney v. State, 219 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ed a license to drive” because the statute only applies to persons whose “license” has been revoked as a habitual traffic offender). Accord Burgess v. State, 198 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1751); State v. Miller, 193 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1170). In sum, because Finney is a habitual traffic offender that cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c), the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the amended information. T…
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Burgess v. State, 198 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…hat those facts have been proved in accord with law. . During the pendency of this appeal the Third District certified conflict with Carroll, 761 So. 2d 417, and reached a similar conclusion to the one we reach in this opinion. See State v. Miller, 193 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Miller also certifies conflict with Newton v. State, 898- So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and State v. Bletcher, 763 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA.2000), to the extent that those cases cite our prior opinion in Carroll w…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Sal Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974)
- Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- State v. Leander Bletcher, 763 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Newton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Crain v. State, 79 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)