ALPHONSO FINNEY, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

PER CURIAM,

Alphonso Finney filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking review of the order denying his motion to dismiss the amended information charging him with violating section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015). Finney contends that he is not subject to prosecution under that statute and that the highest offense he can be charged with is a misdemeanor over which the circuit court lacks jurisdiction. We agree and grant the petition.

Background

Finney was originally charged with violating section-322.34(5),1 but the trial court granted Finney’s motion to dismiss that charge because he has never had a Florida driver’s license. The State thereafter filed an amended information charging Finney under section 322.34(2)(c) for driving while his driving privilege was suspended or revoked. Finney again moved to *255dismiss, arguing that he could not be charged under section 322.34(2)(c) because he was a “habitual traffic offender” as defined in section 322.264.2,3 The trial court denied Finney’s motion, noting that the result advocated by Finney “cannot possibly have been the intent of the legislature and this result goes against public policy and neglects public safety.”

Finney sought review of the order denying his motion to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in this court. The petition argues that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction because Finney is not subject to prosecution under section 322.34(2)(c) and the highest offense that he can be charged with is driving without a valid license, a misdemeanor: We issued an order to show cause, and in response, the State argued that the “evil” addressed by section 322.34(2)(c) is the “exact indifference and disrespect [Finney] flagrantly continues to participate in” and that to preclude his prosecution under section 322.34(2)(c) “would limit the scope of the statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results.”

Analysis

Section 322.34(2)(e) provides:

Any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except, persons defined in s. 322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or .privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree

(emphasfe supplied). Section 322.264 defines “habitual traffic offender.”

Based on this clear and unambiguous language, we agree with Finney that section 322.34(2) does not apply to persons who are habitual traffic offenders. See State v. Harvey, 693 So.2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Under the plain meaning of section 322.34(1) [now (2) ], persons who have been declared habitual traffic offenders are excluded from its application. In *256stead, section 322.34(2) [now (5)] applies to habitual traffic offenders who drive while their license is revoked.”); see also Gil v. State, 118 So.3d 787, 791 (Fla. 2013) (noting that section 322.34(2) “expressly provides that it does not apply to habitual traffic offenders”). Accordingly, Finney, an undisputed habitual traffic offender, cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c).

The exemption of habitual traffic offenders from prosecution under section 322.34(2) was likely based on the fact that such offenders are subject to prosecution under section 322.34(5). However, offenders such as Finney who have never had a driver’s license cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(5). See Crain v. State, 79 So.3d 118, 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that section 322.34(5) “does not outlaw driving by drivers never issued a license to drive” because the statute only applies to persons whose “license” has been revoked as a habitual traffic offender). Accord Burgess v. State, 198 So.3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1751); State v. Miller, 193 So.3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (review pending in case no. SC16-1170).

In sum, because Finney is a habitual traffic offender that cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c), the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the amended information. That said, because Finney cannot be prosecuted as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5) since he has never been issued a driver’s license, we agree with the trial court’s observation that the result in this case “goes against public policy and ne-gleets public safety.” Indeed, there appears to be a gaping loophole in section 322.34 because as the statute is written, an offender who is a habitual traffic offender but who has never had a driver’s license can escape felony punishment and receive a lesser punishment than a habitual traffic offender who had obtained a license. However, as we noted in Crain, “[i]t “‘is a firmly established rule that ‘Courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation.’ ” ’ ” Crain, 79 So.3d at 122 (quoting Guilder v. State, 899 So.2d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). Only the Legislature has the power to close this loophole, and we urge it to do so.4

Conclusion

In sum, because Finney cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2)(c) and the highest crime with which he can be charged is misdemeanor driving without a valid license5 over which the circuit court lacks jurisdiction, see Sections 26.012(2)(d), 34.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), we grant the petition for writ of prohibition. In doing so, we note that the State is not precluded from prosecuting Finney in county court for driving without a valid license.

PETITION GRANTED.

WETHERELL, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.