LIDIA E. CONTRERAS, APPELLANT,
v.
NELSON E. MENDEZ, APPELLEE
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Contreras appeals the vacation of a 2013 judgment that granted rescission of a quitclaim deed and transferred the defendant's property interest to her. The trial court vacated the judgment two years later on Mendez's motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), but the appellate court reversed, holding the motion was untimely and the judgment was not void.
The motion was untimely under Rule 1.540(b)(3), which requires motions based on fraud or misconduct be filed within one year of judgment entry. The judgment was not void under Rule 1.540(b)(4) because the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the defendant, and procedural defects do not render a judgment void when jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
[1] A motion to vacate a judgment based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party under Rule 1.540(b)(3) must be brought within one year after entr…
[2] A judgment is not void, but merely voidable, when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and any procedural defects occur before the entry of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the case law on the void/voidable distinction could draw clearer lines, generally so long as a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and a party, a procedural defect occurring before the entry of judgment does not render a judgment void.”
Establishes the test for distinguishing void from voidable judgments under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceContreras obtained a final judgment in May 2013 rescinding a quitclaim deed and ordering transfer of the property to her. Mendez's counsel withdrew, a…
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Lidia Contreras, plaintiff below, appeals a circuit court order vacating an April 2013 order striking the defendant’s affirmative defenses and a May 2013 amended final judgment in favor of Contreras granting rescission of a quitclaim deed. The amended final judgment expressly stated that it would “act as a duly executed instrument of conveyance” transferring the defendant’s interest in the subject residential property to Contreras. The order and amended final judgment were entered following the withdrawal of the defendant’s counsel and the entry of an order allowing the defendant time (a) to retain successor counsel or (b) represent himself with service of subsequent papers at a designated residence.
The defendant, appellee Nelson Mendez, did not seek review of the order or amended judgment, and took no action in the case for two years after the entry of the amended final judgment. During that period he did not update the service address in the court papers or request counsel for Contreras to copy him via email.
Following those years of inaction, in May 2015, Mendez retained counsel and filed a motion seeking to vacate the 2013 order and amended final judgment under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party) and 1.540(b)(4) (void judgment or decree). The trial court granted Mendez’s motion, and this appeal followed.
We reverse. The claim for relief under Rule 1.540(b)(3) was untimely, as the rule specifies that such a motion must be brought within one year after entry of the judgment or decree (the exception regarding fraudulent financial affidavits- in marital cases is inapplicable).
The claim for relief under Rule 1.540(b)(4) is also unavailing, though such a motion is timely if made within a “reasonable time.” The claim fails because the order and amended judgment in question were not “void,” but were, at best, subject to challenge as “voidable.” “Although the case law on the void/voidable distinction could draw clearer lines, generally so long as a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and a party, a procedural defect occurring before the entry of judgment does not render a judgment void.” Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (internal citation omitted).
In this case, it was undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the defendant. Procedural defects such as the alleged failure to receive pleadings (though addressed to the residence identified by defendant’s initial counsel and never updated or corrected by the defendant) might have been corrected through motions filed within the year applicable to claims for relief under Rule 1.540(b)(1), (2), or (3), but Mendez filed no such motion.
Simply stated, this is not a case in which a judgment is void because the defendant was never served with the initial summons and complaint. Rather, it is a case in which the defendant initially appeared and defended, permitted his counsel to withdraw, and then neglected to monitor the publicly-available docket or assure that an address of record for service of papers was current and reliable. We have repeatedly cautioned pro se parties that such behavior is fraught with peril. Wolff v. Piwko, 104 So.3d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Whitney v. A Aventura Chiropractic Care Ctr., Inc., 21 So.3d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
*398Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the amended final judgment.
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Renovaship, Inc. v. Barclay Quatremain, 208 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…at the very least, checked the court docket or contacted the trial court or opposing counsel to ascertain what action the trial court took at the hearing, and should have obtained a copy of the order entered at that hearing. See Contreras v. Mendez, 194 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). CONCLUSION Quatremain’s motion to vacate was untimely, because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal order was rendered and thus not subject to attack under rule 1.540(b)(l)-(3). Further, the motion to vacate coul…
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Tanis v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 289 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…ar Marcus Pointe, LLC, 227 So. 3d 752, 757-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (imputing a duty upon counsel to actively check the court’s electronic docket where it was known “the trial court would be issuing” an order on a pending motion); Contreras v. Mendez, 194 So. 3d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (This “is a case in which the defendant initially appeared and defended, permitted his counsel to withdraw, and then neglected to monitor the publicly-available docket or assure that an address of record for service of papers…
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KB Home Fort Myers LLC v. Taishan Gypsum Co., Ltd. (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…ocedural defect occurring before the entry of judgment" which "does not render a judgment void." Sterling Factors Corp., 968 So. 2d at 666 (explaining in-depth that procedural errors render a judgment voidable—not void); accord Contreras v. Mendez, 194 So. 3d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). At worst, if there was a notice deficiency attendant to entry of the clerk's defaults, such deficiency would have rendered the adoption order voidable. So long as a defendant has actual notice of a proceeding, a judgment e…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. King, 968 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 968 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Whitney v. A Aventura Chiropractic Care Ctr., Inc., 21 So. 3d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
- Wolff v. Piwko, 104 So. 3d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)