YANCY SCOTT RICHARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
KRISTA L. WEBER, F/K/A KRISTA L. RICHARDS, APPELLEE
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In this Florida dissolution case, the appellate court affirmed most of the trial court's orders regarding alimony and the final judgment but reversed the award of attorney's fees. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by basing the 70% attorney's fee award solely on the parties' disparate incomes without considering their overall relative financial resources.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding 70% of attorney's fees and costs based solely on the disparity in income. Courts must consider the overall relative financial resources of the parties and each spouse's need for suit money versus their ability to pay, not merely income disparity alone.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it awards attorney's fees based solely on the disparity of income between the parties in a dissolution case.
[2] In determining attorney's fees in a dissolution case, courts must consider each spouse's need for suit money versus their respective ability to pay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court cannot award fees based solely on disparity of income”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that income disparity alone is insufficient for awarding attorney's fees
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for eight years. Throughout the marriage, Former Husband earned approximately 70% of the parties' combined gross annual incom…
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Yancy Scott Richards (Former Husband) appeals multiple aspects of the temporary alimony- award, the durational alimony award, the final judgment of dissolution, and the partial award of attorney’s fees and costs to his ex-wife, Krista L. Weber (Former Wife). We affirm as to all issues raised by Former Husband without comment, save for one—the trial court’s order that Former Husband pay 70% of Former Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.
Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2016), requires that the court consider “the relative financial resources of the parties” in-fashioning an award for attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs in a dissolution case. Our supreme court has explained that in evaluating whether an award of fees is appropriate, courts are to “look to each spouse’s need for suit money versus each spouse’s respective ability to pay.” Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997). As such, this court has explained that “the trial court cannot award fees based solely on disparity of income.” Are*715na v. Arena, 103 So.3d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (first citing Balko v. Balko, 957 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); then citing Bohner v. Bohner, 997 So.2d 454, 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
Here, the trial court, found that “Consistently throughout the parties’ eight (8) year marriage,” Former Husband earned approximately 70% of the parties’ combined gross annual income. The trial court then- ordered that Former Husband pay 70% of Former Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs as follows: “Based upon the parties’ disparate incomes the Respondent/Former Husband has the financial ability to contribute towards the Petitióner/Former Wife’s attorney fees and costs.”
The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Former Husband to pay 70% of Former Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs because, on the record before us, the trial court based its award solely on the relative incomes of the parties and did not indicate that it considered anything besides the parties’ disparate' incomes. See Balko, 957 So.2d at 16 (citing Stoler v. Stoler, 679 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).
Although the trial court may have considered the parties’ relative financial resources beyond their disparate income, such considerations are not apparent on the record before us. Thus,*, we-reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We remand to the trial court for reconsideration of its award of attorney’s fees and costs taking into consideration the overall- relative financial resources of, the parties and to make findings of fact that will allow for review of. its decision. See id. If necessary, the court may take additional evidence on this issue. See id. We affirm the trial court’s award of durational alimony and final judgment of dissolution in all respects.
Affirmed in part; reversed -in part; remanded with instructions.
WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
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Allen v. Juul (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…gs of fact regarding the parties' financial resources and any of the Rosen factors that are relevant to its determination. See Sumlar, 827 So. 2d at 1085. "If necessary, the court may take additional evidence on this issue." Richards v. Weber, 221 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Because we reverse that portion of the final judgment denying Former Wife's motion for attorney's fees to allow for the trial court's inclusion of written findings, we express no opinion as to Former Wife's entitlement to…
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Bolliger v. Fries, 310 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…of the final judgment denying Mr. Bolliger's request for attorney's fees and remand for the trial court to make the relevant findings to support its decision. "If necessary, the court may take additional evidence on this issue." Richards v. State, 221 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); see Perez, 100 So. 3d at 773 ("[W]e reverse the order awarding fees and costs to the Wife and we remand for further proceedings. We note that, contrary to the Husband's assertion in his brief, the parties did present eviden…
Authorities Cited
- Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)
- Marcia L. Arena v. John F. Arena, 103 So. 3d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- Stoler v. Anne B. Stoler, 679 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Bohner v. Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Lavelle Copeland v. State, 103 So. 3d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
- Kubasak v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 957 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Balko v. Balko, 957 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)