LEESBURG MOTOR CO., ET AL.,
v.
JOSEPH LIBAL
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed an order appointing a receiver without notice in a foreclosure proceeding, finding that the lower court failed to follow statutory requirements for such appointments.
No, the chancellor was not warranted in appointing a receiver without notice, as the statutory requirements of the 1931 Chancery Practice Act were not met.
“Applying the sections of the Chancery Practice Act above referred to to the allegations of the bill of complaint upon which the appointment of receiver in this case was' made, we find that the chancellor was not warranted in the making of an order appointing a receiver without notice”
This quote establishes the court's finding that the lower court erred in appointing a receiver without notice.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appeal concerned an order appointing a receiver for lands and tenements involved in a foreclosure proceeding. The order was made without notice to…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
In this case the appeal is from an order made without notice appointing a receiver of the lands and tenements involved in a foreclosure proceeding.
The practice in this regard is controlled by Sections 73 and 74 of the 1931 Chancery Practice Act of Florida. These sections' of the Chancery Practice Act are statutory substitutes for Circuit Court Equity Rules 46 and 47, respectively.
Applying the sections of the Chancery Practice Act above referred to to the allegations of the bill of complaint upon which the appointment of receiver in this case was' made, we find that the chancellor was not warranted in the making of an order appointing a receiver without notice, although if notice had been given and the allegations in the bill of complaint in this regard had been substantiated on hearing after notice, the order appointing a receiver would not have constituted reversible error. See Jacksonville Ferry Co. v. Stockton, 40 Fla. 141, 23 Sou. 557; Lehman v. Trust Company of America, 57 Fla. 473, 49 Sou. 502.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed from should be reversed. It is so ordered.
Reversed.
*743Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Phillips v. Greene, 994 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ction 607.1432(1) requires notice to all interested parties and a hearing before a receiver is appointed. It is well established that courts are generally not warranted in appointing a receiver without notice. See, e.g., Leesburg Motor Co. v. Libal, 113 Fla. 742, 152 So. 16 (1934). [*373] Rule 1.620 requires compliance with the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610. Thus, incorporating rule 1.610 requirements, a receiver may only be appointed without notice if: (1) it appears from spe…
Authorities Cited
- Storey Mountain, LLC v. Freestone Enter., LLC (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
- Lehman v. The Tr. Co. of Am., 57 Fla. 473 (Fla. 1909)
- The Jacksonville Ferry Co. v. Stockton, 40 Fla. 141 (Fla. 1898)