CHARLES CANNON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Cannon appeals his conviction and sentence for sexual battery and lewd conduct. The appellate court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing because he was illegally sentenced under a version of Florida's sentencing statute that was not yet in effect when he committed his crimes, resulting in sentences exceeding statutory maximums.
Cannon's convictions were affirmed, but his sentences were found illegal and the case was remanded for resentencing. Under the applicable statute in effect when Cannon committed his crimes, he should have been sentenced to no more than 30 years on each sexual battery count and 15 years on each lewd conduct count; combined prison and probation terms cannot exceed the statutory maximum.
[1] A defendant cannot be sentenced under a revised version of a statute that was not in effect at the time the crimes were committed.
[2] When a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by probation, the combined duration of the prison term and probation cannot exceed the statutory maximum…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant is sentenced to a term in prison followed by probation, the combined times must not exceed the statutory maximum.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that combined prison and probation sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the offense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCannon was convicted of three counts of sexual battery by familial or custodial authority (first-degree felonies) and two counts of lewd or lascivious…
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Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence. We agree with the State’s proper concession that appellant was illegally sentenced pursuant to a revised version of section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes, that was not yet in effect at the time appellant committed his crimes.
Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), appellant should have been sentenced on each of the three counts of sexual battery by familial or custodial authority, a first-degree felony, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. Appellant was improperly sentenced on each count to 30 years’ imprisonment followed by 15 years’ probation—a term longer than statutorily prescribed. Gonzales v. State, 816 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“When a defendant is sentenced to a term in prison followed by probation, the combined times must not exceed the statutory maximum.”).
As to appellant’s conviction of two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation and one count of lewd or lascivious exhibition, all second-degree felonies, the maximum sentence on each count should have been 15 years’ imprisonment. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. However, appellant was illegally sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 15 years’ probation on each count.
Thus, as properly .conceded to by the State, appellant was illegally sentenced on all six counts. We, therefore, AFFIRM appellant’s convictions, but REMAND for resentencing on all counts.
On remand, the trial court should also address various scrivener’s errors noted by appellant, including a scrivener’s error in appellant’s criminal punishment code scoresheet that incorrectly notes appellant entered a plea.1 Additionally, the trial court should be cognizant that if it orders appellant to pay discretionary costs, fines, or surcharges on remand, it must give appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Brooks v. State, 676 So.2d 48, 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).2
ROWE and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Brooks v. State, 676 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Giles v. State, 103 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)