JEREMIAH BUTLER, APPELLANT,
v.
JULIE L. JONES, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
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Butler filed a petition for writ of mandamus/habeas corpus challenging the Florida Department of Corrections' calculation of his tentative release date (TRD). The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding it lacked jurisdiction over what it deemed a collateral challenge to a judgment and sentence. The appellate court reversed, holding that Butler's challenge to the Department's sentence calculation and interpretation is not a collateral attack on the judgment itself, and therefore the circuit court has jurisdiction to consider it.
The circuit court has jurisdiction to consider Butler's petition. A prisoner's challenge to the Department's calculation or interpretation of a sentence is not a collateral attack on the judgment and sentence itself, and therefore falls within the circuit court's jurisdiction to review via extraordinary writ.
[1] A prisoner challenging the Department's calculation or interpretation of a sentence must first exhaust administrative remedies.
[2] After exhausting administrative remedies, a prisoner may seek review of the Department's decision via extraordinary writ, such as mandamus, if not seeking entitlement to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Petition is not a collateral challenge to a judgment and sentence, and we are therefore constrained to reverse for the circuit court's further consideration.”
States the core holding that the petition does not constitute a collateral attack on the judgment, distinguishing it from cases where courts lack jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceButler is a prisoner serving thirteen and fifty-year sentences. He filed a petition challenging the Department of Corrections' calculation of his gain…
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Appellant challenges the denial of his “Petition for Writ of Mandamus And Or Alternative Habeas Corpus.” The circuit court dismissed the Petition because it found it had no jurisdiction to consider what it deemed a collateral challenge to a judgment and sentence. The Petition is not a collateral challenge to a judgment and sentence, and we are therefore constrained to reverse for the circuit court’s further consideration.
Where a prisoner challenges the Department’s calculation or interpretation of his or her sentence, the prisoner must first exhaust administrative remedies through the Department. See Massey v. Crosby, 860 So.2d 529, 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (mem.) (citing Bedford v. State, 775 So.2d 402, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)); Brown v. State, 13 So.3d 1087, 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (mem.). After, the prisoner may seek review of that administrative decision via extraordinary writ—mandamus if the prisoner is not seeking entitlement to immediate release. Head v. McNeil, 975 So.2d 583, 584-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see Bush v. State, 945 So.2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2006). The prisoner has one year from the date of exhausting administrative remedies to file the petition and venue is proper in Leon County— where the Department is located. Bush, 945 So.2d at 1213-14; Head, 975 So.2d at 584-85.
*925Appellant filed a Petition replete with references to how the Department calculated his gain time, forfeited gain time, and arrived at a tentative release date (TRD). Appellant further suggested the Department erred in failing to restore forfeited gain time due to an errant sexual offender classification. Appellant attached various administrative grievances and Department responses to the Petition—all discussing gain time and TRD calculations. Appellant calculated a 2036 TRD, the Department calculated 2058. Appellant was not collaterally challenging his judgment or sentence. He raised no issue as to the court, its rulings, dr the legality of his thirteen and fifty year sentences. His claims were directed at the Department and its implementation of sentences he agrees he has and does not challenge.
However inartful the Petition1 and whatever the merits may be,2 Appellant challenged the Department’s calculation of his TRD. The circuit court dismissed the Petition on the sole ground it was not the sentencing court and therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear a collateral challenge. This was error, and it requires our reversal.
Accordingly, the court’s dismissal order is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for the circuit court’s further consideration.
WOLF and ROWE, JJ., and GRIFFIS III, STANLEY H., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Chandler v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 308 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…). The sentencing court’s directive that Chandler’s 2009 VOP sentence “shall” run consecutively to the 2015 sentence required the Department to calculate Chandler’s release date in the manner it did. We are aware of our decision in Butler v. Jones, 225 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), where we reversed the dismissal of a prisoner’s challenge to the Department’s calculation of his tentative release date under the sentences imposed. In Butler, the circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction o…
Authorities Cited
- Corbblin Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 2006)
- Bedford v. State, 775 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Brown v. State, 13 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- Salm v. Carla-Rae Salm, 975 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Head v. McNEIL, 975 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- E.I. DU Pont de Nemours & Co. v. In re 1997 & 1998 Claims OF Ecuadorian Shrimp Farmers, 860 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Massey v. Crosby, 860 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)