MATTHEW MARANA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2017-08-14
No. CASE NO. 1D14-5829
WETHERELL, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
226 So. 3d 329 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2017) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Matthew Maraña appealed his conviction for traveling to meet a minor for sex, raising due process and entrapment claims. The court affirmed his conviction but reversed his sentence, holding that due process required a de novo resentencing hearing rather than the trial court's ministerial modification of the original illegal sentence.


Holding

The court held that when a sentence is vacated as legally impermissible, the trial court must conduct a full de novo resentencing hearing with the opportunity for both parties to present evidence. The trial court violated due process by simply correcting the sentence downward without a hearing where the court exercised discretion with tangible consequences for the appellant.


Headnotes

[1] A resentencing hearing following the vacation of an illegal sentence is de novo in nature, requiring the full panoply of due process considerations.

[2] Both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence at a de novo resentencing hearing.

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Key Quotes

“where a sentence has been reversed or vacated, the resentencings in all criminal proceedings ... are de novo in nature”

Establishes the foundational principle that vacated sentences trigger full de novo resentencing with complete due process protections

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Facts & Procedural History

Maraña was convicted after an online sting operation in which he traveled to meet "a minor" and "her sister" for sex. His original sentence of twelve …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Matthew Maraña appeals his conviction and sentence arising from on online sting in which he travelled to meet “a minor” and “her sister” for sex. On appeal, he makes two arguments that his conviction should be overturned because law enforcement officers violated his due process rights and impermissibly entrapped him. He also argues to be resentenced because the trial court simply modified his illegal sentence- when a new sentencing hearing was required. We affirm Appellant’s conviction without additional discussion, but reverse and remand for a resentencing hearing.

The Florida Supreme Court “has long held that where a sentence has been reversed or vacated, the resentencings in all criminal proceedings ... are de novo in nature.” See State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 406 (Fla. 2011). “[T]he full panoply of due process considerations attach .,. [and] both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence.” Id. (citing State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)). In this case, Appellant filed a 3.800(b)(2) motion arguing correctly that his prior sentence—twelve years in prison followed by an eight-year probationary term for a second degree felony—was legally impermissible. His motion also requested a resentencing hearing. The trial court granted his motion to vacate the illegal sentence, but then corrected the sentence downward on its own without conducting a resentencing hearing. Appellant’s new sentence gave him twelve years in prison followed by a three-year proba-tionaiy term.

It generally doesn’t present a problem for courts to correct ministerial problems with a sentence without a hearing. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 143 So.3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014); Taylor v. State, 185 So.3d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). But in this instance, the trial court exercised discretion in deciding Appellant’s new sentence that went beyond a ministerial act. Jordan, 143 So.3d at 339-40 (concluding that resen-tencing is not a ministerial act where the trial judge has judicial discretion and where the appellant will suffer practical consequences from the decision). Due process rights attached to Appellant’s resen-tencing here because the court had vacated a prior, legally impermissible sentence and exercised discretion in deciding on a new sentence that had tangible consequences for Appellant. We thus reverse and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

WETHERELL, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Forman v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
    …tley v. State, 279 So. 3d 850, 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("Where the court has discretion to impose a new sentence and is not merely performing a ministerial act, a defendant is entitled to a full de novo resentencing hearing." (citing Marana v. State, 226 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017))). The supreme court has agreed, holding that "resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights." State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Trott…

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