ZAVON DESHAWN TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's cost-striking order entered after the Rule 3.800(b)(2) deadline expired and reversed an improper GED condition in probation, remanding for correction.
An order striking costs under Rule 3.800(b)(2) entered after the rule's time period expires is a nullity, and a probation condition requiring a defendant to 'obtain' a GED must be modified to require only 'good faith effort' under section 948.037(1).
[1] An order striking costs under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) entered after the expiration of the time for ruling on such motion is a nullity and must be r…
[2] A probation condition requiring a defendant to 'obtain' a GED or high school diploma violates section 948.037(1), Florida Statutes, and must be modified to require only a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceZavon DeShawn Taylor was convicted of unarmed carjacking and sentenced. The circuit court attempted to strike certain costs after the deadline for rul…
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Zavon DeShawn Taylor appeals from his judgment and sentence for unarmed carjacking. Although the circuit court attempted to strike certain costs pursuant to Taylor’s request in a motion under Florida Rule of Griminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), the circuit court did'so after its jurisdiction under that rule expired. Therefore, we must declare the corrected judgment and sentence a nullity and remand.for re-entry of that order. See Calidonio v. State, 951 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (explaining that an order entered after the expiration of the time for ruling on a motion under Rule 3.800(b)(2) is a nullity); Sessions v. State, 907 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We also reverse as to an error in the separate order of probation. The circuit court improperly imposed a condition requiring Taylor to “obtain” a GED or high school *1282diploma. See Rodriguez v. State, 768 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), overruled on other grounds as stated in Mier v. State, 58 So.3d 319, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We remand for the court to modify this condition to conform to the requirements of section 948.037(1), Florida Statutes (2012), which would require Taylor to make a “good faith effort” to achieve such.skills or diploma. We affirm as to Taylor’s remaining , arguments. As the acts required by this opinion are ministerial in nature, Taylor need not be present for the court to undertake them.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
WETHERELL, RAY, and. KELSEY, JJ., concur.
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Anderson v. State, 190 So. 3d 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…Accordingly, and as properly conceded by the State, we are constrained, to affirm the conviction and sentence for traveling and vacate the conviction and sentence for solicitation. See Shelley, 176 So. 3d at 919; See also [*1122] Johnston v. State, 185 So. 3d 1281, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D499 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 26, 2016). : We reject Anderson’s remaining arguments without comment. AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. ROWE, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.…
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Kwamane Quason Silas v. State, 208 So. 3d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…veral arguments for reversal, only one of which has merit. Silas argues, and the State properly concedes, that the trial court improperly imposed a condition of probation requiring Silas to “obtain” a GED or high school diploma. See Taylor v. State, 185 So. 3d 1281, 1281-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Aviles v. State, 165 So. 3d 841, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); Rodriguez v. State, 768 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), overruled on other grounds as stated in Mier v. State, 58 So. 3d 319, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We…
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Marana v. State, 226 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…prison followed by a three-year proba-tionaiy term. It generally doesn’t present a problem for courts to correct ministerial problems with a sentence without a hearing. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014); Taylor v. State, 185 So. 3d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). But in this instance, the trial court exercised discretion in deciding Appellant’s new sentence that went beyond a ministerial act. Jordan, 143 So. 3d at 339-40 (concluding that resen-tencing is not a ministerial act where…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Nanivette Rodriguez v. State, 768 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Calidonio v. State, 951 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- Theron Speights v. State, 58 So. 3d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
- Mier v. State, 58 So. 3d 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)