WILLIAM GEORGE LOWE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1959-12-11
No. 1148
ALLEN, C. J., and SHANNON, J., concur.
116 So. 2d 254 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1959) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

William George Lowe was convicted of manslaughter for causing a death through operating an automobile while intoxicated. The appellate court reversed the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient to establish intoxication as distinguished from merely being under the influence of intoxicating beverages.


Holding

The conviction was reversed because the evidence was insufficient to establish intoxication as required by law. The court distinguished between being 'intoxicated' and being 'under the influence of intoxicating beverages,' holding that the former is a higher legal standard that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction.


Key Quotes

“A person intoxicated is under the influence of intoxicating beverages, but it does not necessarily follow that a person under the influence of intoxicants is intoxicated. If a person is prosecuted on a charge of causing the death of a person while intoxicated, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated and not just under the in-influence of intoxicants.”

This quote establishes the critical legal distinction between 'intoxicated' and 'under the influence,' demonstrating that intoxication is the higher standard required for conviction under section 860.01.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lowe was charged in two counts with manslaughter: one for culpable negligence in operating an automobile that caused Frank Lawton's death, and one for…

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Opinion of the Court
KANNER, Judge.

KANNER, Judge.

An information laid in two counts charged the appellant, William George Lowe, under the first count, with the offense of manslaughter for causing the death of Frank Lawton through culpable negligence in the operation of an automobile and, under the second count, with manslaughter through the operation of an automobile while intoxicated. The case went to trial before a jury under both of these counts. The jury returned no verdict on the first count but did return a verdict of guilty as charged under the second count. The appeal ensues from this conviction.

As stated, the jury made no finding as to the first count. It is well established in Florida that such a result is the equivalent of finding the defendant not guilty under that count. Barrington v. State, 1940, 145 Fla. 61, 199 So. 320; Stewart v. State, 1934, 114 Fla. 544, 154 So. 322; and Salon v. State, 1916, 70 Fla. 622, 70 So. 603. In consequence, the appellant was found not guilty of the charge of manslaughter through culpable negligence.

Where death of any human being is caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, it is denounced as a separate and distinct offense of manslaughter under section 860.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

A primary ground urged for reversal is that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the accused was intoxicated. In order to sustain a conviction for causing death of a human being through the operation of an automobile “while intoxicated”, it is necessary that the evidence establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was intoxicated and not merely under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Chief Judge Allen of this court in the case of Clowney v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 316, 321, very aptly stated the distinction and rule in this regard as it governs in Florida. Thus he said:

“A great deal of confusion is caused in criminal prosecutions by the use, interchangeably, of the terms ‘intoxicated’ and ‘under the influence of intoxicating beverages’. These terms are not synonymous. A person intoxicated is under the influence of intoxicating beverages, but it does not necessarily follow-that a person under the influence of intoxicants is intoxicated. If a person is prosecuted on a charge of causing the death of a person while intoxicated, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated and not just under the in-influence of intoxicants.”

The term “intoxicated”, therefore, is stronger than the term “under the influence of intoxicating beverages”; but the latter term is embraced within the former. Clowney v. State, supra; and Taylor v. State, Fla.1950, 46 So.2d 725.

A careful study of the evidence adduced shows use of intoxicants but not of such a nature or degree as to meet the test required to establish that the appellant was intoxicated and not simply under the influence of intoxicants. So we follow the view that where the evidence of the offense of which an accused is convicted is of such inconclusive character that the ends of justice would be best served by awarding a new trial, the judgment will be reversed and a new trial awarded. Stephens v. State, 1939, 140 Fla. 163, 191 So. 294.

There are other points raised by the appellant but because of the conclusion we have reached, it is unnecessary to deal with these. Accordingly, the judgment and sen*256tence are hereby reversed and set aside, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed.

ALLEN, C. J., and SHANNON, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Lowe, 130 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
    …rged under the second count of the information. The appel-lee appealed the conviction to this Court and the judgment entered by the trial court on the second count was reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial. See Lowe v. State, Fla.App., 116 So. 2d 254. [*289] Thereafter, and as a result of the same automobile collision hereinbefore referred to, a second information was filed against the appellee charging him in the first count with driving a motor vehicle in such an unlawful manner so as to cause…
  • Dudley George Hanemann v. State, 221 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
    …of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, * * [*230] The second count then is a separate and distinct offense from the offenses of manslaughter through culpable negligence. Lowe v. State, 116 So. 2d 254 (Fla.App.2d 1959). Therefore, the requirements for proof of guilt urged by the appellant are not germane to the proof of manslaughter by operation of a motor vehicle by a person while intoxicated. An examination of the record discloses testimony fr…
  • State v. Fitzpatrick, 294 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …faculties under Florida law to support the charge of manslaughter under [F.S.] § 860.01, F.S. [F.S.A.]. The Court relies on the cases of Smith v. State [Fla.], 65 So. 2d 303; Cannon v. State [91 Fla. 214], 107 Southern 360; Lowe v. State [Fla.App.], 116 So. 2d 254 Section 322.262, F.S.1973, F.S.A. provides that in any criminal case arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while driving, or in physical control, of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when affected to the…

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