STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS L. FITZPATRICK, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appealed the dismissal of a manslaughter charge against Fitzpatrick, who was accused of driving while intoxicated and causing a death. The trial court dismissed for insufficient evidence, finding that a 0.18% breathalyzer reading alone could not establish intoxication, but the appellate court reversed, holding that such a reading creates a statutory presumption of impairment sufficient to proceed.
A breathalyzer reading of 0.18% creates a statutory presumption that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent their normal faculties were impaired, which is equivalent to being intoxicated. This presumption, combined with Fitzpatrick's claim of sobriety, creates disputed factual issues precluding dismissal on a motion to dismiss.
[1] A breathalyzer reading of 0.10 per cent or more by weight of alcohol in a person's blood creates a prima facie presumption that the person was under the influence of alco…
[2] A motion to dismiss an information based on undisputed facts is precluded when those facts present disputed issues of material fact.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"being under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the extent that one's normal faculties are impaired, or so as to deprive one of full possession of his normal faculties", is equivalent to "being intoxicated."”
Establishes the legal equivalence between the statutory formulation of impairment and intoxication, a key distinction that undermined the trial court's dismissal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFitzpatrick was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence to the extent of impairing his normal faculties, causi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
DOWNEY, Judge.
Appellee was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties causing the death of a human being. Pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4), RCrP, 33 F.S.A. he moved to dismiss the information. Said motion was granted and the state has filed this interlocutory appeal.
The thrust of appellee’s motion is that the undisputed facts do not establish a pri-ma facie case of guilt because appellee contends that the state relies upon a breathalyzer reading of 0.18 per cent by weight of alcohol; that such a reading does not indicate intoxication, nor being under the influence to the extent that one’s normal faculties are impaired. Appellee also states in said sworn motion that he was in full possession of his normal faculties, unimpaired. In granting said motion the court stated:
“The Court finds as a matter of law that .18% blood alcohol in and of itself is insufficient evidence of intoxication or being deprived of full possession of normal faculties under Florida law to support the charge of manslaughter under [F.S.] § 860.01, F.S. [F.S.A.]. The Court relies on the cases of Smith v. State [Fla.], 65 So. 2d 303; Cannon v. State [91 Fla. 214], 107 Southern 360; Lowe v. State [Fla.App.], 116 So. 2d 254
Section 322.262, F.S.1973, F.S.A. provides that in any criminal case arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while driving, or in physical control, of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, when affected to the extent that one’s normal faculties are impaired, the results of a properly administered breathalyzer test are admissible in evidence, and the amount of blood alcohol in the person’s blood as shown by the test shall give rise to certain presumptions; in the case of a reading of 0.10 per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood it shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.
Appellee acknowledges in his motion that the state possessed a breathalyzer reading of 0.18 per cent. Thus, the effect of the motion was to pit appellee’s claim to sobriety against the statutory presumption that he was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent his normal faculties were impaired. What the evidence may show at trial as to appellee’s impairment, or whether or not he in fact caused the accident resulting in death remains to be seen. But in this posture of the case there were disputed facts precluding dismissal.
The trial court relied upon Smith v. State, supra, Cannon v. State, supra, and Lowe v. State, supra, in dismissing the information presumably for the proposition that “being under the influence of intoxicating liquor” and “being intoxicated” are different terms and do not mean the same thing. This of course is true. However, “being under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the extent that one’s normal faculties are impaired, or so as to deprive one of full possession of his normal faculties”, is equivalent to “being intoxicated.” Clowney v. State, Fla.1958, 102 So. 2d 619. Thus, in the case at bar, if appellee had a breathalyzer reading of 0.18 per cent he is presumed to be under the influence to the extent his normal faculties are impaired, i. e., he is presumed to be intoxicated.
Accordingly, the order dismissing the information is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the information.
OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Harris, 348 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1977)…ce. We have for review by petition for writ of certiorari granted the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Harris v. State, reported at 334 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1976), which directly conflicts with State v. Fitzpatrick, 294 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA, 1974). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The decision for review holds that, to charge the crime of manslaughter under Section 860.01(2), Florida Statutes, the charging document must u…
-
Kujawa v. State, 405 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…truction was that it was not applicable to a prosecution for manslaughter under Section 860.01, Florida Statutes (1977), which objection, as both the State and trial court pointed out at the charge conference, was foreclosed by State v. Fitzpatrick, 294 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Kujawa stated no other ground of objection at trial3 and, indeed, in his motion for new trial made no complaint at all about the instruction. He requested no additional instructions. On this appeal, he attempts to challenge the…
-
Sambrine v. State, 355 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…102 So. 2d 619 (Fla.1958); Eizenman v. State, 132 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Lemming v. State, 159 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Crum v. State, 172 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Silver v. State, 188 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1966); State v. Fitzpatrick, 294 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Gillman v. State, 346 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Miranda v. State, 354 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cannon v. State, 107 So. 360 (Fla. 1926)
- Smith v. State, 65 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1953)
- Clowney v. State, 102 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1958)
- Lowe v. State, 116 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)