STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,

v.

LOUIS ALBERT BARONE ET AL., APPELLEES

DREW, Justice.

The State appeals from a final judgment of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida holding Sections 828.-19 and 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., unconstitutional. 1 The final judgment quashed *491an amended 'four count information filed in the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County against the appellees, Louis Albert Barone, Arthur James Horton, Mike Angel Acosta, and Harry Herman Devendorf, charging them with contributing to the delinquency of an unmarried female person under the age of seventeen years. The first three counts were framed under Section 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.2 and the fourth count was framed under Section 828.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.3

*492We accepted jurisdiction under Article V, Section 4(2) of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A.4 after having- determined that the judgment appealed from was a final judgment,5 and that it passed upon the validity of two state statutes by holding each to be unconstitutional and void.

Section 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., under which each of the first three counts of the information charged the appellees with contributing to the delinquency of an unmarried female person under the age of seventeen years, provides that the meaning of a “delinquent child” shall be. that defined under the laws of Florida. While no specific mention is made of it in Sections 828.19 or 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., there is but one place in the statutes of this State where the words “delinquent child1” are delimited. That is to be found in Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.:

“(6) ‘Child’ means any married or unmarried person under the age of seventeen years, or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of seventeen years.

# * * * * *

“(11) ‘Delinquent child’ means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred; or is incorrigible; or is a persistent truant from school or who is beyond the control of the child’s parent or other legal custodian; or who associates with criminals, reputed criminals, or vicious or immoral persons; or is growing up in idleness or crime; or whose occupation, behavior, or associations are such as to injure or endanger the welfare of the child or the welfare of others; or who is found in a place predominantly used for selling intoxicating drinks for consumption on the premises.”

The allegations in counts one, two and three show that the appellees, by their acts and conduct encouraged the named female child to become a “delinquent child” within the area of the definition supra by encouraging the child to associate with vicious or immoral persons, and to engage in such behavior as to injure or endanger her welfare.6

Courts of this country have uniformly upheld statutes of the type here involved against claims that they were unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, and the United States Supreme Court has declined, by denying certiorari, opportunities offered to it to review such holdings. No useful purpose would be served by extensive quotations from the many well reasoned cases from the other jurisdictions where statutes almost identical to ours have been sustained against similar attacks. Typical of the language in statutes *493upheld by the courts in other jurisdictions is that of Washington which made it a misdemeanor to

“ ‘encourage, cause, or contribute to the * * * delinquency’ of a minor child”.7

The statute did not define or specify the particular act or acts which would constitute the offense. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of that state summarized its views on the matter by observing

“It is within the province of the Legislature in creating an offense to define it by a particular description of the acts constituting it, or to define it as an act which produces a certain defined or described result.”

This is a universal rule8 and we have found no case holding otherwise.

The trial court held Section 828.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The fourth count of the information charged the appellees with contributing to the delinquency of an unmarried female person under the age of seventeen years contrary to this section in which “delinquent child” is not defined but reference is made to “as defined under the laws of Florida”. The authorities cited supra supporting the constitutionality of Section 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., are equally applicable to Section 828.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. We hold that the section is sufficiently definite and certain to be capable of enforcement and that the constitutional tests and requirements have been met.

We need discuss but one more feature of this case, namely whether count one of the information, supra, which charges the offense in the language of Section 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is too vague and indefinite. Having upheld the constitutionality of Section 828.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. under which the count is framed, it is obvious by even a casual reading of the count that it is clearly specific, certain and definite, and not subject to the infirmity alleged.

The judgment of the Criminal Court of Record is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, C. J., and TERRELL, ROBERTS, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., and STURGIS, District Court Judge, concur.