BURTON GINSBERG, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLOTTE GINSBERG, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A divorced husband appealed a final divorce decree challenging the sufficiency of evidence for extreme cruelty, the award structure, alleged judicial bias, and the amount of alimony and child support ordered. The appellate court affirmed the divorce decree while modifying it to separately allocate alimony and child support amounts for tax purposes.
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the extreme cruelty finding under Florida law; that while undivided awards are not void, either party may apply for separate allocation of alimony and child support; that no abuse of discretion occurred regarding the amounts awarded; and that the alleged judicial bias claim was without merit.
“what causes mental torture, undermines the health or tends to dethrone the reason may be different among spouses, depending on the degree of their culture, emotions, nervous reaction or moral response”
Establishes the relative standard for extreme cruelty in Florida divorce law, emphasizing individual circumstances
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant/appellant husband was sued for divorce by his wife on the ground of extreme cruelty. The trial court granted the divorce, awarded custod…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Divorce cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant, who was the defendant in a suit for divorce, has appealed from the final decree which, inter alia, (1) granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of extreme cruelty; (2) awarded her custody of the minor children; (3) required the defendant to pay “as alimony and for support of the children of the parties,” the sum of $250 weekly; (4) allowed the wife to occupy the home; and (5) required the defendant husband to pay certain outstanding obligations and attorney’s fees.
*138The appellant has filed 37 assignments of error which are the basis of the four points argued in his brief. He argues first, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decree of divorce; second, he contends that the chancellor erred in making an undivided award for alimony and child support; third, that the chancellor’s repeated expressions of hostility and prejudice deprived him of a fair trial; and lastly, he contends that the sums which the chancellor awarded the plaintiff were excessive and beyond his ability to pay.
In Carlton v. Carlton, Fla.1958, 104 So.2d 363, 364, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Supreme Court of Florida, said:
“It is settled in this state that extreme cruelty, as a ground for divorce, is relative. As we pointed out in Diem v. Diem, 141 Fla. 260, 193 So. 65, what causes mental torture, undermines the health or tends to dethrone the reason may be different among spouses, depending on the degree of their culture, emotions, nervous reaction or moral response. Accord: Collins v. Collins, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 604; Grossman v. Grossman, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 115, 117; Lyon v. Lyon, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 679, 681 and cases cited. As stated in the Lyon case, 'Thus, in determining whether particular conduct constitutes extreme cruelty, the test is not whether the conduct shoidd, result in the infliction of pain and suffering, but whether the conduct does, in fact, have that effect upon the other spouse; and if it does, then the offending spouse continues in the indulgence in that conduct at his or her peril of destroying and bringing to an end the marital relation.’ ” [Emphasis in original opinion]
Applying then the test as discussed in the authority above cited to the evidence adduced, we conclude there was sufficient showing that the defendant’s conduct constituted extreme cruelty.
Both parties agree that appellant’s point No. 2 is controlled by the decision in Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 456, 457, wherein this same question was posed. We there held:
“Where this question has been raised it has been held that such an award is not void, but that either party should be at liberty to apply to the trial court at any time for allocation of the separate amounts intended for alimony and for child support. Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 754, 756; Zalka v. Zalka, Fla.1958, 100 So.2d 157, 159-160; Katiba v. Katiba, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 693.”
Here, as in the Rogoff case, the appellant sought to have allocated in separate amounts the award of alimony and child support. This application for relief was oh the basis that the allocation would benefit the appellant for income tax purposes which was sufficient consideration for separation of the award. The decree appealed should be modified to that extent.
In point four, the appellant contends that the chancellor’s awards of alimony, child support, attorney’s fees and court costs are clearly beyond his capacity and ability to pay. It is well settled that the allowance of such awards and the amounts thereof is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the chancellor. The appellant has the burden of clearly demonstrating that the chancellor abused his discretion. See Pross v. Pross, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 671; Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, Fla.App.1957, 96 So.2d 663; Rogoff v. Rogoff, supra; and 10 Fla.Jur., Divorce, Separation and Annulment, § 137. No abuse of discretion has been shown and in the absence thereof we will not substitute our judgment for that of the chancellor.
We have considered the appellant’s remaining point and find it to be without merit.
*139Accordingly, the final decree appealed is affirmed, with directions to modify the decree by allocating separate amounts for alimony and child support.
Affirmed with directions.
PEARSON and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…ition for an increase in alimony. A party who challenges a child support or alimony ruling has the burden of clearly showing it represents an abuse of discretion. Gilbert v. Gilbert, Fla.App.1958, 105 So. 2d 379; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 137, 138, 2 A.L.R. 3d 592. Such ruling being within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, an appellate court is not prone to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge, unless it affirmatively appears that the trial judge abused his…
-
Weinstein v. Doreene Weinstein, 148 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)…Tex.Civ.App., 1947, 201 S.W. 2d 865. As to the award of attorney’s fees, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. See: Pross v. Pross, Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 671; Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 456; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 137. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the final decree is affirmed in all particulars except as to that portion ordering a sale of the homestead property within 6 months of the date of the final decree, and reserving unto the chancellor the rig…
-
Felice Ginsberg v. Goldstein, 404 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…the appellant. As to the remaining $505.38, the judgment is affirmed.7 Affirmed in part, reversed in part. . The prior appellate history of this case stretches from Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 113 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), and Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 127 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), to Goldstein v. Ginsberg, 399 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). . An initial challenge by Ginsberg to Charlotte’s right to the $505.38 difference has been withdrawn and only $1,500 is now in issue. [3] 3. James v. Commercial Bank…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Pross v. Pross, 72 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1954)
- Diem v. Diem, 141 Fla. 260 (Fla. 1940)
- Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, 96 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)
- Rogoff v. Rogoff, 115 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Lyon v. Lyon, 54 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1951)
- Zalka v. Zalka, 100 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1958)
- Rambo v. Mayo, 65 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1953)
- Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, 65 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1953)
- Grossman v. Grossman, 90 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1956)
- Katiba v. Katiba, 110 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)