STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. LA VIGNE ELECTRIC COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
ROBERT L. FLOYD, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER. V. ROBERT L. FLOYD, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. LA VIGNE ELECTRIC COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
ROBERT L. FLOYD, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT; STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER. V. ROBERT L. FLOYD, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
131 So. 2d 208
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961)
Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases
Opinion of the Court
A rule nisi in prohibition was issued in each of these cases. No return has been made by the respondent. We have therefore considered the allegations of the suggestion and the documents in support thereof. See State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Wiseheart, Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 810.
We hold that the suggestion makes a prima facie case. A trial judge may not grant a petition for rehearing addressed to a summary final judgment. Cf. Marans v. Stang, Fla.App.1960, 124 So.2d 891.
Accordingly, judgment in prohibition is awarded, but we assume it will not be necessary to issue the writ.
HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON, and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bramble v. Garris, 144 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…attempt to analogize to various Supreme Court opinions which are asserted to be inconsistent. A recent and illuminating decision in this area is Floyd v. State, Fla.1962, 139 So. 2d 873. The Third District Court of Appeal, in an opinion recorded at 131 So. 2d 208, entered judgment prohibiting a trial judge from granting a petition for rehearing addressed to a summary judgment. After issuing writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court exhaustively considered the matter, and found that the inherent powers of a court…
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C. M. Whitney Co., Inc. v. Mid-State Prestressed Concrete Co., 140 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)…uling on plaintiff’s motion. This oversight was called to the court's attention during the hearing on defendant’s petition for rehearing. The court found that in view of the decision in State ex rel. La Vigne Electric Company v. Floyd, Fla.App.1961, 131 So. 2d 208,1 it was without jurisdiction to entertain .the- petition for rehearing. Defendant then brought this appeal. The determinative question here is whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. We hold that it did.…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Lavigne Elec. Co. v. Floyd, 140 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)…[*627] PER CURIAM. Whereas judgment in prohibition in the above styled cause was awarded by this court on June 9, 1961, 131 So. 2d 208; and Whereas, on review by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida, by an opinion and judgment filed March 21, 1962, 139 So. 2d 873, having quashed this court’s judgment in prohibition, and the mandate of the Supreme Court thereon having been file…
Authorities Cited
- Marans v. Stang, 124 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- State ex rel. Daniel L. Ginsberg v. Wiseheart, 120 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)