GEORGE J. SULLIVAN, AS ADMINISTRATOR C.T.A. OF THE ESTATE OF MARY E. SUTTON SULLIVAN, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
CHASE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND SELENA M. POSTER, APPELLEES
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Sullivan, as administrator of his deceased wife's estate, appealed a summary judgment favoring Chase Federal Savings and Loan and Selena Poster regarding a joint bank account. The appellate court reversed, finding the account was an attempted testamentary devise that failed to comply with Florida statutory requirements, and remanded for entry of a decree in Sullivan's favor. On remand, the trial court improperly allowed the defendant to amend her answer to raise new issues, which the appellate court found beyond its jurisdiction.
The appellate court held that the joint bank account constituted a testamentary transfer that was void for failure to comply with Florida statutory requirements, and therefore the defendant Poster was not entitled to the funds. On remand, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to allow the defendant to amend her answer to raise new issues; such an order exceeded the scope of the mandate and was quashed.
“Since the evidence in the instant case shows conclusively that the joint bank account was established by Mrs. Sullivan as an attempted testamentary devise, it was error to hold that Mrs. Poster was entitled to the balance in the account at Mrs. Sullivan's death.”
Establishes the core legal holding that the account was a failed testamentary transfer and Poster had no entitlement to it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMary E. Sutton Sullivan established a joint bank account, apparently intending it as a testamentary devise. Upon her death, Selena Poster claimed enti…
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This cause is before us upon petition for constitutional writ and petition for entry of a decree in accordance with mandate of this court. The petitioner was appellant in this court upon an appeal from a summary final decree for the defendant. We reversed,1 using the following language:
“Since the evidence in the instant case shows conclusively that the joint bank account was established by Mrs. Sullivan as an attempted testamentary devise, it was error to hold that Mrs. Poster was entitled to the balance in the account at Mrs. Sullivan’s death. * * * The summary final decree is reversed and the cause remanded for the entry of a decree in accordance with this opinion.”
Thereafter present respondents, then ap-pellees, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to section 4(2), Article V, Constitution of Florida, 26 F.S.A. The Supreme Court, finding that the petition had been fortified by a certificate from this court that the controlling question was one of great public interest, issued the writ and heard argu*343ment. The opinion of the court2 discharged the writ, using the following language:
“We hold therefore that the gift of the funds was a testamentary transfer and void for failure to comply with the requirements of Chapter 731, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. A contrary ruling would operate to defeat the claims of those entitled to priority over testamentary beneficiaries, including creditors and the rights of widows in certain cases to have their dower set apart.
“For the reasons stated the decision under review is not disturbed and the writ of certiorari heretofore issued in this cause is discharged.”
The mandate of this court directed that the summary final decree was reversed and that a decree be entered in accordance with its opinion. The proceedings in the trial court pursuant to the mandate were restricted to that which would implement the holding of this court. It was necessary only to enter a decree for the appellant. Petition of Vermeulen, Fla.App. 1960, 122 So.2d 318; cf. Petition of Chakmakis, Fla.App.1959, 116 So.2d 256. The chancellor, however, misconceived the intent of the remand and has upon motion of defendant, Selena M. Poster, granted leave to that defendant to amend her answer so that the said answer would make it unnecessary for the court to rule upon motion of the plaintiff for the entry of an order on the mandate. The order granting leave to the defendant to amend her answer and raise new issues was beyond the jurisdiction of the chancellor and is quashed. Cone v. Cone, Fla.1953, 68 So.2d 886.
We are not persuaded that the chancellor has refused to follow or will not readily comply with the mandate of this court, as the same has been clarified herein; and for that reason, the petition for this court to enter such decree as should have been given by the trial court under section 59.34, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., or otherwise as authorized under section 35.08, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is denied without prejudice.
It is so ordered.
HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON, TILLMAN, and CARROLL, JJ., concur.
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Kovens v. Bluestone, 134 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…. We conclude that what cannot be done by a plain promissory note cannot be done by a plain endorsement upon a promissory note. Affirmed. . After plaintiff’s appeal was lodged in this court, we remanded the cause (Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla.App.1961,132 So. 2d 341) to the trial court for the entry of an order specifying whether or not the summary judgment was entered pursuant to that court’s construction of the mentioned section of the Constitution of Florida. The trial court having certified that the summary…
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Fla. Power Corp. v. Griffin, 150 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…318; nor is it a case where the trial court misconceived the intent of the mandate and failed, after ample opportunity, to carry out the mandate of this court, as was the case in Sullivan v. Chase Federal Savings and Loan Association, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So. 2d 341, and 132 So. 2d 343. The decision of this court affirming the final judgment did not in any way deal with the question, now raised, of payment of interest on the judgment from the time of its entry, and therefore, our decision and mandate in no way…
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Wood v. Manatee BAY Corp., 386 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…iencies or omissions in the original judgment (Beach Resort Hotel Corp. v. Wieder, 83 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1955)) or to do anything other than that which would implement the judgment which we had affirmed. Sullivan v. Chase Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n., 132 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Applied to the facts at bench, those rules nullify the supplemental judgment. The only possible predicate for the statement in our earlier opinion, that the judgment did not affect the debt underlying the cancelled mortgage,2 wa…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. George J. Sullivan C.T.A. of the Estate of Mary E. Sutton Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960)
- Cone v. Cone, 68 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1953)
- Matter of the Petition for Adoption of an Infant by Richard T. Vermeulen and Lucille P. Vermeulen. Anson A. Carrier v. Vermeulen, 122 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- George J. Sullivan C.T.A. of the Estate of Mary E. Sutton Sullivan v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 119 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- In re Adoption of Apostolos George Chakmakis. Paula Pearson v. Apostolos George Chakmakis and Flora Wallene Chakmakis, 116 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)