CALVIN KOVENS, APPELLANT,
v.
SAM BLUESTONE AND RAY GOODMAN, APPELLEES
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A creditor sought to collect on promissory notes endorsed by a married woman for her husband's debt. The court affirmed summary judgment for the wife, holding that her signature alone on the notes was insufficient to bind her separate property to her husband's debts under the Florida Constitution, which requires a specially executed written instrument.
A married woman's signature on a promissory note or endorsement is insufficient to bind her separate property to her husband's debts. Article XI, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution requires a specially executed written instrument, and this requirement cannot be satisfied by a plain promissory note or endorsement, nor can it be modified by statute.
“the note was given for the husband's debt. The question was decided in the negative. The Supreme Court stated that Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution sets forth the requirements necessary to bind the property of a married woman to pay her husband's debts, and it cannot be done by a plain promissory note, nor can a statute repeal or modify these requirements.”
Establishes the controlling principle that constitutional requirements for binding a wife's separate property cannot be satisfied by plain promissory notes or modified by statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff brought an action on five promissory notes against the defendants. The defendant Minnie Goodman signed the notes as an endorser, though …
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The plaintiff in an action upon five promissory notes suffered a summary final judgment in favor of one of the defendants, Minnie Goodman.1 The basis of the summary judgment was the defense that the debt evidenced by the promissory notes was a debt of the husband of Minnie Goodman and that her signature as an endorser on the notes was not witnessed and acknowledged as required by Article XI, Section 1, of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.2
There is no suggestion of a genuine issue as to a material fact. Appellant’s contention is that the signature of the wife on the notes is sufficient consent in writing to meet the requirement of the constitution to subject her separate personal property to the debts of the husband and that therefore he should not be barred from a judgment against her but that he might be barred from levy of execution on her real property. In addition appellant contends that the liberalization of married women’s transfers of personal property by Section 708.08, Fla.Stat, F.S.A., malíes her separate personal property liable upon her note for her husband’s debt.
*548In Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So. 2d 858, the Supreme Court of Florida decided a question certified to it from the circuit court, Pinellas County. The question was whether or not a judgment secured by the payee on a promissoy note executed jointly by the husband and wife may be satisfied by an execution against the wife’s separate property. It was stated that the note was given for the husband’s debt. The question was decided in the negative. The Supreme Court stated that Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution sets forth the requirements necessary to bind the property of a married woman to pay her husband’s debts, and it cannot be done by a plain promissory note, nor can a statute repeal or modify these requirements. We conclude that what cannot be done by a plain promissory note cannot be done by a plain endorsement upon a promissory note.
Affirmed.
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First Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne v. Berg, 153 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…Court’s answer seems clearly to have barred judgment as well as execution. The interpretation of Article XI as barring judgment as well as execution found in the Drake and Jette decisions, supra, was followed in Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla. App.1961, 134 So. 2d 547, cert. dismissed Fla. 145 So. 2d 473, when the District Court of Appeal for the Third District affirmed a judgment for a debtor’s wife in circumstances somewhat similar to those in the instant case. The rationale of the decisions in the foregoing c…
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First Bank & Tr. Co. OF S. Miami v. Kutner, 151 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Kellogg-Citizens Nat. Bank v. Felton, 145 Fla. 68, 199 So. 50; Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla.App.1961, 134 So. 2d 547.…
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Waechter v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 181 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)…ubject mortgage is not sufficient to render all of her separate property liable for her husband’s debts, and that it operates only to render liable for such debts the personal property specifically described in the mortgage. In Kovens v. Bluestone, 134 So. 2d 547 (Fla.App.1961), the trial court entered summary final, judgment for the defendant wife in an action upon five promissory notes, based upon the defense that the debt evidenced by the promissory notes evidenced the debt of the husband and that the wif…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418 (Fla. 1947)
- Kovens v. Bluestone, 132 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- George J. Sullivan C.T.A. of the Estate of Mary E. Sutton Sullivan v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 132 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)