DONNA FUENTES

v.

IRENE C. LINK, ETC., ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed June 19, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-2053 Lower Tribunal No. 22-2079 ________________

Donna Fuentes, Appellant,

vs.

Irene C. Link, etc., et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L. Fernandez, Judge.

Waugh PLLC, and Christian W. Waugh (Orlando), for appellant.

Virgil & Rubel LLP, and J. Eric Virgil and Stacy B. Rubel, for appellee Irene C. Link.

Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES and BOKOR, JJ.

BOKOR, J.

2

This appeal follows a summary final judgment in a quiet title action which disposed of real property owned by Douglas A. Link, who died intestate on July 21, 2020. Donna Fuentes is Douglas’s daughter, and Irene Link is Douglas’s surviving spouse. Donna alleges that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Douglas validly conveyed ownership of the property to Irene before his death.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to his death, Douglas executed a document assigning his homestead property in Miami-Dade County to a revocable living trust for the benefit of Irene. This document, the “Revocable Living Trust Agreement,” listed Irene as both trustee and beneficiary, providing that Irene would manage the property during Douglas’s lifetime and would then distribute ownership of the property to herself upon Douglas’s death. Douglas, Irene, and two witnesses signed the document. The document wasn’t recorded until after Douglas’s death.

During the probate proceedings, Donna petitioned to quiet title to the property, alleging that the trust agreement constituted an invalid conveyance. According to Donna, Douglas owned the property at the time of his death, entitling Donna (who is not Irene’s daughter) to a share of the

ANALYSIS

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1200 (Fla. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party can demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Issues of fact are “genuine” if a reasonable jury could potentially find for the non-moving party, and a factual issue is “material” if it could reasonably affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

1 The surviving spouse of a decedent is entitled to one-half of the intestate estate when the decedent is also survived by children that are not also children of the surviving spouse. § 732.102(3), Fla. Stat. The remaining portion of the intestate estate passes to the descendants of the decedent. § 732.103(1), Fla. Stat.

Here, the parties agree that the trust agreement wasn’t recorded during Douglas’s lifetime, but the record contains sufficient, unrebutted evidence of

1.

Transfer of Property: Grantor, in consideration of the acceptance by trustee of the trust herein created, hereby coneys, transfers, assigns, and delivers to trustee, his/her successors in trust and assigns, the property described in Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part thereof, by this reference, which property, held by trustee hereunder, is herein referred to as Trust Estate. Grantor, and any other persons shall have the right at any time to add property acceptable to trustee to this trust and such property, when received and accepted by trustee, shall become a part of the trust estate.

Additionally, “Irene C. Morris” is named as trustee and signed in acceptance and execution of this agreement, along with the presence of two witnesses. Further, the trust also designates to Irene as the trustee (who is also designated as the beneficiary of the trust), the obligation to “care for and manage the trust estate and collect the income derived therefrom” and after payment of taxes, assessments, and expenses, at the request of the grantor, the obligation to pay any leftover income to the grantor or whomever he may direct, but upon the grantor’s death the property goes to the beneficiary— Irene. The fact that the agreement purports to be revocable, alone, doesn’t create an issue of fact. Here, the trust instrument contained whereas clauses, incorporated into the agreement, that explicitly set forth that the intent was to collect income from the property during his life, and take care