HOOVER

v.

PEAK, C.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-2529 _____________________________

MATTHEW R. HOOVER,

Appellant,

v.

CATIA PEAK, o/b/o C.P., a Minor,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. William F. Stone, Judge.

August 7, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

Matthew R. Hoover appeals the trial court’s final judgment granting Catia Peak a permanent injunction for stalking against him. We reverse because the record does not support the imposition of such an injunction. I On Independence Day, 2023, Hoover aimed a Roman candle firework at several children present in his neighborhood. Peak’s daughter, C.P., was one of those children. C.P. had her back turned to Hoover when the firework went off, and she suffered a minor injury to her thigh.

2 Peak reported the incident to the Department of Children and Families, which led to Hoover’s arrest for child abuse. Hoover was also arrested for a separate domestic incident with his now estranged wife Mandelin Hoover. The court granted Mandelin Hoover a domestic violence injunction against Hoover with a nocontact provision. Then, in August 2023, Hoover and his ex-wife—not Mandelin Hoover—attended their daughter’s ninth-grade orientation at Crestview High School. C.P. was also a ninth-grader at Crestview High School. Thus, Peak, her husband, C.P., and Mandelin Hoover (Peak’s purported best friend) also attended the orientation. While at the orientation, Peak and Hoover crossed paths on four occasions. Peak believed that Hoover understood his criminal case for child abuse due to the fireworks incident to also include a nocontact order as to C.P. In fact, no such provision existed. Peak sought out the school police deputy to inform him that Hoover was on the premises and that he should be removed. At the same time, Hoover turned into the same hallway but after seeing Peak’s family, he walked away. Based on the four encounters at orientation, Peak filed the underlying petition for an injunction for stalking against Hoover. The trial court held a hearing, where it heard from Peak, her husband, Mandelin Hoover, and Hoover’s ex-wife. C.P. did not testify. The court also denied Hoover’s request to allow his daughter to testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Peak satisfied her burden of showing that a reasonable person would have been placed in substantial emotional distress by Hoover’s actions and granted the permanent injunction final judgment. Hoover appeals. II We review the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143– 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). But we review the sufficiency of the evidence for such an injunction de novo. See id. at 1144; Brennan v. Syfrett, 369 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023).

3 Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes, creates a civil cause of action for injunctive relief from stalking. Paragraph (6)(a) further provides that “[u]pon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such relief as the court deems proper . . . .” § 784.0485(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). Stalking occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person[.]” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. To establish a showing of “stalking” under the statutes, a petitioner must show evidence of “repeated acts” of “following, harassment, or cyberstalking.” Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144 (quoting Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). Moreover, competent, substantial evidence must be present in the record to support a finding that a “reasonable person” suffered from emotional distress due to the stalking. See Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1146 (noting that a petitioner must “prove stalking by competent, substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)); Brennan, 369 So. 3d at 324 (noting that “courts have repeatedly reversed injunctions where a reasonable person would not have suffered emotional distress from the asserted conduct.” (citation omitted)); Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (reversing a stalking injunction because the petitioner “did not sufficiently establish his case that [the respondent]’s conduct caused him substantial emotional distress[]”). Here, there was neither evidence of harassment nor following—much less evidence of “repeated acts” of such actions, that would support an injunction for stalking.¹ We address each in turn. A “‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct[2] directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to