JULIUS DANAL BUNCH

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-1691 LT Case No. 2018-CF-000172 _____________________________

JULIUS DANAL BUNCH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County, Alicia R. Washington, Judge.

Laura L. Cepero and William R. Ponall, Ponall Law, Maitland, for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

October 8, 2024

JAY, J.

Appellant challenges the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm on all issues and write only to address Appellant’s argument that the trial court should have allowed him to amend one of his claims before denying his motion.

Appellant negotiated a plea agreement with the State. Under

Appellant then sought postconviction relief on several grounds, among them being that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a sufficient competency evaluation, request a competency hearing, and preserve the competency issue for direct appeal by filing a motion to withdraw plea.¹ State, 336 So. 3d 391, 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 762 (Fla. 2007)). But the court does not need to order an amendment when “denial of the motion was not based on insufficiency in pleading.” See Winters v. State, 347 So. 3d 526, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); see also Ward v. State, 19 So. 3d 1060,

1 Generally, a claim that counsel was ineffective for not preserving an issue for direct appeal fails as a matter of law. See Strobridge v. State,¹ So. 3d 1240, 1242–43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). However, such a claim is cognizable when the defendant alleges that he pleaded guilty or no contest while relying on counsel’s erroneous assurance that an issue was preserved. See Anderson v. State, 183 So. 3d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Shade v. State, 59 So. 3d 1214, 1215–16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Appellant does not make that claim in this case.

Here, the court did not deny Appellant’s competency claim as insufficiently pleaded. The court noted that the claim was “conclusory,” but it did not end its discussion there. The court credited counsel for “appropriately investigat[ing] [Appellant’s] mental status.” The court also found the record was clear that Appellant was competent to proceed. Given these substantive findings—which culminated in the court’s conclusion that “[n]either prong of Strickland[2] [was] met”—Appellant is not entitled to a reversal to try to restate his claim. See Winters, 347 So. 3d at 527.

The record also supports the merits of the court’s ruling. Summary denial of a postconviction claim is proper when the claim is “conclusively resolved as a matter of law or by reliance upon the records in the case.” Harrell v. State, 338 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Claims alleging that counsel was ineffective must show deficiency (“errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”) and prejudice (“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867, 875 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694).

“To satisfy the deficiency prong based on counsel’s handling of a competency issue, the postconviction movant must allege specific facts showing that a reasonably competent attorney would have questioned competence to proceed.” Thompson v. State, 88 So. 3d 312, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). A defendant is competent to proceed if he has “sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the pending proceedings.” Id.

2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth deficiency and prejudice requirements for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Here, the record supports the court’s conclusion that neither deficiency nor prejudice existed. Counsel had Appellant undergo an evaluation for “competency, mitigation and sanity.” The evaluation found “no evidence or signs of a thought disorder or a major cognitive behavioral disorder.” It also found “no abnormalities of thought, affect, or behavior.” Under “various tests of mental control and mental status,” Appellant “present[ed] within normal limits.” Based on these and other findings, the evaluation concluded that Appellant was competent. The evaluation also noted that Appellant tried to manipulate testing to exaggerate mental health concerns. Thus, the record refutes any allegation that a reasonable attorney would have questioned Appellant’s competence to proceed. See Thompson, 88 So. 3d at 319.

Other aspects of the record further belie any notion that there was a “real, substantial and legitimate doubt” as to Appellant’s competency. See id. In addition to the competency evaluation discussed above, Appellant was an active, capable participant in the proceedings and made numerous sworn assertions that are incompatible with his claim for relief. See generally Scheele v. State, 953 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“A plea conference is not a meaningless charade to be manipulated willy-nilly after the fact; it is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in the case. What is said and done at a plea conference carries consequences.”); Henry v. State, 920 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (confirming that postconviction movants “are bound by” their sworn statements). The plea agreement included

Before accepting the agreement, the court conducted a sworn plea colloquy. Appellant responded appropriately to all the court’s questions. Among those questions, the court asked if Appellant was “being treated for any mental health conditions that may impact” his decision making. Appellant answered negatively. He also confirmed that he signed the plea agreement after reviewing it “carefully” with counsel so that he understood “everything that is on the form and all of its consequences.” He further verified that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation and there was nothing else that he wanted counsel to do. Based on Appellant’s responses, the court accepted the plea agreement, finding that Appellant entered it voluntarily and intelligently.

Given the entirety of this record, Appellant cannot show the prejudice that his claim demands. See Thompson, 88 So. 3d at 319; see also Faulk v. State, 284 So. 3d 1158, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (affirming summary denial of a postconviction competency claim in a case where the appellant “was able to express himself appropriately, confer with counsel, and understand the judge’s explanation of the proceedings,” and “[t]here [were] other documents in the record that undermine[d] the Appellant’s claims of severe mental illness prior to and during the proceedings”); Gillis v. State, 807 So. 2d 204, 205–06 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing a defendant’s written plea agreement and plea colloquy—both of which disclaimed mental disability—in holding that “the trial court correctly concluded that Gillis’s claims were conclusively refuted by the record” in a case where the defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective for not investigating his mental competence and history before allowing him to plead guilty).

AFFIRMED.

6

WALLIS and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________