A.C., A JUVENILE

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April⁹, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1490 Lower Tribunal No. 22-1531 ________________

A.C., a juvenile, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Orlando A. Prescott, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Chief Assistant Public Defender and Clifford Goldkind, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel Colmenares, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, GORDO, and LOBREE, JJ.

GORDO, J.

2 A.C., a juvenile, appeals a final order withholding adjudication of delinquency and issuing a judicial warning. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.145(b)(1). Because the trial court did not err in denying A.C.’s motion for judgment of dismissal, we affirm.

I.

The State charged A.C. with one count of misdemeanor culpable negligence under section 784.05(1), Florida Statutes. The charge stemmed from an incident at A.C.’s middle school involving his eighth-grade science teacher. A.C., who was fourteen years old at the time, smeared deodorant gel on his teacher’s desk, chair, the nearby floor and several areas of the classroom, causing the teacher to slip and fall. The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. At the end of the State’s case, A.C. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing the State had not established a prima facie case of culpable negligence. A.C. specifically argued the State failed to show he knew or reasonably should have known that his actions were likely to cause death or great bodily harm. The State responded it was not required to establish a “likelihood of death or great bodily harm” under section 784.05(1) and that A.C.’s conduct of smearing deodorant gel all over his classroom, including the floor, demonstrated a

II.

“[I]n reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal, a de novo standard of review applies.” P.N. v. State, 976 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State.” D.L. v. State, 138 So. 3d 499, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). “So long as competent, substantial evidence supports the verdict, the denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal will not be reversed on appeal.” Id. Additionally, “[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 747 (Fla. 2010).

4

III.

On appeal, A.C. argues the evidence presented was insufficient to establish he was culpably negligent. A.C. specifically argues the State failed to present any evidence to establish that he: (1) acted with gross, flagrant or reckless disregard for the safety of others; and (2) knew or reasonably should have known that his actions were likely to cause death or great bodily harm. In advancing the latter argument, he asks this Court to interpret section 784.05(1) as requiring that the defendant’s conduct create a “likelihood of death or great bodily harm” in order to qualify as misdemeanor culpable negligence.

A.

We begin our analysis with the plain language of section 784.05(1) as “[t]he ‘plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.’” Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)). As recently explained by our Florida Supreme Court, “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Conage v. U.S., 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “[w]hile we review the plain meaning of the

1 Section 784.05 criminalizes three separate offenses. Subsection (1), the provision at issue here, makes culpable negligence exposing another to personal injury a second-degree misdemeanor. Subsection (2) makes culpable negligence resulting in actual personal injury to another a firstdegree misdemeanor. Subsection (3) makes any violation of subsection (1) involving leaving a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a minor a third-degree felony if the minor uses the firearm to inflict injury or death upon himself or another person. See § 784.05, Fla. Stat.

B.

Despite the plain text of section 784.05(1), A.C. invites us to adopt the definition of “culpable negligence” as used in manslaughter and child neglect cases, arguing there is no compelling reason for applying different interpretations or definitions to the same word or phrase. The same word or phrase, however, can possess different meanings in different contexts. While “culpable negligence” is an element of all three crimes,2 the legislature clearly delineated the scope of activity it meant to proscribe and the

2 The crimes being: (1) manslaughter by culpable negligence in violation of section 782.07, Florida Statutes; (2) child neglect by culpable negligence in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes; and (3) culpable negligence standing alone (section 784.05).

3 A person who has been convicted of a second-degree misdemeanor, such as culpable negligence under section 784.05(1), may be sentenced “by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days” and/or may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $500. §§ 775.082(4)(b), 775.083(1)(e), Fla. Stat.

4 Section 827.03(2) criminalizes child neglect with and without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement. “A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the second degree[.]” § 827.03(2)(b), Fla. Stat. “A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree[.]” § 827.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat.

5 “Culpable negligence” has been defined in the corresponding jury instruction for section 784.05, Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 8.9, Culpable Negligence, as the following:

I will now define ‘culpable negligence’ for you. Each of us has a duty to act reasonably toward others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care for others. In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and flagrant. Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless disregard for human life, or for the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire want of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard for the safety and welfare of the public, or shows such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation of such rights.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.9.

The term “culpable negligence” has been defined in caselaw consistent with the standard jury instruction for culpable negligence offenses. See Aledda v. State, 337 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (adopting definition of “culpable negligence” as set forth in standard jury instruction 8.9, which contains no “likelihood of death or great bodily harm” requirement).

6 Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.7, Manslaughter, defines “culpable negligence” as:

I will now define ‘culpable negligence’ for you. As I have said, every person has a duty to act reasonably toward others. If there is a violation of that duty,

without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care toward others. In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and flagrant. Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire want of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard for the safety and welfare of the public, or such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation of such rights.

The negligent act or omission must have been committed with an utter disregard for the safety of others. Culpable negligence is consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7 (emphasis added).

C.

“The plain language of section 784.05 refers to exposing another person to personal injury or inflicting actual personal injury on another through culpable negligence.” State v. Simone, 431 So. 2d 718, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see also State v. Greene, 348 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1977) (holding section 784.05 as constitutional and stating “[t]he purpose of the statute is to make criminal those acts which create an unreasonably great risk of harm to others. The degree of punishment for such acts depends on whether injury is inflicted.”) (emphasis added). By a plain reading, it does not reference death or great bodily harm. For this reason, we find the plain and unambiguous language of section 784.05(1) precludes us from adopting A.C.’s interpretation of “culpable negligence” as requiring a “likelihood of death or great bodily harm.” Such an interpretation “suffers from a rigid parsing of the statutory language divorced from ‘the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”

IV.

A.C. argues that even if “culpable negligence” under section 784.05(1) does not require a “likelihood of death or great bodily harm,” the State failed to prove his act of smearing the deodorant gel was a course of conduct showing a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

It is well settled that “[t]here is no uniform schedule of specific acts that constitute culpable negligence.” Aledda, 337 So. 3d at 850. “[T]he defendant’s conduct is not viewed in a vacuum, but rather, through the prism of ‘the circumstances surrounding the particular case.’” Id. (quoting Russ v. State, 191 So. 296, 298 (Fla. 1939)); see also Dominique v. State, 435 So. 2d 974, 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Culpable negligence must be determined from the facts peculiar to the case.”); Medina v. State, 226 So. 3d 1018, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“Culpable negligence must be determined upon the facts and the totality of the circumstances in each particular case.” (quoting Ibeagwa v. State, 141 So. 3d 246, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014))).