BAILEY

v.

LAURIE, DESANTIS

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2024-1643 _____________________________

CHRISTOPHER “DOC” BAILEY,

Appellant,

v.

RON DESANTIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, and WILLIAM LAURIE, in his official capacity as Crescent City Commissioner,

Appellees. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

August⁶, 2025

LEWIS, J.

Appellant, Christoper “Doc” Bailey, appeals the trial court’s order denying his amended petition for writ of quo warranto, arguing that the court erroneously rejected his claim that Florida must give full faith and credit to the restoration of his civil right to hold office under Missouri law following his federal conviction. For

BACKGROUND

In October 1995, Bailey was convicted of a federal felony (a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri pursuant to a guilty plea.² He was sentenced to five years of probation, which terminated in October 2000. In 2012, Bailey moved to Florida. To date, he has not obtained a presidential pardon or a restoration of his civil rights from the Florida Board of Executive Clemency. In November 2022, Bailey won a seat on the Crescent City Commission, Group 2. He took the oath of office and began his term on November 14th. On August⁷, 2023, Appellee Governor Ron DeSantis issued Executive Order 23-159, declaring the Group² seat on the Crescent City Commission vacant pursuant to article VI, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 114.01(2) of the Florida Statutes on the asserted basis that Bailey failed to qualify for the office within thirty days from the commencement of the term of office because of his 1995 federal felony conviction. Following a special election in October 2023, Appellee William Laurie won the Group² seat. Bailey filed an amended petition for writ of quo warranto against Appellees, arguing that the Governor unlawfully removed him from office after falsely claiming that he failed to qualify within thirty days. Bailey asserted in part that his right to hold office was automatically restored upon his discharge from probation in 2000 by operation of section 561.021.2 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes, and that Florida must give full faith and credit to the restoration of his civil rights pursuant to article IV, section¹ of the United States Constitution.

1 We affirm as to Bailey’s remaining arguments without discussion.² See United States v. Bailey, 34 F. 3d 683 (8th Cir. 1994) (setting forth the factual background of the criminal case).

ANALYSIS

Because a writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary writ that is not an absolute right, its granting lies within the court’s discretion. Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004). While a trial court’s decision on a petition for writ of quo warranto is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, matters of constitutional interpretation are reviewed de novo. Israel v. Desantis, 269 So. 3d 491, 494 (Fla. 2019) (explaining that “[q]uo warranto is used ‘to determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or right derived from the State’” (quoting League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2017)). Under article VI, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution, “[n]o person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to . . . hold office until restoration of civil rights . . . .” Article IV, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution provides in part that the governor may, with

3 The Governor stated in a footnote of his answer brief that while not addressed by the trial court, Bailey’s amended petition for writ of quo warranto also failed because he had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a declaratory judgment. We need not reach this alternative rationale as we affirm the trial court’s order on the grounds set forth therein.

9

2. Except as provided in subsection 3 of this section,

a person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is convicted under the laws of this state of a felony or under the laws of another jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed within this state, would be a felony, shall be ineligible to hold any public office, elective or appointive, under the government of this state or any agency or political subdivision thereof, until the completion of his or her sentence or period of probation. However, the later-enacted section 115.306.1, Missouri Annotated Statutes (2023), provides that:

1. No person shall qualify as a candidate for elective

public office in the state of Missouri who has been found guilty of or pled guilty to a felony under the federal laws of the United States of America or to a felony under the laws of this state or an offense committed in another state that would be considered a felony in this state. Thus, sections 115.306.1 and 561.021.2 appear to be in conflict regarding qualification for elective public office following a guilty plea to a felony. Section 561.021.2 was enacted in 1977, while section 115.306.1 was enacted in 2015. Courts in both Missouri and Florida adhere to the later-enacted statute rule, making section 115.306.1 controlling. See Turner v. State, 245 S.W. 3d 826, 829 (Mo. 2008) (“[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict, the later-enacted provision, even when there is no specific repealing clause, repeals the first statute to the extent of any conflict with the second.”); Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]hen two statutes are in conflict, the more recently enacted statute controls the older statute.”). Bailey seeks to distinguish section 115.306.1 from section 561.021.2 on the ground that the former addresses whether an individual may qualify as a candidate on an election ballot while the latter addresses eligibility to hold office, but it makes little sense to disqualify a person from running as a candidate for elected public office yet make him eligible to hold the elected office. Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court recently stated that “the legislature has determined in section 115.306.1 that a plea of guilt

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Bailey’s amended petition for writ of quo warranto.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, J., concurs; ROWE, J., concurs with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

ROWE, J., concurring.

I agree that we should affirm the trial court’s order denying Bailey’s petition for a writ of quo warranto. But I would affirm because Bailey had an adequate remedy at law, and thus quo warranto was not a proper remedy. See e.g., State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So.¹, 2 (Fla. 1938) (explaining that a writ of quo warranto “will not be issued where there is another ample and sufficient remedy provided by law for the relief sought”); Gryzik v. State, 380 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (“Where quo warranto is an adequate remedy, it is the only proper remedy . . . .” (quoting State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964))).¹

11 Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution grants circuit courts the power to issue the writ of quo warranto as part of their original jurisdiction. Quo warranto, meaning “by what authority,” was a remedy at common law historically used to “test the right of a person to hold an office of franchise or exercise some right or privilege the peculiar powers of which are derived from the state.” W. Flager Assocs., Ltd. v. DeSantis, 382 So. 3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2024) (quoting State v. Gerow, 85 So. 144, 145 (Fla. 1920));³ William Blackstone, Commentaries *262 (under English common law, the writ was “for the king, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty”). In chapter 80, Florida Statutes, the Legislature regulates in certain circumstances when a person may file a petition. See § 80.01, Fla. Stat. (“Any person claiming title to an office which is exercised by another has the right, on refusal by the Attorney General to commence an action in the name of the state upon the claimant’s relation, or on the Attorney General’s refusal to file a petition setting forth the claimant’s name as the person rightfully entitled to the office.”).

Quo warranto has traditionally been an extraordinary remedy that “should only be employed with great caution and under very limited circumstances.” Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 723 (Fla. 2011) (Polston, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But even though the writ’s application at common law is narrow, the Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that some of its prior decisions have untethered the use of the writ somewhat from its “common law moorings.” See, e.g., W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (“[O]ver time, the use of the writ has drifted from its common law moorings.”); Richardson v. Sec’y, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 395 So. 3d 500, 506 (Fla. 2024) (Francis, J., concurring) (characterizing the petition denied by the Court in that case as “the quintessential example of a petition availing itself of the runaway nature of our quo warranto precedent”). Still, the supreme court has made clear that “an ‘essential feature’ of quo warranto is that it should be ‘used to challenge the authority to exercise a state power rather than the merits of the action.’” Richardson, 395

an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons so long as there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.” (citation modified)).

12 So. 3d at 504 (quoting W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287). Here, Bailey did not show that another adequate remedy was unavailable to him to challenge the merits of the Governor’s executive action. As explained below, there was at least one.

By Executive Order 23-159, Governor DeSantis, through his authority under section 114.01(2), Florida Statutes, declared a seat vacant on the Crescent City Commission, Group 2. The seat was deemed vacant under section 114.01(1)(h), Florida Statutes, which provides that a vacancy in office occurs upon the failure of a person elected to office to qualify for office within thirty days from the commencement of the term of office. The Governor determined that Bailey failed to qualify for office because he was a convicted felon and thus not qualified to hold office. See Art. VI, § 4(a), Fla. Const. (“No person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights.”).

Bailey argues that the Governor exceeded his executive authority when he declared a vacancy in office² because even though Bailey had been convicted of a federal felony, his right to hold office had been restored in Missouri by operation of a Missouri statute. Bailey asserted that Missouri’s statutory restoration of his right to hold office should be given full faith and credit under Article IV, Section¹ of the United States Constitution, making him qualified to hold office in Florida.

Section 114.01(1) defines when a vacancy in office occurs, and section 114.01(2) authorizes the Governor to issue an executive order declaring an office vacant. None of this is in dispute. Bailey’s petition focuses not on the Governor’s authority to declare a vacancy in office but on the Governor’s interpretation of what it means to qualify for office under section 114.01(1)(h). Rather, Bailey advances a constitutional argument to challenge the Governor’s interpretation, contending that he was qualified to hold

13 office despite his felony conviction because his civil rights had been restored by operation of a Missouri statute and that Florida had to give full faith and credit to that restoration. Indeed, Bailey pleaded in his original petition—which is not materially different from his amended petition—that “his petition presents wholly legal issues of constitutional magnitude.” But no matter how his arguments are characterized, his petition challenges the Governor’s exercise of the authority to declare a vacancy in office, not the existence of that authority. See W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (explaining that quo warranto is available to “challenge the authority to exercise a state power rather than the merits of the action”); State v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 47 So. 358, 359 (Fla. 1908) (observing that quo warranto was designed to determine “the existence of authority, not the proper exercise of it”). Quo warranto is not the proper vehicle for that challenge. See W. Flagler, 382 So. 3d at 1287 (“We have never used the writ to test the substantive constitutionality of a statute, and we decline Petitioners’ implicit invitation to expand the scope of the writ here. To do so would serve as an affront to an essential feature of quo warranto.”).

Moreover, Bailey had a proper vehicle available to him—he could have sought a declaratory judgment under section 86.101, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla. 1998) (“We have stated that under ordinary circumstances, the constitutionality of a statute should be challenged by way of a declaratory judgment action in circuit court.”); Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1991) (explaining that the purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to “afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations, and it should be liberally construed”). Indeed, declaratory judgment actions are routinely used to challenge the Governor’s executive orders. See, e.g., Bass v. Askew, 342 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (declaring that the Governor’s executive order suspending a county commissioner was insufficient and that the Governor lacked the right to amend the order of suspension). Because an adequate remedy was available, the trial court did not err when it declined to issue the writ. See State v. Duval Cnty., 141 So. 173, 176 (Fla. 1932) (“It is one of the fundamentals of procedure in quo warranto that the writ will not be issued where there is another ample and sufficient remedy provided by law for the relief sought.”).

14 _____________________________

Mark Herron of Messer Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Nicholas J.P. Meros of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellee Ron DeSantis.