DAVID SCOTT WELLS, AND NORTH FLORIDA OBGYN, LLC D/B/A WOMEN'S CARE FLORIDA

v.

RODRIGO QUINTERO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF IRIS QUINTERO, RODRIGO QUINTERO AND D.E.Q., A CHILD, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN RODRIGO QUINTERO, AND ST. VINCENT'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. D/B/A ASCENSION ST. VINCENT'S RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-3379 LT Case No. 2021-CA-003505 _____________________________

DAVID SCOTT WELLS, and NORTH FLORIDA OBGYN, LLC d/b/a Women’s Care Florida,

Appellants,

v.

RODRIGO QUINTERO, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Iris Quintero, RODRIGO QUINTERO AND D.E.Q., a Child, by and through his Parent and natural Guardian Rodrigo Quintero, and ST. VINCENT’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Ascension St. Vincent’s Riverside Hospital,

Appellees. _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Virginia Baker Norton, Judge.

Dinah S. Stein and Lindsey A. Hicks, of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfield & Stein, P.A., Miami, and Mindy McLaughlin and Kaitlin Rosenthal, of Beytin, McLaughlin, McLaughlin, Osborne, Brumby, Hoffman & Mirelman, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.

January 23, 2026

SOUD, J.

Appellants David Wells, M.D. and North Florida OBGYN, LLC d/b/a Women’s Care Florida, appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss three counts in this wrongful death medical malpractice action filed by Appellee Rodrigo Quintero. Concluding that Quintero failed to provide presuit notice regarding counts II, III, and IV as required by The Medical Malpractice Act, Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2018), we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

As personal representative of his late wife’s estate and on behalf of himself and his minor child, Quintero filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN. In the operative third amended complaint, Quintero alleged that his wife Iris died as a result of the medical negligence of Dr. Wells, an obstetrician and gynecologist, in his treatment of her uterine tumor. Prior to filing his initial complaint, Quintero served his Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation for Medical Malpractice on Dr. Wells and his employer, North Florida OBGYN. The corroborating affidavit from out-of-state obstetrician and gynecologist Dr. Marcela del Carmen asserted that, during the course and scope of his employment with North Florida OBGYN and while working at

II.

1 Appellee St. Vincent’s Medical Center did not join Dr. Wells’s and North Florida OBGYN’s motion to dismiss below and has not appeared in this appeal.² No second amended complaint is presented in the record before us.

A.

Initially, we reject Appellants’ suggestion that we have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3), which provides for interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that “deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of the qualifications of a corroborating expert witness under subsections 766.102(5)–(9), and (12), Florida Statutes[.]” Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(H) (emphasis added). The referenced statutory provisions address the necessary qualifications of persons seeking to offer expert opinion concerning the prevailing professional standard of care in corroboration of claims of negligence as part of the presuit investigation process required of medical malpractice claims. See § 766.102(5)–(9), (12), Fla. Stat. Here, this case does not turn on whether Dr. del Carmen was qualified to render certain opinions regarding alleged direct negligence of North Florida OBGYN or its other employees, or opinions pertaining to informed consent. Rather, Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN urged dismissal based on the absence altogether of any corroborating opinion supporting the claims raised in counts II, III, and IV. As a result, the plain language of Rule 9.130(a)(3)(H) does not vest us with interlocutory jurisdiction, as the rule is limited to denial of dismissal “on the basis of the qualifications of a corroborating expert witness.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(H). Yet, this does not end our jurisdictional inquiry. Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN alternatively request that we exercise our certiorari jurisdiction.

5

B.

Certiorari is “an ‘extraordinary remedy’ . . . provid[ing] this Court ‘the prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other remedy exists.’” Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Machalek, 383 So. 3d 534, 536 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (quoting Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 251–52 (Fla. 2023)). The writ is more limited in scope than that of review on appeal and is not “intended to redress mere legal error . . . .” Id. at 537. And certiorari does not serve as an end around to facilitate interlocutory review of orders falling outside those provided by Rule 9.130. See id. (citing Abbey v. Patrick, 16 So. 3d 1051, 1053–54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)) (“[Certiorari] is not a remedy that can be used simply because the order in question is not appealable . . . .”). To warrant certiorari relief from the denial of their motions to dismiss, Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN must establish that in denying dismissal the trial court (1) departed from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. See id. at 537 (citing Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 252). The last two requirements are often combined into the concept of “irreparable harm.” Id. “We must first consider the final two elements because irreparable harm is jurisdictional and must be found before we may decide whether there has been a departure from the essential requirements of the law.” Id. Because nonfinal orders subject to interlocutory review are limited to those set forth in Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, certiorari generally is unavailable to review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. See id. at 537 (citing Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 252). However, “Florida courts have created an ‘exception . . . when the presuit requirements of a medical malpractice statute are at issue’ since the ‘purpose’ of the Medical Malpractice Act is ‘to avoid meritless claims and to encourage settlement for meritorious claims.’” Id. (quoting Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 252). Thus, as the Florida Supreme Court reiterated in Carmody, certiorari lies “to ensure that the procedural aspects of the presuit requirements are met.” Id. at 537–38 (quoting Carmody, 372 So.

C.

The Medical Malpractice Act sets out numerous requirements a plaintiff must satisfy before filing a medical malpractice action. See Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 248. These requirements “address a legitimate legislative policy decision relating to medical malpractice and establish[] a process intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a full adversarial proceeding.” Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991); see also Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (quoting Williams).

3 The Act defines “investigation” to mean “that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert.” § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).⁴ “‘Medical expert’ means a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.” § 766.202(6), Fla. Stat.

III.

As Quintero failed to provide presuit notice to Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN as required by the Medical Malpractice Act regarding causes of action asserted in counts II, III, and IV of the third amended complaint, we REVERSE the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss those counts and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

WALLIS and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________