ERIC M. REDMOND

v.

FIRST GUARANTY MORTGAGE CORPORATION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ERIC M. REDMOND,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D18-2147

FIRST GUARANTY MORTGAGE

CORPORATION,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed April 12, 2019

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County, Mike Murphy, Judge.

Adam H. Sudbury and Melissa Alfonso, of Apellie Legal, Orlando, for Appellant.

Matthew R. Feluren and Anthony R. Smith, of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.

LAMBERT, J.

Eric M. Redmond timely appeals the trial court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motion for relief from a final judgment of foreclosure. Concluding that the court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason, we affirm.

The appellee, First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation (“First Guaranty”), sued Redmond and his codefendant, Kimberly Thomas-Tornillo, in foreclosure because they

Subsequently to the entry of the judgment, Redmond retained counsel; and on May 21, 2018, his counsel filed a motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) with an embedded motion to vacate the clerk’s default. Redmond explained in his supporting affidavit attached to the motion that he did not file an answer to the complaint because no one at the October 9, 2017 conciliation

1 A conciliation conference is defined as a relatively unstructured method of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party meets with the parties in an attempt to help the parties explore and settle their differences. Conciliation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). There is no indication in our limited record whether the trial court ordered the parties to attend the conciliation conference or if they attended this conference voluntarily.

On Friday, May 25, 2018, Redmond noticed his motion to cancel the sale for hearing on the morning of May 29, 2018. On Sunday, May 27, First Guaranty’s counsel cross-noticed Redmond’s motion for relief from final judgment and to vacate the default for the same May 29 hearing. Although Redmond’s counsel had reserved the time on May 29 for his hearing on the motion to cancel the sale, counsel did not attend the hearing. The trial court entered separate orders that day, denying both motions with the explanation that the denial was due to Redmond’s counsel having “failed to appear for the hearing.” Redmond’s counsel filed an unsworn motion for rehearing of these orders, and thereafter filed a notice of appeal.²

Redmond’s sole argument on appeal regarding trial court error is that he was denied due process when his motion for relief from judgment was heard and denied without proper notice. He contends that First Guaranty’s cross-notice of the hearing on the motion for relief from judgment sent on the Sunday afternoon before the Tuesday morning hearing was not reasonable notice for this substantive hearing. We agree. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(d) (requiring that a notice of hearing on a party’s motion “shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing”); Russ v. State, 622 So. 2d 501, 501–02 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (finding that a contempt hearing held less than two days after service of the order to show cause violated the defendant’s right to due

2 Although not fully explained in our record, it appears that the foreclosure sale set for May 29 did not take place.

We nevertheless affirm the trial court’s order under the “Tipsy Coachman” doctrine, which allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result, even for the wrong reason, where the record supports a legal basis for the order. See Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002). Because the trial court could have summarily denied Redmond’s motion for relief from judgment without an evidentiary hearing, the insufficiency of the notice of hearing on the motion is neither critical nor dispositive.

To be entitled to a hearing on a rule 1.540(b) motion, the allegations in the motion and accompanying affidavits must show a “colorable entitlement to relief.” See Smith v. Smith, 903 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Richards v. Crowder, 191 So. 3d 524, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Here, Redmond’s motion for relief from the final judgment is predicated upon his argument that the clerk’s default previously entered against him should be vacated. In order to vacate the default, Redmond had the burden of showing: (1) excusable neglect for failing to file a response to First Guaranty’s complaint; (2) a meritorious defense to the opposing party’s claims; and (3) due diligence in obtaining relief after learning of the default. See Szucs v. Qualico Dev., Inc., 893 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Second, Redmond failed to show due diligence by waiting almost seven months from the time the default was mailed to him before moving to vacate the default and for relief from the final judgment. See Szucs, 893 So. 2d at 711 (holding that filing motion four months after default is not due diligence in seeking to set aside default). Redmond also waited approximately six weeks before moving for relief from the final judgment that was entered against him based upon the default. See Hepburn v. All Am. Gen. Constr. Corp., 954 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Absent competent substantial evidence of some exceptional circumstances explaining the delay, a six-week delay in

AFFIRMED.

COHEN and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.

3 Redmond raised one other argument in his initial brief. He contended that this court should have granted his motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to allow that court to rule on his timely filed motion for rehearing. We disagree. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 permits courts to rehear matters only after entry of a “judgment.” An order denying a rule 1.540 motion for relief from judgment is not a “judgment” as contemplated under rule 1.530. See Helmich v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 136 So. 3d 763, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Accordingly, Redmond’s motion for rehearing after such an order was unauthorized. See Catalano v. Catalano, 516 So. 2d 77, 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure,² So. 3d 89, 93 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing the “unique nature” of an order entered on a rule 1.540 motion and clarifying that motions for rehearing directed to this type of order are unauthorized).