JAMES N. GLOVER, JR., ET AL.,

v.

FRANCISCO VASALLO, ET AL.,

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 18, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D19-2068 Lower Tribunal No. 19-1769 ________________

James N. Glover, Jr., et al., Petitioners,

vs.

Francisco Vasallo, et al., Respondents.

A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E. Trawick, Judge.

Josef Timlichman Law, PLLC, and Josef Timlichman, for petitioners.

Blanck & Cooper P.A., and Jonathan S. Cooper, for respondent Francisco Vasallo.

Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON and LOBREE, JJ.

LOBREE, J.

James N. Glover, Jr. (“Glover”) petitions for certiorari review of the trial

2 court’s order granting the motion to sever the operative complaint’s replevin count for separate trial filed by Francisco Vasallo (“Vasallo”). Because factual and legal issues underlying the severed count are inextricably intertwined with those of other counts, we grant the petition. According to the complaint, Glover owned a vessel and, through an agent, contracted with Mystic PowerBoats, Inc. (“Mystic”) to find it a buyer in Florida. Between November, 2018 and January, 2019, Mystic allegedly forwarded a blank bill of sale and contract to Glover for his signature, which he provided. Subsequently, Mystic made representations to Glover that there was a potential buyer for the vessel. In January, 2019, however, Mystic informed Glover that the sale fell through, “something happened,” and it was no longer in possession of the vessel. Glover then rushed to Florida, where Mystic operates, to check on the vessel’s whereabouts. After confronting a third party—then storing the vessel at the behest of Vasallo—who refused to release it, Glover filed suit against Vasallo and others asserting nineteen counts, including replevin, conversion, negligence, and fraud. He first obtained a writ of replevin and regained possession of the vessel. Weeks later, Vasallo successfully petitioned the lower court to dissolve the writ, producing for the first time the bill of sale and contract, dated November 2018 and December 2018 respectively, purportedly executed by Glover and transferring title. Glover alleges

3 that these were documents that he had executed in blank and that they were finalized by Mystic and Vasallo without his knowledge. Glover then amended his complaint to aver that the documents were fraudulent and aimed to deprive him of his vessel and the proceeds. Although the operative complaint alleges one count of replevin and two counts of negligence against Vasallo, he successfully moved to sever the replevin count from the remaining two counts against him and sixteen counts against others. “The applicable standard of review . . . is whether the challenged order (1) constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law; (2) causes material injury throughout the remainder of the proceedings below; and (3) causes injury that is irreparable, as it effectively leaves no adequate remedy at law.” Reilly v. Design Build Interamerican, Inc., 954 So. 2d 673, 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Boby Express Co. v. Guerin, 930 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). Where erroneous bifurcation of causes of action results in material injury that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal, the jurisdictional prong of certiorari review is met. See Choi v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 224 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); see also Kavouras v. Mario City Rest. Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Certiorari is an appropriate remedy for orders severing or bifurcating claims which involve interrelated factual issues because severance risks inconsistent outcomes.”); ACT Servs., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 29 So. 3d 450, 452

4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Martinique Condos., Inc. v. Short, 230 So. 3d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). “Rule 1.270(b) generally gives courts the discretion to sever claims ‘in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice.’” Choi, 224 So. 3d at 884. Nevertheless, “it is well-settled that it is a departure from the essential requirements of the law to sever claims that are inextricably interwoven based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts.” Id. “‘[A] single trial generally tends to lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned, and . . . separate trial[s] should not be ordered unless such disposition is clearly necessary, and then only in the furtherance of justice.’” Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 710 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Vander Car v. Pitts, 166 So. 2d 837, 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)). The dispositive question is whether the factual or legal issues underlying the severed claims, as alleged in the complaint, were “inextricably interwoven” or “intertwined.” See Lopez v. S. Audio Visual, Inc., 278 So. 3d 843, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Precedent employs these terms to alternatively mean that the issues are “overlap[ping],” ACT Servs., 29 So. 3d at 451, “common,” Ludeca, Inc. v. Alignment & Condition Monitoring, Inc., 276 So. 3d 475, 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), “interrelated,” or outright the “same.” Kavouras, 88 So. 3d at 214. Counts are intertwined where they share identical or substantially similar allegations of fact or law, Kavouras, 88 So. 3d at 214, arise from allegations of a