FRANCIS A. SOBIESKI AND ANNE DION SOBIESKI, APPELLANTS,
v.
FRANCES MARESCO, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's decision voiding a contingent fee employment agreement between attorneys and their client in a matrimonial divorce action, holding that such agreements are against public policy and unenforceable.
Contingent fee employment contracts in matrimonial actions are against public policy and therefore void and unenforceable. The trial court's decree declaring the contract illegal, void, and unenforceable was properly entered.
“attorneys' contingent fee employment contracts in matrimonial actions are against public policy and therefore unenforceable”
States the core holding of the case and the majority rule adopted by Florida
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Sobieski and Anne Dion Sobieski were employed as counsel on a contingent fee basis to represent the appellee in a prior divorce proceeding.…
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The appellants, plaintiffs below, seek review of an interlocutory decree and order, declaring “illegal, void and unenforceable as against public policy” a contract in which the plaintiffs were employed as counsel, upon a contingent fee basis, to represent the appellee in a prior divorce proceeding.
The principal issue presented by this appeal is the' validity of a contingent fee agreement in a matrimonial action. Neither counsel, in their excellent briefs, nor this court, by independent research, have discovered any Florida decision directly on this point. It does appear, however, that a number of other jurisdictions have passed on the validity of such an agreement and have almost universally declared such employment contracts void. The chancellor’s decree, here under review, is in accord with the majority opinion that attorneys’ contingent fee employment contracts in matrimonial actions are against public policy and therefore unenforceable. See: McCarthy v. Santangelo (1951), 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240; In re Fisher (1958), 15 Ill.2d 139, 153 N.E.2d 832; Dannenberg v. Dannenberg (1940), 151 Kan. 600, 100 P.2d 667; Baskerville v. Baskerville (1956), *63246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762; State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Jensen (1960), 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W.2d 459; In re Smith (1953), 42 Wash.2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 ; 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 166; 30 A.L.R. 189. There appears to be no good reason why Florida should not join those states which hold such agreements void and unenforceable.
No error is shown on this record in that portion of the order directing the release of certain documents and funds. Therefore, the decree and order under review is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Sheilah Kristine Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982)…ide counsel in the tort action. This, however, is inconsistent with the strong public policy of prohibiting contingent fees in domestic relation matters because such fee arrangements can adversely affect possible reconciliation. Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).11 Contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation matters are now deemed unethical. See Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 2-20, Disciplinary Rule 2-106(C); see also The Florida Bar v. Winn, 208 S…
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The Valparaiso Bank & Tr. Co. C. T. A. of the Est. of Coleman L. Kelly v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…e virtual assurance of a fee if either spouse can pay it. Moreover, contracts for contingent fees are prohibited in domestic litigation by public policy and by judicial canon. Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla.3d DCA 1962); Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule 2-106(C) (1970): “A lawyer shall not . . . enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which i…
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Salter v. ST. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…decree which upheld a contingent fee contract between her and the appellee, an attorney, relative to the recovery of her separate property in prior litigation. The appellant contends that this court’s opinion in Sobieski v. Maresco, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So. 2d 62, declared such agreements to be against public policy and void. In his decree, the chancellor distinguished the Sobieski case as follows: ** “ * * * The instant case appears distinguishable from Sobieski * * * and the authorities cited therein, wh…
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