ANN SALTER, APPELLANT,
v.
HARVEY J. ST. JEAN, APPELLEE
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The Third District Court of Appeal upheld a contingent fee agreement between an attorney and his client for recovery of the client's separate property in domestic relations litigation. The court held that while contingent fee agreements are against public policy in domestic relations cases involving alimony or property settlement, they are enforceable when limited to recovery of a wife's separate property.
Contingent fee agreements in domestic relations litigation are against public policy and unenforceable as they relate to alimony, support, or property settlement in lieu thereof, but are enforceable when they relate to the return of a wife's separate property. Additionally, even if the agreement were void as against public policy, the attorney would be entitled to a fee based on quantum meruit.
“contingent fee agreements in domestic relations litigation are against public policy and unenforceable as they relate to alimony or support or property settlement in lieu thereof, but that same are enforceable when they relate to the return of a wife's separate property”
The court's holding distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable contingent fee agreements in family law cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn attorney and client (Salter) entered into a contingent fee contract regarding recovery of Salter's separate property in prior litigation. The chanc…
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By this appeal the appellant challenges a final decree which upheld a contingent fee contract between her and the appellee, an attorney, relative to the recovery of her separate property in prior litigation.
The appellant contends that this court’s opinion in Sobieski v. Maresco, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 62, declared such agreements to be against public policy and void. In his decree, the chancellor distinguished the Sobieski case as follows:
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“ * * * The instant case appears distinguishable from Sobieski * * * and the authorities cited therein, which appear to relate exclusively to awards-for alimony or sums in lieu thereof. In the case at bar, the monies recovered’ for the plaintiff were those which constituted her separate property and it is clearly indicated in the provisions of the employment agreement, * * * that the plaintiff was desirous of seeking the return of her separate property regardless of the outcome of the divorce proceedings, * * *
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We approve the distinction made by the chancellor and specifically hold that contingent fee agreements in domestic relations litigation are against public policy and unenforceable as they relate to alimony or support or property settlement in lieu thereof, but that same are enforceable when> they relate to the return of a wife’s separate property. See: Article XI of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. and Ch. 708, Fla.. Stat., F.S.A.
It is further noted from this record that even if the agreement had beeni void as against public policy, the attorney would be entitled to a fee based on quantumi *96meruit, which services (from the pleadings and the evidence adduced before the chancellor) appear to have been worth at least what was awarded by the final decree. See: Estate of Sylvester v. Tesdell, 195 Iowa 1329, 192 N.W. 442, 30 A.L.R. 180; McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746; Ownby v. Prisock, (1962) 243 Misc. 203, 138 So.2d 279; 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 229.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the chancellor’s action is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
(concurring specially).
I concur on the ground that no reversible error was made to appear because the issue of a reasonable fee upon a theory of quantum meruit was presented and tried. The judgment is fully supported on this theory by the evidence.
TILLMAN PEARSON, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur on the ground that no reversible error was made to appear because the issue of a reasonable fee upon a theory of quantum meruit was presented and tried. The judgment is fully supported on this theory by the evidence.
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Sheilah Kristine Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982)…hts in decedent spouse’s estates). . See cases collected at 92 A.L.R.3d 901, § 13 (1979). . See cases collected at 92 A.L.R.3d 901, § 15 (1979). . Accord Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); McCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A. 2d 240 (1951); In re Fisher, 15 Ill.2d 139, 153 N.E. 2d 832 (1958); Dannenberg v. Dannenberg, 151 Kan. 600, 100 P. 2d 667 (1940); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W. 2d…
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The Valparaiso Bank & Tr. Co. C. T. A. of the Est. of Coleman L. Kelly v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…tirely, by the abolition of grounds for divorce and the virtual assurance of a fee if either spouse can pay it. Moreover, contracts for contingent fees are prohibited in domestic litigation by public policy and by judicial canon. Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla.3d DCA 1962); Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule 2-106(C) (1970): “A lawyer shall not . . . enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect any fee in a domes…
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Barwick, Dillian & Lambert, P.A. v. Carey L. Ewing, 646 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…e Barwick-Grego-ry letter agreement is not enforceable, it does not mean that Gregory forfeits entitlement to a fee. It means instead that Gregory would be entitled to compensation for work performed, based on quantum meruit. See Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94, 95-96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). See generally Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), review denied, No. 83,120 (Fla. May 5, 1994).8 In the present case, however, Gregory elected not to make a qu…
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- Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)