JAY LIEBMAN AND ANDREA LIEBMAN

v.

YELLOW BOOK SALE, INC.,

Before HENDON, TINKLER MENDEZ, and DE LA O, I].

PER CURIAM.

Jay Liebman and Andrea Liebman (“Petitioner-Defendants”) challenge non-final decisions rendered on October 6, 2008 and an ex parte order. We decline reviewing the non-final decisions in the October 6, 2003 order and find the ex parte order compelling discovery erroneous, thus warranting cettiorari relief. Appelinte Jurisdiction Obtaining cettiorari review requires that a petitioner submit £1 petition within 30 days after the lower tribunal rendered the order. Fla. R. App. P, 9.l00(b) 84 (e)(l). Rule 9.1_00(<>)(1)’s thirty (30) day timefrente constitutes a jurisdictional time limit, Mwcosukee Tribe ofIndians of [*2] O?'—80—’l⁴ 14:48 FR0l‘4l— T-378 P0002/0008 F-520 I Fla. v. Lewis, I22 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Failing to comply with Rule 9.l00(c)(l) creates a jurisdictional impediment prohibiting an appellate court from reviewing the meltel‘. Id. at 506. Here, the Petitioner-Defendants challenge non-final decisions rendered in the October 6, 2008 order. They filed a notice of appeal in the Third District Court of Appeal on November 5, 2008. Id. at 239. The jurisdictional timeframe’s thirtieth (30th) day fell on November 5, 2008.‘ By filing the notice of appeal on November 6, 2008, they filed it thirty-one (31) days after rendition. As we do not possess jurisdiction under Rule 9.130 and lack certiorari jurisdiction, we may not review the decisions within the October 6, 2008 order. Regarding the ex parts order, the Petitioner-Defendants submitted their amended notice of appeal on March 3, 2009, within thirty (30) days after the February 25, 20092 rendition date. Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the ex parte order. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b) 8:. 9.l00(c)(l). Ex Harte Orde_rCompelling Discovery The Petitione¹‘—Defendttnte seek relief from the ex 'parte order compelling discovery? Although the Petitioner-Defendants do not focus upon how the ex parte order violates the law, we observe~that a district court granted relief from an ex parts order compelling discovery where e court's local rule authorized ex parte orders. Waters v. Am. Gen. C'0rp., 770 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Waters, the district court noted that Local Rule 10 permitted ex paite orders compelling discovery only when “the motion to compel alleges a complete failure to respond or object to discovery” and the litigant made “no request for extension of time". Ia‘. The district coutt reasoned that where the facts do not satisfy Local Rule l0, Rules “l.380(o) and l.090(d) apply”, thus “requiring that the motion not be heard without proper notice”. Id. (emphasis added). Waters relates to the Seventeenth Circuit’s Local Rule 10 and similar local rules from l Yom Kippur (October 9, 2008) and Columbus Day (October 13, 2008) did not toll the lurisdictional clock for filing a notice of appeal or s. petition. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.5l4(a)(1)(B). We found no clerk’s date stamp on the ex pane order. Although the trial court conformed the ex paite order on February 23, 2009, (R. 51-52), the Justice Electronic Filing Application (“JEFA”) shows the date as February 25, 2009. We presume February 25, 2009 as the rendition date. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i). 3 On October 19, 2011, this Court directed the Petitioner-Defendants to submit an amended initial brief within thirty (30) days and warned them that if they fail to submit an amended brief} the Court would “proceed based solely on the items currently filed". United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Total Rehab ii’: Med. Center, 8'70 So. 2d 866, 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). The Petitioner-Defendants submitted another brief, presumably their amended brief, on January 23, 2012, well over thirty (30) days after the October 19, 2011 order. In accord with the warning, we only review the brief filed on February 26, 2010. [*3] 0?—30—’ 14 14:48 As the Eleventh Circuit does not operate pursuant to a similar local rule, Waters does not completely control this matter.‘ An “ex parte proceeding is only proper where permitted by law”. Stare v. Calloway, 937 So. 2d 139, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). See Canon 3B(7)(e), Code of Judicial Conduct. This ex pane order does not reference an Eleventh Circuit local mle or administrative order authorizing ex porte orders resolving motions to compel. As no local rule or administrative order from this circuit authorizes ex parte orders in response to a motion to compel, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380(a) applies. Waters, 770 So. 2d at 1276. Rule i.380(a) indicates that parties should receive notice and rt hearing regarding a motion to compel. We do notlinterpret Rule i.380(a) as authorizing an ex parte order where a litigant fitiiflfl I0 attend £1 1110li0I1 Galloway, 937 So. 2d at 143. Accordingly, we vacate the ex parte order. Considering, that a “court has broad discretion to impose sanctions Cm litigflllte fol‘ their Colldllol before the court", JP. Morgan Chase Bonk v. Combee, 883 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. ist DCA 2004), options other than an ex parte order existed.

CERTIORARI RELIEF GRANTED.