TERRENCE BOYKINS
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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Terrence Boykins appealed a trial court's decision to impose a 364-day jail sentence instead of the negotiated 120-day sentence after the court determined he committed a new law violation during furlough. The appellate court reversed, finding the case not moot despite Boykins having served his sentence, because he faces collateral consequences including potential liability for incarceration costs.
The appeal was not moot because Boykins faced possible collateral consequences from his conviction, including potential liability for incarceration costs under Florida statute. The court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the original 120-day sentence.
[1] An appeal is not moot when a defendant faces potential collateral consequences from a conviction, even if the sentence has been served and the defendant released.
[2] A defendant may face collateral consequences such as liability for the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs, even after serving a sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although Boykins has served his sentence and been released from jail, he faces possible collateral consequences from his conviction.”
Establishes that mootness doctrine does not apply where collateral consequences exist beyond the served sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoykins was granted furlough before serving his original sentence. During the furlough, the trial court determined he committed a new law violation an…
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d C rlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, John Eddy Morrison, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, an a ‘ for Appellant. Ansley B. Peacock, Esq., Assistant State Attorney, Megan Wood, Esq., Assistant State Attorney, and Katherine Fernandez Runctle, State Attorney, for Appeliee. "Before MURPHY, MILLER and R0DRIGUEZ-CHOMAT, J3. (MILLER, J). Terrance Boykins appeals the trial court’s failure to mitigate his 364 day jail sentence to 120 days pursuant to a negotiated agreement alter the trial court determined that he. committed a new lawl violation following his release on a furlough. The State concedes error in the determination that Boykins committed a new law violation, but contends thatbecause Boykins [*2] .4 i I ,1 VI '4 I l l l 1| 1,.. i has already served the 364 day sentence, the controversy is moot. This Court disagrees. Although Boykins has served his sentence and been released from jail, he faces possible coilateral consequences from his conviction. See Brown v. State, 128 So. 3d 964, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that defendant’s appeal from a two~year sentence imposed upon resentencing after he connnitted a new law violation during the furlough he was granted before his original ten month sentence began was not moot, even though he had been released from prison because he faced possible collateral consequences from his conviction, including possible liability for the costs of incarceration); citing, Bush v, Stare, -So. 3di, 38 Fla. Weekly D1991, 2013 WL 5224933 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. I8, 2013) (reversing in pan for reinstatement of order of probation in one of appellant's cases on appeal because of the possibility appellant would be liable forpinoarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.293, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that upon conviction, defendants are liable to the state and its local subdivisions for the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.297 (authorizing a civil action to recover the costs set forth in section 960.293); MiamI'~Dade Cniy. v. Moss, 842 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[T]he plain language of section 960.293(2)(b) states that damages are liquidated for the number of days of the convicted offender's sentence, not the number of days actually served.”). Thus, this court accepts the State’s concession of error and REVERSES and REMANDS this cause with directions to the trial court to reinstate the original 120 da entencc. (MURPHY and RODRIGUEZ-CI-IOMAT, J1. concur). '
COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Mel Tyrone Moss, 842 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Brown v. State, 128 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)