KERWIEN BAPTISTE

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

REBULL, J.

[*1] The issue presented in this case is whether a notification on a police officer's laptop from a license plate reader provides reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct an investigatory stop of the motor vehicle triggering the notification. We hold that it does, and therefore affirm the judgement appealed and the trial court's denial of Mr. Baptiste's motion to suppress.

I.

On April 14, 2019, Miami Beach police officer Sofia Darias was conducting a license plate reader¹ detail at the intersection of 7th street and Washington Avenue in the City of Miami Beach. A camera fixed at that location randomly captures images of license plates and runs the license plate numbers through a database. On that date, the camera captured an image of the license plate on the motor vehicle Mr. Baptiste was driving.

After the running the license plate number through a database, the software on Officer Darias's laptop in her police cruiser then issued an alert or notification.

[*2] Officer Darias testified that "electronically, a review of that license plate's number is made and, if it gets a hit, it tells you, "Hey, we need to address this person." The trial court, clarified, “So, you have a laptop. You're there and, all of a sudden, it alerts you to a particular car; is that it or a plate that is on car?" The witness replied, "Yes, Your Honor."

As a result, Officer Darias conducted a traffic stop of that motor vehicle. Mr. Baptiste, who was driving, was unable to produce his driver's license at Officer Darias's request. He told her that his driver's license was suspended. After confirming Mr. Baptiste's suspension in her database, Officer Darias issued him a traffic citation for driving while knowing his driver's license was suspended.

At the bench trial for this charge, Mr. Baptiste moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was illegal. The trial judge denied the motion, and ultimately found Mr. Baptiste guilty of driving while knowing his driver's license was suspended. Mr. Baptiste appeals that judgment, and raises as his sole issue on appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II.

Mr. Baptiste's argues that the evidence elicited in the trial court did not establish the content of the notification that Officer Darias received from the software. In other words, the evidence does not reflect why the license plate reader [*3] registered a hit for the license plate of the vehicle that Mr. Baptiste was driving. Did the notification, for example, reflect that the registered owner of the motor vehicle with that license plate had a suspended driver's license? Absent that information, Mr. Baptiste argues that the evidence fails to demonstrate that Officer Darias had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Baptiste.

We reject this argument for several reasons. Preliminarily, we note that in "reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, the reviewing court is to consider the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." See Sims v. State, 805 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Seen in that light, the evidence presented in this case was that the camera captured an image of the license plate on the car Mr. Baptiste was driving. The software in the system electronically reviewed the tag number in its database. That review led to a "hit," which then notified Officer Darias on her laptop, "Hey, we need to address this person." That alone provided Officer Darias with reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Mr. Baptiste's vehicle.

In State v. Laina, 175 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), a police officer ran his own check on the license plate of a vehicle he was following. The results of his search revealed that the registered owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. The Laina Court held that this information gave the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle. [*4] Police may make an investigatory stop if police have reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, based on the totality of the circumstances.... Reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch, but specific and articulable facts, together with the rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant the investigatory stop.

*** [R]eviewing courts must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing.

*** To justify temporary detention, only "founded suspicion" in the mind of the detaining officer is required. A "founded suspicion" is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer's knowledge.

State v. Laina, 175 So. 3d 897, 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

Here, Officer Darias plainly had a "founded suspicion" to stop Mr. Baptiste. This was not a mere hunch. The basis for the stop was "particularized," in that it was a hit directed to the specific license plate number on the vehicle he was driving. And it was "objective," in that it did not depend on Officer Darias's subjective interpretation of what she was seeing, but instead on the computer software database generating a "hit" that the vehicle needed to be addressed. When [*5] interpreted in the light of Officer Darias's knowledge, she had a founded suspicion to pull over Mr. Baptiste. The trial judge properly denied the motion to suppress.²

III.

Additional testimony elicited from Officer Darias at the hearing, seen in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial judge's ruling, supports the basis for the stop. At trial, the prosecutor marked as an exhibit the traffic printout, or driving history, of Mr. Baptiste from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.³ The prosecutor then asked Officer Darias some questions and the following colloquy took place:

Q So, Officer, looking at this traffic history, on the date of the incident which was April 14, 2019, was Mr. Baptiste's license suspended?

A Yes.

Q And, how do you know that?

3 "This court, too, has held that the defendant's driving record as maintained by the DMV is sufficient to prove that his license was revoked due to his habitual traffic offender designation. State v. Fields, 809 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). See also Rodgers v. State, 804 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that certified copy of computer printout of defendant's driving record maintained by DMV was sufficient to present prima facie case of driving while license revoked as habitual traffic offender, and that State was not required to prove each qualifying conviction for DWLS.)" State v. Miller, 830 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). [*6] A I received notification that it was suspended.

MR. GARDINER: Objection. Hearsay.

THE COURT: You are so soft-spoken. I can hardly hear you.

BY MS. DELLA FERA:

Q Using -- using the information – THE COURT: Just a second. I didn't hear the prior response.

MS. DELLA FERA: I'm sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: Can you repeat it, Officer. I'm sorry.

THE WITNESS: I received notification that it was suspended, Your Honor. THE COURT: What -- now, the question was what the document says.

BY MS. DELLA FERA:

Q So, using the information in front of you, how did you know that the license was suspended?

And, you can flip through the whole document.

(Trial Tr. 33-34) (emphasis added).

This testimony reflects that the notification Officer Darias received on her laptop was that the registered owner linked to the tag number captured by the license plate reader had a suspended driver's license. The exchange in the transcript makes clear that Officer Darias misunderstood the question about the driving history printout, and instead testified to the contents of the notification she [*7] received on her laptop. This of course provides an independent reasonable suspicion for the stop of Mr. Baptiste. It places this case squarely within the holding of the Laina, which also involved a record check which revealed that the registered owner's license was suspended. See also Ellis v. State, 935 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (response from computer database query that tag had "no record found" gave police officer reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for tag not assigned). The trial judge correctly denied the motion to suppress.

IV.

Lastly, to the extent that there was any error in failing to establish the content of the notification that Officer Darias received on her laptop, the defense invited that error. "The [invited error] doctrine prevents a party from inviting error, then attempting to make that error an issue on appeal. See Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 94 (Fla.1997) (the invited error doctrine prevents a party from making or inviting error in a case and then taking advantage of that error on appeal) . . . ." Mora v. State, 964 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not make or invite error at trial and then take advantage of the error on appeal. In the instant case, if any error was committed in honoring the defendant's demand for speedy trial, the defendant clearly invited the error. Therefore, the defendant cannot take advantage on appeal of the situation he created at trial.

Anderson v. State, 93 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). [*8] Here, when the State attempted to elicit testimony from Officer Darias regarding the content of the notification she received on the vehicle Mr. Baptiste was driving, the defense objected on hearsay grounds.

Q How did you first come in contact with Mr. Baptiste?

A I was conducting a license reader detail on 7th and Washington Avenue. I received a notification that – MR. GARDINER: Objection. Hearsay.

This objection was erroneous. Probable cause may be based entirely on hearsay. "Unlike the burdens of proof in a criminal trial, the obligation to establish probable cause in an affidavit may be met by hearsay, by fleeting observations, or by tips received from unnamed reliable informants . . . ." Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1995). If probably cause may be based on hearsay, then certainly reasonable suspicion can too.

"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). As a result, Officer Darias should have been permitted to testify freely without objection regarding the content of the notification she received on [*9] her laptop from the license plate reader and the hit in the database. Counsel cannot object to that information coming into evidence, and then argue on appeal that it was error to fail to determine the content of the notification to which he objected.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the lower court's denial of the motion to suppress, and the judgment and sentence on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

TRAWICK AND WALSH, JJ., concur.