VICTORIA SZURANT
v.
JOSEF AARONSON, JAMES P. KNOX, ESQ.
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Victoria D. Szurant appeals a charging lien judgment imposed in favor of her former attorney, James P. Knox, for fees and costs in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The court held that while a charging lien is proper in dissolution actions, the judgment was overly broad because it extended beyond the proceeds recovered through the attorney's efforts.
A charging lien in a dissolution action must be limited to property recovered by the client as a result of the attorney's efforts in that specific action and cannot attach to all of the client's money and personal property. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for entry of an amended judgment striking the overly broad language.
[1] A charging lien in a dissolution action attaches only to property recovered by the client through the attorney's efforts in that specific action and cannot extend to the…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By definition, an attorney's charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court.”
Court explaining the fundamental limitation on charging liens, citing Rudd v. Rudd, 960 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
Ms. Szurant was represented by attorney James P. Knox in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Knox's firm sought to impose a charging lien for attorn…
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BADALAMENTI, Judge.
Victoria D. Szurant, appearing pro se, appeals a judgment imposing a charging lien in favor of her former counsel, James P. Knox, for attorney's fees and costs incurred during his representation of her in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
Because the scope of the charging lien judgment extends beyond the proceeds recovered by Ms. Szurant through the attorney's efforts in the dissolution proceeding, we reverse the judgment in part.
"[A] 'charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It serves to protect the rights of the attorney.' " Riveiro v. J. Cheney Mason, P.A., 82 So. 3d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983)). "A charging lien may issue in a dissolution action and attach to the proceeds that are awarded to the client as part of the equitable distribution of property." Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Here, the charging lien judgment states that Mr. Knox's firm, James P. Knox, PLLC, is entitled to the equitable distribution of funds Ms. Szurant has received from the marital dissolution action and "all of her money and/or personal property in her possession." A charging lien judgment in a dissolution action, however, is limited only to property recovered by the client in the dissolution action as a result of the attorney's efforts. See Rudd v. Rudd, 960 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("By definition, an attorney's charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court." (quoting Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998))); Yavitz v. Martinez, Charlip, Delgado & Befeler, 568 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (explaining that when a charging lien is imposed, it is against the judgment proceeds and not against the wife's personal assets).
The wording of the charging lien judgment here is overly broad because it does not limit the charging lien to the proceeds recovered by Ms. Szurant as a result of Mr. Knox's efforts in the dissolution action. Therefore, we reverse the charging lien judgment, in part, and remand with directions that the trial court enter an amended judgment striking the language that the charging lien be placed on "all of her money and/or personal property in her possession." See Mitchell, 868 So. 2d at 642 (affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but reversing "the charging lien judgment, in part, because it is overly broad" and "remand[ing] this matter for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the charging lien attaches to and is enforceable against those proceeds of the dissolution action that [the client] recovered through [the attorney's] efforts"). We affirm the charging lien judgment in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
MORRIS and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Sinclair v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983)
- Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Rudd v. Rudd, 960 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Franz Edward Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Yavitz v. Martinez, 568 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Kirsten L. Riveiro v. J. Cheney Mason, P.A., 82 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)